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Afghanistan is a conservative country with deeply entrenched traditional values. It is also a 
country facing numerous challenges. In the 1990s, Afghanistan suffered from a disastrous 
civil war. Before that, it was the site of a proxy war between the West and the Soviet Union, 
resulting in the invasion of Afghanistan. As a result of numerous and ongoing conflicts, its 
citizens hardly have had access to health facilities, education, clean drinking water, food, 
shelter and employment in order to lead a dignified life. Things have begun to improve, 
nonetheless. Since 2001, the international community has poured a large amount of 
development funding into Afghanistan. One programme that has received significant 
international assistance is the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) which provides basic 
rights to 85 percent of communities in rural Afghanistan.  
This thesis considers the human rights-based approach (HRBA) to development, with a focus 
on the NSP. In particular, this thesis asks whether implementation of the NSP is consistent 
with the five core principles of HRBA. These principles are: recognition of rights, 
participation, empowerment, non-discrimination, and accountability and transparency. The 
thesis considers whether, and to what extent, the Afghan government has been able to 
embrace the HRBA while implementing the NSP. I attempt to answer this question by 
drawing on the relevant literature on the NSP and interviewing different individuals who 
have been involved with the design and implementation of the Programme. 
While the field work indicates that the extent of application of each principle of the HRBA 
varies, the study concludes that the NSP observes the hallmarks of the HRBA bar the 
recognition of rights as a legal obligation, and the extent of participation from women and 
persons with disabilities. These, the study argues, are largely related to the challenges of 
implementing a human rights-based approach to development in a post-conflict country like 













On the ground, access to education, health facilities, water, food, shelter and employment is 
usually taken for granted in affluent countries. In developing countries, the story is the total 
opposite where access to basic rights is a constant daily struggle. Guaranteeing basic rights 
is a distant reality and an idea only on paper for millions.    
This is the case in Afghanistan – a country that has also been affected by decades of war and 
civil strife. Millions of people have not had access to basic rights for many years. While 
conditions have begun to improve for a large number of Afghans, daily life remains a 
constant struggle. The improvement is also seen as temporary because funding basic rights 
is on the shoulders of the international community. There are no credible indications the 
Afghan government will be able to take some financial responsibilities to fund such rights.  
Purpose of the research 
The purpose of the research is to consider whether the flagship National Solidarity 
Programme (NSP) in Afghanistan observes a human rights-based approach to development. 
The thesis aims to achieve the following:  
a. Explain the currently accepted framework for human rights and development, 
starting from the United Nations’ Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Declaration on the 
Right to Development, the Millennium Development Goals and the new Sustainable 
Development Goals. 
b. Set out the generally accepted principles of the human rights-based approach to 
development. 
c. Capture the human rights framework in Afghanistan, including Afghanistan’s 
incorporation of the relevant Covenants and creation of relevant policies and national 
programmes. 
d. Assess the application on the ground of the principles of the human rights-based 
approach to development in the National Solidarity Programme in Afghanistan. 
Methodology 
At its core, this thesis is a socio-legal study intended to study the human rights-based 
approach (HRBA) to development in Afghanistan as practiced on the ground under the NSP. 
More specifically, this thesis studies “the implications of the law”,  using interviews1 and 
focus groups that have either been affected or have been at the forefront of policy, design, 
operations, implementation and oversight of the NSP.2   Drawing on the insights of these 
                                                          
1 A list of base questions which formed the basis of the semi structured/unstructured interviews is listed in Annex Two. 
2 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui Research Method for Law (1st edition, eBook, 2007). 
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actors and project participants of the NSP, this thesis aims to see how the law and policies 
are working on the ground and ascertain their implications for rural communities in 
Afghanistan.  
This thesis uses a combination of sources including desk research and field work. The desk 
research involved review of documents from the United Nations, the World Bank, literature, 
journals and international reports to capture the framework for human rights and 
development. A significant amount of information was also obtained through interviews to 
ascertain the situation on the ground.  
I have been working in Afghanistan since June 2013. This has enabled me to carry out the 
fieldwork in Afghanistan, from April 2015 to December 2015, in line with approval from 
the University of Canterbury’s Human Ethics Committee.3 The focus of the fieldwork was 
on three different groups: government staff and advisors of the National Solidarity 
Programme (NSP); staff working with the Facilitating Partners (FPs) of the NSP; and elected 
and ordinary members of the Community Development Councils (CDCs). While the NSP 
staff gave consent to mention their names, the details for FPs’ staff and community members 
remain confidential. Instead, pseudonyms are used for FPs’ staff and community members.  
The fieldwork was carried out in four provinces, namely Kabul, Badakhshan, Ghor and 
Samangan. I selected these provinces primarily because it was relatively easy for me to visit 
them as they constitute Afghanaid’s working areas. Secondly, Afghanaid has been 
implementing the National Solidarity Programme in Badakhshan, Ghor and Samangan while 
it has been also involved in policy level discussions in Kabul. In addition, I interviewed staff 
from NGOs and one United Nations Agency, who work across 15 provinces including 
Badakhshan, Balkh, Bamyan, Farah, Faryab, Ghor, Hirat, Kabul, Kandahar, Kapisa, 
Nangarhar, Panjshir, Parwan, Samangan and Wardak.4 In total, I was able to carry out 20 
interviews - 12 in the provinces and eight in Kabul.5 Security was a major challenge during 
my interviews with project participants. As a result, I only managed to personally visit two 
communities where I conducted two focus group discussions (FGDs). Members of one other 
CDC visited the Provincial Centre for Badakhshan where I conducted the third FGD. Given 
the security limitations, the Provincial Programme Manager for the province of Ghor 
facilitated two FGDs with the CDCs on my behalf. In total, five FGDs were held with 
community members. The fieldwork resulted in almost 400 minutes of recorded interviews 
which I have also transcribed. Informed consent was received prior to conducting each 
interview.  
In order to examine the application of the human rights-based approach to development in 
the National Solidarity Programme, I have used a qualitative method, namely purposive 
                                                          
3 University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee (Ref:  HEC 2015/17, 23 March 2015). Annex One. The Amended approval is also available 
as part of Annex One. 
4 A map of these provinces is found as Annex Four. 
5 The full list of interviewees is found as Annex Three. 
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sampling which “groups participants according to their knowledge and role to a particular 
research question”.6 My sample size is small because my research is concerned with “depth 
and not breadth”.7 
While both quantitative and qualitative research methods can adopt an empirical approach,8 
qualitative method is often of a non-numerical nature.9 Observations and factual 
representations happening on the ground make research empirical.10 In addition, facts and 
observations that are relevant to the affected population are considered as data and wherever 
research involves data that has been observed, it is empirical data.11 Therefore, qualitative 
research has the ability to provide “complex textual descriptions of how people experience 
a given issue” because the participants are in the environment which is being studied.12   
My research involved structured and semi-structured interviews and Focus Group 
Discussions (FGDs) with key participants. I have used both the interviews and the FGDs to 
help understand how interviewees perceive the implementation of the National Solidarity 
Programme (NSP) on the ground in Afghanistan. I used open-ended questions about the core 
elements of the human rights-based approach (HRBA) and the extent of their application 
within the NSP. The interviews allowed me to investigate key aspects of the NSP in more 
depth. I used the FGDs to provide insight into how members of the Community Development 
Councils (democratic village level councils representing the wider community members) 
perceive their roles and the projects delivered under the NSP. 
Statement of positionality 
Since June 2016, I have worked in different capacities in Afghanistan.  As a result, I have 
relied on my own observations and experiences acquired during field trips conducted as part 
of my work commitments. I have used my understanding of the NSP to put ‘better informed’ 
lead and supplementary questions to the interviewees. 
During the field work, I was the sole person for data collection although in one case due to 
security limitations, a senior field colleague conducted two focus group discussions on my 
behalf. Generally speaking, I have been both the data collector and analyser. As such, my 
knowledge and role in development work in Afghanistan may have influenced data 
                                                          
6 Kalpana V Jawale “Methods of Sampling Design in the Legal Research: Advantages and Disadvantages” (2012) 2 (4) International 
Interdisciplinary Research Journal 183 at 188. 
7 Alice Donald A Guide To Evaluating Human Rights-Based Interventions In Health And Social Care,  Human Rights and Social Justice 
(Research Institute,  London Metropolitan University, 2012)  http://www.humanrightsinhealthcare.nhs.uk/ at 28. 
8 Lee Epstein and Gary King “Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal Scholarship: The Rules of Inference” (2002) 69 (1) University of 
Chicago Law Review, 1-134 at 1. 
9 Ian Dobinson & Francis Johns “Qualitative Legal Research” in McConville & Chui (eds) Research Methods for Law  (Edinburgh University 
Press, Edinburgh, 2007)  at 17. 
10 Epsetein and King, above n 8, at 18.  
11 At 18. 
12 Natasha Mack “and others” Qualitative Research Methods: A Data Collector’s Field Guide (2011) Family Health International 
<http://www.fhi360.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/Qualitative%20Research%20Methods%20-
%20A%20Data%20Collector's%20Field%20Guide.pdf> at 1. 
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collection. In addition, the data collected is from a wide range of individuals which helps 
minimise and avoid researcher bias. On the other hand, my in-depth understanding and 
knowledge have provided me with an advantage to discuss in depth the topic from different 
angles with the interviewees.  
Structure 
The following structure represents the order of the thesis.  
In order to consider whether a human rights-based approach to development is applied in 
Afghanistan, Chapter One sets out the current framework for human rights and 
development. It starts with the United Nations Charter, Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the wider 
development framework, including the Declaration on Right to Development, the 
Millennium Declaration and the latest developments surrounding the transition from the 
Millennium Development Goals to the Sustainable Development Goals. Chapter One 
concludes by identifying the principles of human rights-based approach (HRBA) which will 
be used as a basis to assess the application of HRBA in the National Solidarity Programme.  
 
Chapter Two presents the current development context in Afghanistan, including the 
country’s human rights framework. This also covers the relevant policies and national 
programmes aimed at realising basic rights. The Chapter sets out the programmatic and 
operational requirements of the National Solidarity Programme, setting the scene for 
Chapters Three and Four. In addition, Chapter Two also briefly sets out the Citizens Charter 
which will build on the work of the National Solidarity Programme, and will be a crucial 
programme for the human rights based approach to development in the future arguably 
embraces a more consistent human rights-based approach.  
 
Chapter Three draws on data from the field, in particular with key individuals who have 
been part of design and implementation of the National Solidarity Programme. The Chapter 
uses data obtained during interviews with community participants who are at the forefront 
of implementation and helping realising rights for other community members. While the 
main focus of Chapter Three is to capture how the NSP is implemented on the ground, the 
Chapter also considers the perspectives of the interviewees against the five principles of 
human rights-based approach in an effort to find out the extent of application of human 
rights-based approach in the NSP.  
 
Chapter Four synthesises the field work with the literature both in Afghanistan and other 
similar contexts to squarely address the research question, ie is the human rights based 
approach being used in the NSP? While the NSP has made important strides in embracing 
the HRBA, the Chapter discusses a number of challenges which interfere with smooth 
implementation. They include insecurity, elite capture, politicisation of development aid, 
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coordination among different stakeholders, financial sustainability of the NSP and 
sustainability of the Community Development Councils (CDCs). Lastly, Chapter Four asks 
if each principle of the HRBA is met under the NSP, and if so, to what extent.  
 
Chapter Five presents the findings, recommendations and conclusions on the human rights 
based approach to development in Afghanistan. The Chapter identifies some of the main 
obstacles to implementation of the approach while also offering concrete and contextual 
recommendations on how the Citizens Charter, which will build on the work of National 
Solidarity Programme from 2017 onwards, can have a fully-fledged human rights based 












Human Rights and Development 
The Human Rights-Based Approach to Development 
 
This Chapter captures the framework for human rights and development. In doing so, the 
Chapter attempts to provide a chronological order of events in relation to human rights and 
development. In addition, the Chapter investigates the legal basis for economic social and 
cultural rights in order to determine state’s obligations towards realisation of these rights. 
The Chapter also discusses the core principles of human rights-based approach (HRBA) 
which will enable me to apply these principles to the programmatic requirements of the 
National Solidarity Programme (NSP) with a view to find out the application of HRBA in 
the NSP.  
 
1.1. Human Rights and Development - The Current Framework 
 
Human rights is a contested and controversial concept. While the donor community may 
have good intentions to realise human rights, projects targeting human rights have generated 
criticism and even violent protests on the ground. The general public’s first impression of 
human rights has been, albeit mistakenly, Civil and Political Rights (CPR) and not 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR). Given this limited understanding, human 
rights have become a polarising concept as people in developing countries often see CPR as 
a tool and agenda to promote Western values. The tension between the two concepts was 
often seen through the lenses of the cultural universality and relativity, often resulting in 
human rights being seen as a fluid concept. 1  Yet, human rights also offers a normative 
framework which puts people at the centre of the analysis, linking states as duty bearers and 
citizens as rights holders.2  
 
Equally, development is an elusive concept for many despite all its attractions and promises. 
The interface between human rights and development has been minimal until recently as the 
development enterprise operated independently, even in isolation from human rights3 and 
was perceived as “an instrument of solidarity.”4  
 
While there are still gaps in understanding the interrelatedness of the two concepts, both 
human rights and development are “parallel streams”, addressing not only similar values and 
                                                          
1 Florian F Hoffmann “Shooting Into The Dark - Toward A Pragmatic Theory Of Human Rights’ Activism” (2006) 41Texas International Law 
Journal 403 at 407. 
2 The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) Integrating Human Rights into Development: Donor Approaches, 
Experiences, and Challenges (2nd edition, World Bank Publications, Washington DC, 2013) at 69. 
3 Peter Uvin “From the right to development to the rights-based approach: how ‘human rights’ entered development” (2007) 17 Development in 
Practice at 597. 
4 Hans Otto Sans “Development and Human Rights: the necessary but partial integration of Human Rights and Development” (2000) Human 
Rights Quarterly 734 -752 at 736. 
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similar issues,5 but also complementing and reinforcing each other as both concepts target 
human beings.6 Yet, inequalities and extensive poverty continue to pose serious concerns 
and the relationship between human rights and development has never been more striking 
than today. When working with communities, the relationship between the two is un-
divorceable and inseparable as without development, communities will not enjoy their 
human rights and a dignified life. Major documents have stressed the relationship and 
complementarity between development, peace, security and ESCR including the United 
Nations (UN) Charter,7  which is based on four key cornerstones, namely peace, 
development, human rights and international law.8 
 
1.2. United Nations Charter 
 
Human rights, whether political, civil, economic, social or cultural rights, are captured in a 
legal framework, comprising conventions, declarations and other international documents. 
The UN Charter provides the initial starting point and a normative umbrella for human rights 
and development. When the UN Charter came into existence, there were three interrelated 
and interconnected concepts, namely human rights, development and peace that constituted 
the rationale for “we the people of the United Nations coming together”.9 While the three 
depended on each other, it was later increasingly clear that development became a key 
condition for the realisation of both human rights and peace.10  
 
The Charter’s preamble expresses the UN’s determination “to promote social progress and 
better standards".11 The Charter entails key provisions supporting the relationship between 
human rights and development. Article 55 requires the UN, amongst other things, to 
nationally promote a higher standard of living and conditions of economic and social 
progress and development.12Article 56 requires all members to pledge to take joint and 
separate action in cooperation with the organisation for the achievement of the purposes set 
forth in article 55.13 
 
Three UN documents constitute the contemporary and definitive statement of human   
rights.14 These are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International 
                                                          
5 Mary Robinson (2005) as cited in David D’Hollander, Axel Marx, and Jan Wouters Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: 
A comparative assessment of strategies and practices of donors Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (Working Paper No. 108 – June 
2013) at 6. 
6 Sans, above n 4, at 735. 
7 Clarence J Dias “The Rights Way to Development: Challenges and Opportunities” (2007) 34 Development Bulletin at 25. 
8 Clarence J Dias and Scott Leckie, Human Rights Council of Australia the Rights Way to Development: Challenges and Opportunities, 
Symposium Papers - A Human Rights Approach to Development (1997) < 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/clarence_j_dias_scott_leckie.pdf> at 3. 
9 Dias, above n 7, at 25. 
10 At 25. 
11 United Nations Charter, the Preamble. 
12 United Nations Charter, art 55. 
13 United Nations Charter, art 56. 
14 Adam McBeth, Justine Nolan and Simon Rice The International Law of Human Rights (Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 2011) at 3. 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),15 and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).16 They are also referred to as the 
‘International Bill of Rights’ and in addition to other documents, state the rights, freedoms 
and responsibilities which together comprise the framework for human rights law.17   
 
In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the UDHR. The UDHR 
sets out an internationally recognised set of standards which apply to all persons without any 
qualification, transcending national, cultural, religious and ideological considerations.18 
Since this momentous decision by the UNGA, the UDHR has served as a cornerstone to 
promote and protect human rights. Nonetheless, one question that subsequently became a 
contentious issue was the overall understanding of human rights. In other words, why ESCR 
were seen as secondary rights compared to CPR? 
 
While there may have been some contention and disagreement as to the categorisation of the 
rights or controversy around the phrase human rights, “certain non-derogable human rights 
cannot be suspended” which are “rights to life, physical security, due process and 
discrimination on the basis of race”.19 One reason for such non derogation is that violation 
of these rights is regarded “particularly evil”20 and all other rights depend on them. If human 
rights such as right to life, physical security and other civil rights are violated, it arguably 
makes other rights meaningless.21  
 
While the debate about categorisation still permeates human rights discourse today, all 
human rights are ostensibly equal.22 Moreover, human rights are “interdependent and 
indivisible” as the principle of indivisibility acknowledges that no one human right is 
inherently superior or inferior to any other.23 This interrelatedness captures well the idea that 
if one and not the other set of rights is provided, it may not make a real difference. Thus, the 
concept of indivisibility recognises the nonexistence of hierarchy which is consistent with 
the concept that human rights are to be treated “fairly, in an equal manner and with the same 
emphasis”.24 
 
                                                          
15 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar 23 1976, 999 UN TS 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also GA Res. 2200, UN GAOR, 
21st Sess (1966). 
16 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICESCR) Mar 23, 1976, 999 UNTS 171 [hereinafter ICESCR]; see also GA- Res A/6316 
(1966).  
17 At 3.  
18 Australian Development Studies Network, Development Bulletin (1995) Editors’ Note at 3. 
19 ICCPR (1966) art 6 on life, art 7 on torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, art 8 on slavery, art 18, freedom of though 
and religion; Tom Farer "The Hierarchy of Human Rights" (1992) 8 American University International Law Review 115-119 at 115.  
20 At 115. 
21 Farer, above n 19, at 116; Walter J Landry “The Ideals and Potential of the American Convention on Human Rights” (1975) 4 Human Rights 
395 at 410. 
22 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Frequently Asked Questions 
On A Human Rights-Based Approach to Development Cooperation (2006) ˂www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FAQen.pdf˃ at 2 and 7.  
23 At 2. 




The UDHR itself asserted universality for all human rights, and did not make a distinction 
between CPR and ESCR. The UDHR was not a legally binding document and, therefore,25 
the ICCPR and ICESCR were adopted to translate the rights in the UDHR into specific treaty 
obligations.26 Given the ideological differences between the West and Soviet blocs, 
establishing two covenants was an effective way, at the time, to actively engage both power 
blocs in the UN human rights regime.27 As a result, the two classifications of rights became 
part of the human rights discourse.28 
 
The reality on the ground has remained different as greater emphasis has been awarded to 
CPR at the cost of ESCR.29 For instance, we frequently hear how violators of CPR are 
condemned, if not punished, but little is heard about the millions who continue not to have 
access to food, water, education, hospitals and jobs – all essential for a dignified life. 
Although the two Covenants are key milestones, this paper focuses on ESCR because the 
ICESCR has provided important groundwork for the human rights-based approach (HRBA) 
in development discourse. Nonetheless, for ease and flow of discussion, I briefly refer to the 
debate between CPR and ESCR where arguably ESCR had a second class status, before 
focusing on ESCR. 
 
1.3. Civil and Political Rights vis-à-vis Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 
The categorisation of rights reflected the political climate of the time, influenced strongly by 
Cold War politics.30 In light of the ideological differences between the Warsaw and NATO 
blocs, the Western countries advocated for CPR, with an emphasis on freedom and 
democracy. The West, in contrast, saw ESCR as a “socialist manifesto”.31  
 
CPR are mainly derived from the 17th and 18th century reformist theories which are largely 
associated with the French, American and English revolutions.32 These rights are known as 
“negative rights”33 or “first generation rights”34 because they were seen as “demanding 
freedom” from the State. At the time, they were also seen as “justiciable and readily 
enforceable”.35 While the Western bloc supported CPR, the Communist bloc challenged 
CPR, arguing CPR did not assure “substantive commitment to material equality”.36 
                                                          
25 Philip Harvey “Human Rights and Economic Policy Discourse: Taking Economic and Social Rights Seriously”  
(2001-2003) 33 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 363-471 at 377. 
26 At 377. 
27 Jim Ife Human Rights from Below, Achieving rights through community development (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009) at 113. 
28 At 113. 
29 Manisuli Ssenyonjo Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (Hart Publishing, Portland, 2009) at 4. 
30 Ife, above n 27, at 113. 
31 Paula Dobriansky U.S. Human Rights Policy: An Overview, U.S. Dep't Of State, Current Pol'y No 1091, at 2-3 (1988); Barbara Stark, 
“Economic Rights in the United States and International Human Rights Law ; towards an entirely new strategy” (1992-1993) 44 Hastings Law    
Journal 79 at 81. 
32 Ssenyonjo, above n 29, at 10. 
33 At 9. 
34 Rebecca Wallace International Law (5th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2005) at 225, ac cited in Ssenyonjo above n 29, at 9. 
35 Ssenyonjo, above n 29, at 10. 
36 Dianne Otto “Rethinking The ‘Universality’ Of Human Rights Law” (1997) 29 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 1 at 5. 
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Advocates of CPR claimed that individuals cannot live without CPR such as freedom from 
arbitrary deprivation of life, the right to life, freedom of speech, assembly and movement.37 
The proponents of CPR further claimed that “poor people [sic] themselves choose CPR over 
ESCR by relinquishing basic needs to pursue a cause.38 Proponents of CPR have made a 
“politically charged claim” that ESCR flow from an environment where we have CPR and, 
therefore, it is only normal to prioritise CPR over ESCR.39 
 
Initially, the position of the United States, which was leading the Western bloc, was hopeful 
on ESCR. President Roosevelt had argued in his State of the Union address that true 
individual freedom could not exist without economic security and independence.40 He went 
on to claim that “people who are hungry and out of jobs, are the stuff of which dictatorships 
are made”.41 In his now famous speech of “the four freedoms”, President Roosevelt talked 
about the freedom from want - a life with the basic needs met.42  
 
Despite not having ratified the ICESCR, the US position has, nonetheless, incrementally 
relaxed over the last two to three decades. The US has gradually accepted and recognised 
ESCR. For instance, in the Vienna Declaration, the US recognised the promotion of ESCR 
and CPR of paramount importance for human dignity and for legitimate aspirations of human 
beings.43 The relaxation of the position can be seen in numerous statements but in principle, 
the US has also emphasised two points. First, “development can be set as goals and not 
guarantees”44 and secondly, democratic institutions should promote both CPR and ESCR.45  
 
On the other hand, the Communist bloc was advocating for ESCR and equal rights for all. 
ESCR are rights such as the right to education, health, water, shelter and employment.46 
These are core rights which are necessary for a dignified life to meet basic human needs.47 
These rights are known as “second generation rights”48 or “positive rights”49 which demand 
                                                          
37 Landry, above n 21, as cited in Dorothea Anthony ‘Indivisibility of Human Rights: A Theoretical Critique 
(2010)˂https://www.uts.edu.au/sites/default/files/law-form-dorothea-anthony.pdf˃ at 27. 
38 Penny Overby “The Right to Food” (1990) 54 Saskatchewan Law Review 19, 29, as cited in Anthony above n 50, at 27. 
39 M Rodwan Abouharb, and David Cingranelli Human Rights and Structural Adjustment (2007) 68, as cited in Anthony above n 37, at 27; Farer, 
above n 19, at 116; Landry above n 21, at 410. 
40 90 CONG REc 55-57 (1944) as cited in Padideh Ala'i, A Human Rights Critique of the WTO: Some Preliminary Observations (2001) 33 
George Washington International Law Review 537 at 545. 
41 At 545. 
42 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Frequently Asked Questions on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Fact Sheet No 33 (2008)  ˂www.refworld.org/docid/499176e62.html˃ at 8. 
43 Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe: Concluding Document from the Vienna Meeting, Nov 4, 1986 -Jan 17, 1989, 28 ILM. 
527, 534 114 (1989) as cited in Ala'i, above n 40, at 548. 
44 Comments submitted by the United States of America, Report of the Open Ended Working Group on the Right to Development, UN ESCOR, 
Commission on Human Rights, 57th Session UN Doc E/CN4/2001/26 (2001) at [8].  
45 Ala'i, above n 40, at 549. 
46 These five basic rights have been captured in articles 13, 12, 11, 9, 6 and 15 of the ICESCR. 
47 Amnesty International, Economic, Social And Cultural Rights: Questions and Answers (1998) Adapted from Human Rights Education: The 
Fourth R, 9:1. For more details, please see ˂ http://www.pdhre.org/˃. 
48 Wallace, above n 34, at 225. 
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state intervention to provide basic rights such as education, health, infrastructure and social 
security, among others. 
 
Opponents of ESCR have termed provision of ESCR as “state interventionism” and where a 
state attempts to provide ESCR, it would be seen as infringing upon individual liberty.50 On 
the other hand, proponents of the ESCR have argued that the provision of these rights are 
key for the fulfillment of the basic needs of individuals. Its proponents have advanced a 
number of arguments, including the “full belly” theory, stating that prioritising CPR is like 
“throwing a rope of sand to a drowning man”.51 Proponents of ESCR also contend that lack 
of provision of ESCR not only contributes to but also strengthens the existing inequalities, 
especially vis-à-vis women - a situation that “many rights advocate have no answer for and 
will not be resolved overnight”.52  
 
1.4. Are human rights really universal?  
 
While the adoption of the UDHR purported to give human rights universality,53 there have 
always been ideological differences on the validity and applicability of human rights both 
inside and outside the West.54 Increasingly, it was clear that the UN Charter and the UDHR 
were based on Western political ideologies which provided a Western notion of human 
rights, perceivably applicable to non-Westerners.55 Such a difference of opinion dates back 
to the original interpretation of human rights from a liberal understanding which interpreted 
human rights as CPR.56 At the time of the formulation of the UDHR, there were concerns 
that “ideas about rights and wrongs and good and evil that exist in one society are 
incompatible with the ideas of rights and wrongs and good and evil in many other 
societies”.57  At the time of voting, for instance, Saudi Arabia abstained from the vote on the 
UDHR on the grounds that the UDHR was inconsistent with Islamic law and that it did not 
factor into the cultural and religious context of non-Western countries.58 In addition, some 
also asked if a right must be “feasible at all times, or in every country” for it to be binding.59  
 
                                                          
50 Frank B Cross “The Error of Positive Rights” (2001) 48 UCLA Law Review at 857 as cited in Anthony above n 50, at 27. 
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52 OHCHR, above n 42, at 5. 
53 Jack Donnelly “The Relative Universality of Human Rights” (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 281 at 289. 
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55 Pollis and Schwab, above n 54, at 1. 
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57 The Executive Board: American Anthropological Association “Statement on Human Rights” (1947) 49 American Anthropological 539 at 542. 
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Proponents of universality, on the other hand, have claimed that “all societies cross-
culturally and historically manifest conceptions of human rights”,60 that all societies have 
human rights and use the same vocabulary61 and that “human rights are not a Western 
ideology”.62 The first person credited with developing a comprehensive theory of human 
rights was John Locke who stated that “people form societies, and societies establish 
governments to promise the enjoyment of “natural rights”.63 Locke defined government as a 
social contract between rulers and the ruled where people swear allegiance to the government 
which should protect their human rights.64 Locke also argued that “natural or human rights 
are possessed by all persons” by virtue of being rational persons.65 Thus, Universalists 
contend that rights envisaged under the UDHR and the two Covenants are universally 
valid.66 They have also argued that universality is an essential and distinctive aspect of 
human rights and, by definition, human rights apply to all human beings, without any 
distinction, and are, therefore, universal.67  
 
On the other hand, from a relativist perspective, human rights is arguably a concept of 
modern Western civilisation,68 where “individual wellbeing is prioritised over the greater 
good of the community”.69 As such, it is not necessarily congruent with non-Western values 
and culture.70 Relativists have also questioned the validity of human rights for all cultures, 
arguing that if human rights are Western, they cannot also be universal.71 Similarly, the 
universality of human rights is questioned on the account of autonomy, noting not all rights 
are universally applied.72 Of course, human rights are but one type of rights, namely the 
rights one holds by virtue of being a person. Thus, not all rights held by human beings are 
human rights or universal. Legal, contractual, promissory, and constitutional rights are held 
by human beings without their being necessarily human rights.73 
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According to Hans Morgenthau’s realist perspective, “universal moral principles cannot be 
applied in abstract universal formulation” and “must be filtered through the concrete 
circumstances of time and place”.74 Relativist thinkers argue, therefore, that there are no 
absolute or permanent truths for a given culture against which that culture can be judged.75 
As a result, there is “no universal nature to human rights” in the absence of philosophical 
foundation for human rights.76 Universal values have also been dismissed as “mere pretense” 
in international politics for the pursuit of national policies.77 As such, human rights should 
be understood in view of their function in contemporary international politics.78 Rorty has 
tried to unite the position between Relativists and Universalists by arguing that while the 
Western culture may be superior to other cultures, the superiority does not mean these values 
should have universal application.79 Rorty contends that a shared human attribute is 
rationality, a term that may be ambiguous, in itself.80 Perhaps, the question that could be 
asked is ‘what all human beings have in common’.81 The response could be simple that we 
are all like each other.82 
 
Despite the ongoing debates between Universalists and Relativists, the fact remains that the 
core international human rights treaties have now been widely ratified. For example, ICCPR 
has 168 ratifications and ICESCR has 164 ratifications.83 States have, therefore, committed 
themselves to universal standards although, as noted by Abdullahi An-Na'im, the key issue 
in today’s world is how to translate those universal standards into meaningful local 
contexts.84 Abdullahi An-Na'im has argued that universal values cannot exist in abstract 
terms. For such values to exist, they have to be constructed through debate and action on the 
ground.85 
 
1.5. The concept of progressive realisation and states’ obligations 
 
States’ responsiveness vis-à-vis ESCR may differ from state to state, depending on the state’s 
resources. The ICESCR requires states “to take steps to the maximum of their available 
resources to achieve progressively the full realisation of ESCR”.86 The reference to “resource 
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availability” recognises the fact that realising these rights can be challenged by lack of funds 
and resources.87  
 
The concept of ‘progressive realisation’ in the Covenant has been often mistakenly 
understood to imply that ESCR can wait until a country develops economically and has 
sufficient resources.88 This, in fact, was neither the intention nor the aim behind this 
provision. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights requires states to move 
quickly to realise the ESCR.89 The Committee also requires states to use resources 
effectively, equitably and immediately.90 The concept, however, does not mean states should 
wait until it has all the resources to provide ESCR to all. Rather, states should progressively 
and incrementally address the realisation of ESCR to the most marginalised and vulnerable 
groups.  
 
Under the concept of progressive realisation, there are obligations of result and obligations 
of conduct. The obligation of conduct requires a state to undertake specific steps, either 
active or passive.91 This means enacting laws or putting policies in place. The obligation of 
result, on the other hand, mandates states to ensure rights are realised and the desired results 
are produced.92 In other words, states are expected to design, finance and implement 
programmes to “provide immediately the core minimum level of rights” to the most 
marginalised persons.93  
 
While both the obligations of result and conduct provide “an effective tool for monitoring 
and evaluating of the implementation” of the ESCR,94 the division may not be as clear cut 
and the distinction between the two may be blurred.95 At times, even these obligations may 
overlap and it may be impossible to differentiate between the two.96 Having said this, the 
ICESCR enshrines in article 2(1) a progressive realisation of the ESCR, which has been 
interpreted that “the Covenant imposes an obligation of result”.97 Steps towards achieving 
ESCR are expected to be taken within a reasonably short time98 and where a state fails to 
take steps, this could amount to a violation of the Covenant.99 
                                                          
87 Ssenyonjo, above n 29, at 10; ICESCR, art 2 (1). 
88 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Handbook for 
National Human Rights Institutions, Professional Training Series Number 12 (2006, New York) 
˂http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training12en.pdf˃ at 10. 
89 General Comment No 3 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the nature of 
States parties' obligations at [9] as cited in OHCHR), above n 88, at 10. 
90 At 10. 
91 University of Minnesota, Human Rights Centre, Circle of Rights, Economic Social and Cultural Rights Activism: A Training Resource 
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/IHRIP/circle/toc.htm>; Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona The Nature of the Obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2003, Hart/Intersentia, Antwerp) at 185. 
92 OHCHR, above n 88, at 61;  Sepúlveda Carmona, above n 91, at 185. 
93 OHCHR, above n 88, at 61. 
94 University of Minnesota, above n 91. 
95  Sepúlveda Carmona, above n 91, at 191. 
96 At 192. 
97 At 191. 
98 OHCHR, above n 88 at 10. 




However, disagreement continues as to whether states are legally bound to financially 
provide for the ESCR. Neither the drafting history nor state practice can provide a definitive 
answer.100 Although there was consensus that international cooperation and assistance was 
important for the realisation of ESCR, there was disagreement on the notion and scope of 
extraterritorial obligations.101 There is also no case law on the ESCR while the ICESCR also 
lacks provisions governing territorial scope.102 That is why the drafters avoided the usage of 
the word “guarantee” and instead used “take steps for”103 because such a commitment would 
be seen as too onerous.104  
 
During the negotiations for the Optional Protocol, some industrialised countries accepted 
moral responsibility but also argued that the ICESCR does not “impose legally binding 
obligations” when it comes to ESCR.105 This is understandable because such a duty implies 
that rich states have an obligation to address ESCR in poorer countries.106 In the case of 
Afghanistan, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapters Two and Four, the whole of the 
development budget including financing the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) is on the 
shoulders of the rich nations.  
 
While the disagreements may be on the scope of the duty, there is broad consensus that the 
ICESCR imposes some extraterritorial obligations towards ESCR.107 Similarly, the UNGA 
does illustrate that the right to food requires national and international cooperation to fulfill 
such a right for all.108  The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which is strong 
expression of support from the international community, strengthen the political 
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1.6. Resurgence in economic, social and cultural rights? 
 
At the UN level, there is increasing recognition that ESCR are the birthright of every 
individual,110 necessary for development of human beings.  This increased recognition has 
only been witnessed since the 1990s111 as more studies also indicate that ESCR have already 
brought substantial benefits to poor people and are “likely to continue enriching the lives of 
millions”.112 There is also increasing consensus that lack of provision of such rights 
continues to have dire consequences on our freedoms and capabilities. Senior UN officials 
have admitted that poverty and exclusion have contributed to the security threats we face 
today across borders, which in turn undermine promoting and protecting human rights.113 
Therefore, it is only timely to ensure the increased recognition is translated into meaningful 
local contexts.114  
 
A number of national constitutions including those of Finland, Portugal and South Africa 
explicitly recognise ESCR. In addition, both the French Constitution of the Fifth Republic 
(1958) and the Swiss Constitution contain provisions on the justiciability of ESCR.115 The 
Afghan Constitution also makes express reference to economic and social rights by affirming 
to “accelerate and improve economic, social and cultural matters and foster people’s 
participation in development”.116 Chapters Three and Four will test the Afghanistan 
government’s position if the National Solidarity Programme has ensured inclusive 
participation in development.  
1.7. The Declaration on the Right to Development (1986) 
 
In 1986, the UNGA recognised and established development as a right, putting people for 
the first time at the heart of the development process.117 The Declaration on the Right to 
Development (R2D) started a more visible resurgence of ESCR, aiming to find a middle 
ground between the ideological positions of the Western and Communist blocs. Given the 
widespread poverty and disparities, the R2D provided states with an initiative to address the 
inequalities between the South and the North, stressing all states to create an environment 
that is realistic for the realisation of the R2D.118  
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The Declaration proclaimed the right to development as an inalienable right, stating that each 
person is “entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and 
political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully 
realised.”119 The Declaration on the R2D confirmed that all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms are indivisible and urgent consideration should be given to the implementation, 
promotion and protection of CPR and ESCR.120 The R2D framework has also recognised 
the inclusive and participatory nature of development by placing special emphasis on 
meaningful and inclusive participation which requires integrating human rights into 
development theory to tackle and alleviate poverty.121 In Chapters Three and Four, I intend 
to find out if the National Solidarity Programme, the Afghan government’s flagship 
development programme, has been able to integrate human rights principles in its design.  
The R2D has been seen as a key milestone by “third world states” as it aims to introduce a 
package of reforms intended to have a new economic order which is fairer to less fortunate 
states.122 Although it is a non-binding UNGA resolution, it has emphasised the global 
dimension and the inequalities between the South and the North, advocating to create a just 
and equitable international environment for the realisation of the right to development.123 
Arguably, the Declaration is a bold attempt to gradually contribute towards equitable 
development.  
 
Even though the approval of the Declaration on R2D was a major step, the Declaration was 
not reached by consensus,124 illustrating the continued divide among the UN member states. 
For example, eight industrial countries, including the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan 
abstained from voting while the United States was the single country voting against the 
Declaration.125 In total, there were 146 votes in support of the Declaration, including 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand and Norway. 126 
Although the Declaration was adopted in a plenary meeting, there are no records of 
Afghanistan’s position.  
 
The R2D has placed the onus on states to “create conditions favourable to the development 
of peoples and individuals” as their primary responsibility.127 To that effect, the R2D 
affirmed that states are responsible to formulate appropriate national development strategies 
and policies. Afghanistan was quick to develop and finalise its National Development 
                                                          
119 At 8.  
120 At 8.  
121 United Nations The Right to Development at a glance <www.un.org/en/events/righttodevelopment/pdf/rtd_at_a_glance.pdf> at 2. 
122 Nyamu-Musembi and Cornwall, above n 118, at 8. 
123 Declaration on the Right to Development, above n 117.  
124 Felix Kirchmeier The right to development, where do we stand?’ Dialogue on Globalisation (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Occasional Paper No 2, 
2006) at 9. 
125 Brownlie (1989) as cited in Nyamu-Musembi and Cornwall, above n 118, at 8. 
126 Brownlie (1989) as cited in Nyamu-Musembi and Cornwall, above n 118, at 8. 
127 Declaration on Right to Development, above n 117. 
28 
 
Strategy although it has only invoked the language of “right to development” in 2016.128 The 
R2D aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population, on the 
basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development.129  
While the right to development was already recognised by the 1982 African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights, it has, since then, been recognised in many jurisdictions. The 
Arab League, for example, recognises the right to development as “a fundamental human 
right” requiring all states to formulate policies and to take measures to guarantee the R2D.130 
Under the Arab Charter, every citizen has the right to the realisation and enjoyment of these 
rights.131 More recently, it has been reaffirmed in the Millennium Declaration as well as the 
World Summit Outcome Document – both discussed below.  
1.8. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993) 
 
The 1990s saw increased momentum on the right to development as the principle of 
indivisible, interdependent and non-hierarchical nature of rights became the norm.132 The re-
energised drive started with the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna – where the 
indivisibility of human rights and the right to development were again endorsed 
unanimously. The Vienna Declaration also represented a major shift as it was endorsed by 
the US,133 further highlighting the resurgence of the ESCR. 
 
The World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna was a watershed event in the context of 
ESCR, affirming that “all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and 
interrelated” and that “the international community must treat human rights globally in a fair 
and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis”.134 As a result, the legal 
content of internationally recognised ESCR has been clarified,135 putting “the universal 
nature of all human rights and fundamental freedoms beyond question”.136 The Conference 
Report is seen as “the most comprehensive human rights document in the history of the 
United Nations”, as it allowed ESCR to receive more attention, which had previously been 
given to the CPR.137 
 
The final text which was agreed by 171 states - including Afghanistan and endorsed by the 
UNGA- reaffirmed the longstanding recognition of interdependence between democracy, 
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development and human rights.138 The Vienna Declaration prepared the way for promotion 
of the right to development139 and reaffirmed it as an integral part of fundamental human 
rights”.140 While there were concerns that some states still questioned the indivisibility of all 
human rights at the expense of implementation of ESCR,141 the biggest concern had been 
how the international community would operationalise the concept of the R2D so 
communities on the ground can have access to basic rights.  
 
1.9. The Millennium Declaration 
 
In late 2000, the High Level Plenary Meeting on the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) attracted a majority of world leaders, key actors from the civil society and the 
private sector.142 The meeting continued the resurgence of ESCR by generating 
extraordinary attention and unprecedented agreement from member states on the importance 
of human rights.143 This collective pledge by the international community by way of the 
MDGs was to operationalise human rights standards in a bid to help the most marginalised 
and vulnerable populations. Perhaps, it was the first real attempt to translate states’ 
commitments to meaningful changes on the ground.  
 
The MDGs were designed to address different aspects of poverty, including hunger, disease, 
access to water and lack of education.144 The eight goals, which were time bound and 
measurable, included reduction of poverty and hunger; achieving universal primary 
education; promotion of gender equality and women empowerment; reduction of child 
mortality; improve maternal health; combating HIV, malaria and other diseases; ensuring 
environmental sustainability; and developing global partnerships.145 These goals were 
anticipated to be achieved between 2000 and 2015.  
 
The MDGs have been the subject of sharply divided opinions. Some have described them as 
the most important initiatives in the history of development while others have termed them 
as “betrayal of human rights and universal values”146 or representing a donor-led agenda 
which did not take into account local contexts.147 Despite the disagreements, there seems to 
be some consensus that the MDGs have served as a catalyst for governments and major 
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donors to increase their expenditure for the poor. As a result, the MDGs have contributed to 
help almost half a billion people who were previously living on under one dollar a day,148  
and have produced good results by galvanising support across the spectrum among  political 
leaders, civil society, donors, media and even the private sector.149 While the MDGs have 
provided a powerful fillip for the realisation of human rights,150 millions still live under 
poverty and do not have access to basic rights. In order to address these concerns, the 
dialogue on the MDGs continued, in an effort to assess and review progress.  
 
1.10. The World Outcome and Millennium Summits 
 
The World Outcome Summit in 2005 and Millennium Summit in 2010 both served as 
opportunities for comprehensive reviews of the progress of the MDGs. Lack of consistency 
among states on not having incorporated human rights principles into their development 
policies was identified as a key area. During the World Summit 2005, the significance of 
MDGs in national development policies and strategies was highlighted. Some results were 
encouraging. For instance, states that incorporated human rights into their national policies, 
they were more likely to achieve the MDGs by the 2015 deadline.151 Therefore, the World 
Outcome Summit asked all states to develop their national development strategies and 
integrate human rights principles into them152 whereas the Millennium Summit re-affirmed 
the pledge from the internationally community “not to fail the promises made in the 
Millennium Declaration for millions to have a better life”.153 The Summits were intended to 
allow world leaders to “review the progress, identify gaps, take stock and commit to concrete 
action plans”.154 While the 2010 Summit welcomed the progress that had been made, it also 
expressed concerns about uneven implementation and the shortfalls.155 It also asked for a 
more coordinated approach and called on the Secretary General of the United Nations to 
“avoid [a] fragmented approach” to the MDGs which would result in dysfunctional 
outcomes.156  
 
1.11.  How do human rights relate to the MDGs? 
 
The relationship between the MDGs and human rights starts with definitions accorded to 
human rights which include both CPR and ESCR. The MDGs attempt to address human 
rights but with a focus on the ESCR. Nonetheless, the 2003 Human Development Report 
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(HDR), which was dedicated to the MDGs, argued that the diverse human rights, including 
CPR and ESCR, are causally linked and mutually reinforcing.157 The MDGs can create 
synergies contributing to poor individuals to escape poverty by allowing individuals to enjoy 
their rights and enhance their human capabilities.158 As such, the MDGs do not mean an 
entitlement to a handout. Rather, they are claims to norms and rights, intended to 
economically empower individuals.159 
 
There are substantive and direct links between the MDGs and human rights.160 For example, 
article 25 of the UDHR protects the right to an adequate standard of living, including food. 
MDG 1 covers reduction of poverty and hunger. Similarly, MDG 2 covers universal 
provision of primary education, and so reflects the right to universal primary education in 
article 26 of the UDHR. Given these links, the Millennium Declaration directly mentions 
human rights as a requirement for realising the MDGs.161 
 
In addition to the direct linkages between human rights and MDGs, there is also an indirect 
link between the two. This is through the paradigm of human development because human 
development and human rights are linked via a “common denominator” which is human 
freedom.162 Development concerns substantive human freedoms,163 creating conditions for 
people to be able to live in dignity164 and, therefore, human rights are an extension of these 
freedoms.165 The MDGs allow opportunities and human capabilities to be enlarged, which 
in turn enhance freedom of choice. Human rights protect these freedoms and choices.166 Seen 
this way, both human rights and the MDGs mutually reinforce and supplement each other.  
 
1.12. Weaknesses of the MDGs 
 
In addition to being donor driven, the MDGs have also come under criticism for only aiming 
to halve global poverty rates by 2015. Thomas Pogge contends the MDGs lacked serious 
aspiration as they implied leaving the other 50 percent of the world population in de-
humanising poverty.167 In any case, halving the number of people who were hungry was not 
something new and only in 1996, four years earlier, the World Food Summit in Rome had 
pledged “achieving food security for all and to eradicate hunger in all countries” – with an 
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immediate view to reduce the number of undernourished to half of the present level no later 
than 2015.168  
 
In addition, MDG 1 is seen as a gross tolerance of poverty as millions are dying due to lack 
of access to food. Some have termed this situation, albeit exaggeratingly, as “the biggest 
crime committed against humanity”.169 The same criticism can be levelled at MDG 7 which 
requires states to halve the proportion of the world population who do not have access to 
sustainable drinking water. MDGs 1 and 7 are also inconsistent with the human rights 
principle of nondiscrimination as leaving out the other 50 percent effectively breaches their 
basic right to clean drinking water.  
 
Critics have also argued that the MDGs lacked consultation and that they had merely been 
put forward by diplomats.170 The suffering communities or countries were not consulted and 
did not provide input in their formulation. As a result, the MDGs adopted a “top-down and 
not a grassroots approach”.171 Despite these weaknesses, the post September 2015 
framework provides another window to continue helping people and address these 
weaknesses and perceived shortcomings.  
 
1.13. The post September 2015 framework 
 
In September 2015, the eyes and hopes of many millions were on the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) where all stakeholders and governments agreed and endorsed 
the universality, interrelatedness and indivisibility of human rights, and by extension the 
SDGs. While the priority areas for a post 2015 framework remained as food security, 
sustainable agriculture, energy, education, water and sanitation, poverty eradication and 
health,172 the UNGA agreed on 17 new SDGs, aimed at ending poverty, protecting the planet, 
and promising prosperity for all.173  
 
The MDGs were not written from a human rights perspective and this was one of the main 
criticisms levelled at the MDGs. Since then, although it had been stressed that the SDGs will 
need to take this into account so that the post 2015 framework formulates the SDGs in the 
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language of human rights,174 human rights have remained “peripheral to the SDGs”.175 The 
draft declaration for the SDGs showed an immense “disconnect between the declaratory 
parts and the SDGs”.176 Although the UN claims the SDGs cover issues related to all human 
rights,177 including ESCR and the R2D, the 17 SDGs do not explicitly mention human 
rights.178 Unfortunately, the UNGA, unlike its previous stance, took a very cautious approach 
to human rights and failed to send a strong message that human rights are essential to the 
conception and implementation of the SDGs.179  
 
In September 2015, Afghanistan also continued its transition from the MDGs to the SDGs 
by joining the rest of the international community to endorse the 15 year plan to guide the 
international community in its shared efforts to “end extreme poverty, fight inequality and 
injustice as well as protect our planet”.180 While the SDGs do offer hope and determination 
for human rights in the future, they were only endorsed in late 2015. As such, discussing 
them here is beyond the scope of this research. Nonetheless, both SDGs and MDGs were 
expected to integrate human rights in the design of programmes and planning. One way to 
do so was to ensure the indivisibility of human rights on the ground where all individuals 
have access to basic rights. Unlike the conventional needs-based approach, such an 
integration cannot be rhetorical but one that emphasises the practical aspects of integrating 
human rights into development discourse and initiatives.  
 
1.14. Introduction to integrating human rights into development discourse  
 
1.14.1. Needs-based approach vis-à-vis human rights-based approach 
 
Formerly, the most prevalent approach to addressing rights within development discourse 
was a needs-based approach. The needs-based approach defined poverty as “absence or lack 
of basic services” and remained the most favoured approach by development NGOs.181 Even 
UN agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) hardly talked 
about human rights prior to the 1990s and were subsequently not expected to do anything 
with human rights in their programmes.182 The needs-based approach focused on needs and 
ignored the structural causes of poverty. Needs were seen as an aspiration which could be 
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quite legitimate, but were not necessarily associated with an obligation on the part of 
governments to provide them.  
 
A needs-based approach is met through benevolent or charitable actions which is often 
understood as giving of assistance by richer people to those who have either less or 
nothing.183 Under the needs-based approach, the so-called beneficiary does not have any say 
in the process other than to receive charity.  It was, therefore, assumed that providing 
assistance was a charity and the aid sent from the richer North was for the poor in under-
developed and developing countries.  
 
In a needs-based approach, individuals are seen as “passive beneficiaries” who receive 
assistance whereas individuals in HRBA are active participants who are empowered through 
their rights.184 Moreover, the recognition of needs may be different from culture to culture 
and a needs-based approach may not generate an obligation but sympathy, while a rights-
based approach will imply obligations and responsibilities.185 For example, a right can be 
enforced before the government and entails an obligation on the part of the government to 
honor it. A needs-based approach creates a mentality and culture of dependency, turning the 
vulnerable communities into more vulnerable ones when the next crisis hits them.186   
 
On the other hand, HRBA takes a holistic approach by providing an enabling environment 
and promoting a strategy of empowerment and accountability.187 Empowerment is designed 
to provide people with “capabilities to change, influence and improve their own lives”.188 
For each right, there is a corresponding duty bearer who is responsible, and more 
importantly, the duty bearer can - at least theoretically - be held accountable.  
 
Although different actors may have different understandings of what HRBA is, the definition 
provided by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) may be the 
most comprehensive. According to the OHCHR, HRBA is a conceptual framework for the 
purposes of development which is normatively based on international human rights 
standards.189 The HRBA is also “operationally directed to promoting and protecting human 
rights”190 by seeking to analyse the inequalities that are at the centre of development issues 
and “redress discrimination, and unjust distribution of power and resources”.191  
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Thus, HRBA focuses on processes and impacts while a needs-based approach focuses on the 
immediate needs, inputs and immediate outcomes. As mentioned earlier, under the needs-
based approach, individuals are seen as recipients of aid and may create a culture of 
dependency among communities while HRBA involves project participants to learn how to 
analyse their own situations, attribute responsibility and work out ways to improve their 
situations.192 That is why HRBA focuses on structural issues and problems and not 
immediate causes of problems.193  
 
Given the shortcomings of the needs-based approach, one reason HRBA has attracted both 
donors and development practitioners is because it is aimed at finding more sustainable 
solutions. Such an approach requires more than benevolence and a change in language, 
attitudes and decision-making patterns; 194 it requires a paradigm shift to enable integration 
of human rights in development work.  
 
1.14.2. Different approaches to integrate human rights into development 
  
Over the last few years, different approaches have been used to integrate human rights into 
development work. Some of these approaches may be superficial while other approaches are 
intended to integrate human rights in development work in a way where programmes are 
framed using human rights language and standards.  
 
In the 1990s, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a leading proponent of integrating 
human rights in development, used three approaches, namely (1) development policy 
dialogue; (2) development projects strengthening human rights and democracy; and (3) 
integrating human rights and democracy into development.195 In 2010, the World Bank 
offered three modes of integration: (i) ‘non-explicit integration’ which acknowledges a 
substantive overlap between the areas covered by human rights and development, but does 
not embrace an explicit commitment to human rights; (ii) the ‘integration of human rights 
principles’ which entails the strategic and sectorial integration of human rights principles, 
while also applying other perspectives; and (iii) the integration of human rights 
accountability whereby legal accountability is emphasised, and programming is explicitly 
framed in human rights norms and obligations.196  
 
These approaches illustrate an evolution in donor approaches and policies towards how 
communities and participants benefit from development assistance under their portfolios. 
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These approaches also indicate that donors move away from the rhetoric of international aid 
and reach out to the most marginalised communities to find more sustainable solutions to 
their problems, in partnership with communities. These different approaches, aimed at 
integrating human rights into development, bring people to the heart of interventions where 
realisation of human rights becomes the goal of development.  
 
This research particularly focuses on the approach used by the World Bank given its leading 
role on sustainable poverty reduction. The World Bank has gone through five policy 
approaches to integrating human rights in development work. They are: (1) implicit human 
rights work; (2) human rights projects; (3) human rights dialogue; (4) human rights 
mainstreaming; and (5) human rights-based approaches.197 However, before coming to a 
detailed overview of the HRBA, some of the other approaches merit brief discussion as 
donors do not necessarily chronologically follow these approaches. 
 
1.14.2.1. Implicit human rights work 
 
Under this approach, agencies are not expected to work explicitly on human rights. Rather, 
the agencies may like to work on other matters such as projection, empowerment or such as 
governance. The content goal of the project is repackaged in human rights language.198  
Normally, this approach is used in highly hostile environments where human rights are seen 
as a western agenda and while, in essence, the work may be related to human rights, both 
the project and staff avoid using human rights language to avoid possible conflict and 
reaction. Critics have argued that the human rights language in “repackaging development” 
is harmful as it suggests human rights is a feel good term for development.199 
 
1.14.2.2. Human rights projects 
 
Under this approach, projects specifically target realisation of specific rights such as freedom 
of expression, the right to vote and creation of enterprise and economic opportunities.200 
Other times, it could be a human rights project to specifically promote women’s rights. 
Normally, these are standalone projects aimed at contributing to human rights. As such, these 
can be substantive human rights projects and may cover both awareness and economic and 
livelihood opportunities.  
 
1.14.2.3. Human rights dialogue 
 
Under this approach, foreign policy from the respective donors makes aid conditional on 
human rights issues. Under this approach, states with a history of human rights violations 
are engaged in a dialogue on human rights under the presumption that sincere dialogue will 
                                                          
197 OECD, above n 2, at 23. 
198 At 23. 
199 Uvin, 2004, at 51, as cited D’Hollander, Marx, and Wouters, above n 5, at 14.  
200 OECD, above n 2, at 24. 
37 
 
result in improvements on human rights. Aid, as such, is then provided to states that show 
willingness to engage in such dialogue. Where recipients of aid continue to be involved in 
significant violations of human rights, aid modalities and volumes may be affected.201 While 
this may be a good incentive to the government, it could also result in collective punishment 
of the ordinary population who may have no direct association with the state in violation of 
human rights.  
 
1.14.2.4. Human rights mainstreaming 
 
Under this approach, donors expect recipient countries or development NGOs to ensure 
human rights are “mainstreamed” into activities undertaken whether they relate to basic 
services or livelihoods.202 Although mainstreaming may be a buzz word, it identifies the 
immediate causes of poverty. Once such an analysis is carried out, human rights are then 
incorporated into programming. Human rights considerations are taken into account in new 
projects and different tools are developed to facilitate this process.  
 
1.14.2.5. Human rights-based approach 
 
Under this approach, human rights are seen to be serving the main purpose of development. 
It requires a new approach to development. It requires institutional change where human 
rights are integrated into the design of national policies and programmes.203 Agency 
mandates are redefined in terms of human rights, seeking a more structural, systematic and 
holistic approach to development and social change.204 This is seen as the highest level of 
integration of human rights into development.  
 
In principle, HRBA is a concept for human development that is based on international human 
rights standards and is directed to operationalise human rights in development.205 HRBA is 
increasingly seen as a critical approach to tackle existing inherent inequalities by analyzing 
these inequalities, discriminatory practices and imbalance in power relations that are often 
the main challenges to development.206 
 
Although a lack of consensus on a single approach has led to a variety of practices and 
terminologies among different actors,207 most donor projects would fit within one of the five 
approaches advanced by the World Bank. While the different terminologies and approaches 
may be nuanced, ultimately, they are united by a common purpose.208 Development is seen 
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as a human right, and human rights considerations are taken into account in development 
policies.  
 
More recently, the World Bank has used the HRBA to “enhance inclusive participation in 
development” and reduce poverty.209  Development practitioners prefer the HRBA because 
it ensures “human rights are integrated into development plans, policies and projects from 
the outset”.210 This approach, which has been referred to as the “scaffolding of development 
policy”211 seeks to ensure human rights are at the heart of policy making where people have 
the ability to participate in, influence and monitor their rights.  
 
HBRA requires institutional policy commitments, changes in how aid is provided and more 
importantly a clear articulation of human rights as an objective of development.212 In fact, 
communities and project participants are at the heart of this approach – with special focus 
on marginalised and vulnerable groups who are given a voice to participate in decision-
making processes.213 It is argued that HRBA also has advantages over other development 
approaches, including the requirement for genuine participation of the most marginalised 
and vulnerable groups.214 Therefore, this study also adopts the HRBA as a tool to assess the 
effectiveness of the NSP in Afghanistan.  
 
Since HRBA is the latest trend and given its appeal, a number of leading donor agencies and 
development actors have now also embraced the approach for their work on the ground. 
These agencies include the Swedish Development Agency (SIDA), the British Department 
for International Development (DFID), the Australian Aid Agency (Ausaid), and the New 
Zealand Aid Programme.215  Since 2003, the UN Common Understanding (UNCU) requires 
UN agencies to apply consistently HRBA to all their programmes and activities.216  While 
this is laudable, the extent of application on the ground is a different matter, and beyond the 
scope of the current study. Therefore, for the reasons stated, and increasing attention given 
to this by donors,217 this research paper adopts the World Bank approach as this is the 
dominant approach among leading donors for development aid. I, now, turn to study the 
main principles of the HRBA in more detail.  
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1.15. Core principles of the HBRA 
 
While HRBA is the preferred approach of an increasing number of donors, opinions have 
differed on what exactly constitutes HRBA. One line of thought is that HRBA is based on 
principles of participation, accountability, nondiscrimination, empowerment and linkages to 
human rights standards, which are collectively known as PANEL. PANEL is recognised as 
a significant tool218 to promote the HRBA and help organisations to “identify risks, priorities 
and opportunities in relation to specific areas of operation”.219 In contrast, the Stamford 
Common Understanding, which was approved by the UN Development Group, identifies 
extra principles such as universality and inalienability and indivisibility; inter-dependence 
and interrelatedness as core elements of HRBA.220  
 
The World Bank, which has been at the forefront of the HRBA discourse and behind many 
major development initiatives, contends that the core principles of the HRBA are -1) express 
application of human rights framework; 2) empowerment; 3) participation; 4) 
nondiscrimination and prioritisation of vulnerable groups; and 5) accountability.221  These 
core principles are derived from applicable international, regional, or domestic human rights 
instruments, 222 and are seen as interconnected and internationally recognised.223 There is 
extensive overlap between the PANEL approach and the World Bank approach and they are 
almost identical. Since the World Bank has been at the forefront of poverty reduction and 
has been the leading proponent of the HRBA, this research adopts the World Bank endorsed 
principles for HRBA. I study each principle in more detail below.  
 
1.15.1. Express application of human rights framework 
 
Under the human rights framework, all development work takes place in light of the legal 
obligations of states. This can be by way of incorporating human rights treaties into national 
legislative frameworks and devising relevant policies promoting and realising rights – 
consistent with the concept of obligation of conduct. For example, under HRBA, states are 
expected to explicitly refer to human rights obligations in their national policies and 
development strategies.224 The human rights framework requires states to progressively 
                                                          
218 Victorian Equality Opportunity and Human Rights Commission (VEOHR) From Principle To Practice: Implementing The Human Rights-
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40 
 
provide education, health, shelter and employment.225 States are then expected to deliver 
these rights as per their obligation of results.  
 
Although the legal obligations surrounding ESCR are based on international human rights 
treaties and principles contained in the UDHR, the ICESCR and other international human 
rights instruments,226 the exact nature and extent of legal framework for the HRBA is hard 
to measure. Nonetheless, states party to human rights treaties and instruments are under 
obligation to “respect, protect and fulfill human rights”.227 For instance, the legal obligation 
on what constitutes HRBA is enshrined in numerous documents, including the ICESCR, the 
Declaration on R2D and the Millennium Declaration, among others.228 Equally, the R2D 
requires states to encourage popular participation, for the full realisation of human rights in 
all spheres of development.229 The Millennium Declaration explicitly recongises the 
upholding of the UDHR.230  
 
Despite such recognition, resource allocation from states, whether poor or rich, has always 
been a challenge for the application of human rights framework. The Maastricht Principles 
on Extraterritorial Obligations of States is seen as a significant development which has 
further clarified and identified legal responsibilities of countries under the human rights 
framework – and particularly in the areas of ESCR.231 For example, under article 3 of the 
Maastricht Principles, while states are not responsible for the human rights of every person 
in the world, Principle 3 indicates that states ‘may have extraterritorial’ obligations in 




The second key element of HRBA is participation. Development and participation are 
interconnected as participation allows communities to critically engage to claim and exercise 
their rights. Most approaches insist on participation. Yet, HRBA widens the concept of 
participation and demands “active, free, inclusive and meaningful participation”.233 
Although meaningful and inclusive participation will differ from country to country - and 
even from province to province - it would require both men and women to take part in the 
design, implementation, monitoring and ownership of development activities.  
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Meaningful participation, in human rights terms, is a mechanism for ensuring that people 
have a say in the decision making process that affects their lives and that they become aware 
of their entitlements so that they can claim them.234 In particular, HRBA ensures 
participation of those who are “systemically excluded”.235 Inclusive and meaningful 
participation contributes positively to ownership and sustainability of community driven 
development processes and initiatives. Participation is also seen as a measure to ensure 
people become aware of their rights to demand social justice and change, and have control 
over their resources. 236 This allows for a structural change to move from “informing people 
of fully planned and designed projects”, towards “rights holders controlling planning, 
process”. Essentially, therefore, participation becomes a right per se that communities shall 
exercise.237   
 
In development context, where there is either insecurity or a weak state, project participants 
are less likely to have a say in their development projects affecting their lives. In the process, 
it becomes more challenging for women, marginalised people such as minorities and persons 
with disabilities as they may not be able to participate in the resource allocation or decision 
making process. As such, inclusive participation also helps mainstream gender and effect a 
behavioural change of accepting participation from both men and women.238 
 
HRBA provides a voice to project participants, such as the marginalised, persons with 
disability and women, who may not have otherwise a fair and effective opportunity to 
influence the decision making process.239 On the other hand, participation should not be just 
in name but should be meaningful and should go beyond mere consultation. Meaningful 
participation not only creates but also promotes capacity to hold governments and duty 
bearers accountable whereby public decision making becomes more transparent. 240 Thus, 
participation in HRBA is not done in a piecemeal fashion but is systematised and 
institutionalised. This way, inclusive participation becomes sustainable well after the 
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A human rights-based approach to development should enable communities and project 
participants to be independent after the intervention or programme.  Historically, the term 
empowerment has tended to emphasise power and personal relations.242 Nonetheless, in the 
development context, it implies individual self-assertion for groups and communities, 
particularly the most marginalised and women who can exercise their rights to access 
resources but can also act to change, or at least influence positively, existing power 
relationships.243 
 
In reality, empowerment is a process. It does not happen overnight or at the end of a 
particular initiative. It has different dimensions including a strong focus on building capacity 
of communities and project participants where they can begin to question the status quo and 
the rationale for existing projects and discover how power affects, both positively and 
negatively, their lives.244  In addition, more marginalised groups, such as women, minorities 
and persons with disabilities are able to express their views and find their voice in the 
decision making process. Specifically, with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, it is recognised that the issue of disability is now firmly established as a 
human rights issue. These groups should have a voice and influence the resource allocation 
process on how their needs should be prioritised. They should also be enabled to demand 
that states respect, protect and fulfill their rights and establish linkages with external 




Non-discrimination is a basic tenet which is based on fundamental principles within 
international law.246 Under this element, communities receive development assistance in a 
transparent manner and the rights are provided to all while making sure the most vulnerable 
communities are prioritised. The idea is to ensure people from different ethnicities, 
minorities and genders are not deprived from basic entitlements which may be enjoyed by 
the rest of the population within a locality.247 HRBA is consistent with the concept of 
substantive equality which ensures equality of outcomes, equal access and equal benefits for 
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men and women.248 On the other hand, under the concept of formal equality men and women 
are regarded as the same without taking into account their biological differences.249  
 
Therefore, HRBA pays special attention to disadvantaged groups, individuals in poverty, 
women and children. This makes HRBA different from the other approaches as it becomes 
inclusive and transparent where capacity of poor and excluded groups is built to enable them 
participate in the development process.250 Also, HRBA addresses the root causes of 
discrimination by integrating “an analysis of patterns of exclusion faced by poor people, 
vulnerable groups, and minorities, including indigenous population”.251 Such an analysis 
also requires looking at the implications of existing development policies and strategies on 
such groups. Importantly, such an analysis goes well beyond the normal disaggregated data 
analysis under other approaches where the focus solely remains on how many men and 
women live in a given community. Rather, an analysis of this kind does take into account all 





Accountability, which lies at the heart of HRBA, means different things to different people. 
In the development context, accountability refers to duty bearers and policy makers being 
held accountable by right holders.253 Seen in this context, duty bearers are accountable and 
answerable to communities whose lives are affected by their decisions.  
 
Realisation of human rights is compromised in the absence of accountability.254 Similarly, 
lack of accountability in development policy has often been identified at the root of failing 
development efforts.255 Often, the case may be that there is little accountability between the 
duty bearers and rights holders, which may result in international development assistance 
and investment not having the desired impact. As such, HRBA becomes a means to establish 
a “platform to demand accountability”256 and strengthen inclusion and equality. In this 
process, it is important to build the capacity of local communities to know their rights and 
roles, enabling them to ask questions and hold the duty bearers accountable.  
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Participation, which is a core element of HRBA, not only builds a community’s capacity but 
also sharpens a community’s understanding and significance of holding duty bearers 
accountable. Participation has added value to the HRBA approach as it puts increased 
emphasis on the accountability of policy makers and other actors towards citizens.257 Also, 
while the traditional human rights programmes focus on political accountability, i.e. fair and 
transparent elections or supporting local civil societies, improved accountability on the main 
outcomes of development work becomes a priority under the HBRA.258  
 
In addition, human rights frameworks help advance accountability by holding duty bearers 
to account for their actions, as marginalised communities are empowered to demand that the 
state respect, protect and fulfill their rights.259 Although this may be difficult in post-conflict 
countries, in theory, HRBA clearly articulates the responsibilities of duty bearers towards 
right holders and in the process can establish a strong accountability paradigm.260 
HRBA ensures the provision of basic rights in a transparent and fair manner. While the 
principles and core elements of HRBA are clear and powerful, concerns remain about states’ 




There are different perceptions about what exactly constitutes human rights. There are 
questions about their universality, eurocentrism, and ethnocentrism or whether they are 
grounded on rationality or natural rights. For instance, human rights are only understood, in 
some quarters, as CPR at the cost of millions not receiving ESCR. Some have even 
questioned if everyone is entitled to all these rights. Thus, human rights raise many 
questions, some controversial and others less divisive but still unanswered. Given these 
ideological differences, CPR continue to receive priority over ESCR. However, the good 
news is that while ESCR might have been subservient to CPR, the former has seen 
resurgence and increased acceptance, albeit more on paper with the UN and to a lesser degree 
on the ground. 
 
The so called resurgence of ESCR has been captured well in major reports, including R2D, 
the Vienna Programme of Action, Millennium Declaration, the two Outcome Summits and 
now the framework for the Sustainable Development Goals. According to these UN 
documents, the universal nature of all human rights and fundamental freedoms is beyond 
question. While all these offer a normative and strategic framework for human rights, the 
resurgence will be seen as toothless until there is sufficient clarity on states’ extraterritorial 
obligations vis-à-vis ESCR.  
                                                          
257 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Principles and Guidelines for a Human Rights Approach to Poverty 
Reduction Strategies (Geneva, June 2012) 
258 D’Hollander, Marx, and Wouters, above n 5, at 41. 
259 OECD, above n 2, at 34. 




The MDGs served as the first collective international response to provide basic rights to 
millions to escape endemic poverty. In doing so, the MDGs provided a substantive link to 
human rights. However, since the MDGs only targeted 50 percent of the population, the 
other 50 percent were left to the mercy of God. That is one reason why the MDGs have left 
a negative legacy by representing a gross tolerance of poverty for the remaining 50 percent. 
While lack of funding may have played a part in not covering the other 50 percent, targets 
that are not 100 percent arguably breach human rights. Instead, had MDGs have been treated 
as rights and not goals, it would have been fitting to not have set any targets in the first place. 
 
The SDGs, on the other hand, attempt to be more universal, at least in the sense they apply 
to all countries. While the SDGs do not explicitly mention human rights in its 17 goals, the 
SDGs go far beyond the MDGs by including principles surrounding ESCR and the right to 
development. These are encouraging developments. The SDGs offer hope to all those who 
do not have access to basic rights. While offering hope is good, it will not bring meaningful 
change. The SDGs will, therefore, require all states to incorporate human rights into their 
national policies and programming. SDGs will need to align with all the corresponding 
obligations under the UDHR and the two Covenants to have more sustainable and equitable 
development. Unlike the MDGs, a rights sensitive monitoring framework will be required to 
closely watch the progress on the ground.  
 
While it is easy to claim human rights should be realised, its relationship vis-à-vis 
communities must be articulated. This relationship should start when governments formulate 
their national policies by integrating human rights as an entitlement for which governments 
are primarily responsible. The government, as duty bearer, should budget for development 
initiatives. Equally, the so called beneficiaries should be treated as rights holders. There 
should be a culture of accountability and transparency so communities take inclusive 
decisions to influence their future. Community members need to know their rights and be 
enabled to raise their concerns and, where necessary, hold the duty bearers accountable. The 
answers for these points lie in the principles of HRBA. 
The HRBA provides plausible explanations to the aforementioned points by ensuring a 
holistic approach, recognising the fact to align needs of the communities with a future 
programme. At the heart of the HRBA analysis is the just and equitable distribution of power 
and resources. HRBA reaches out to the most marginalised and vulnerable populations by 
tackling the root causes of social inequalities, exclusion and poverty by allowing 
communities to be part of the design of the projects affecting their lives. HRBA gives a new 
meaning and direction to development where communities are part of the decision making 
process and development is seen as a human right. When individuals have the right to 
development, it allows them to have access to basic human rights, make their own decisions 




While a needs-based approach may be appropriate in an emergency context to cater for the 
most immediate needs, HRBA is process and impact driven. HRBA takes into account the 
shortcomings of the needs-based approach by attempting to find sustainable solutions. Such 
an approach to tackling existing inequalities requires states to fund development initiatives 
as part of their pledge to collectively work towards the realisation of human rights. In 
addition to ideological differences, scarce financial resources have proven to be a major 
obstacle, as the richer states are often the ones who finance the ESCR. Thus, it is unsurprising 
that there is continued resistance from major industrial countries to recognise ESCR as 
binding rights. The voting pattern has shown that most of the industrial countries have either 
voted against or abstained from voting when it comes to ESCR.  
Human rights is an attractive and fashionable concept. It is appealing to everyone. It is even 
appealing to those who would otherwise engage in the violation of human rights or even 
appealing to those who think ESCR are not for all. While many would like to champion the 
cause of human rights, sometimes such calls might have been by way of rhetoric. Concrete 
steps are needed to not only advocate for such rights but also work towards their 
implementation on the ground, in a fair, transparent and equitable manner.  Human rights 
need to address the widespread marginalisation and discrimination. Rights under both 
Covenants need to be realised in practice. While the West recognises CPR as genuine rights, 
it has mostly treated ESCR with scepticism. This needs to change as ESCR should have teeth 
and enjoy equal respect.  
 
Individuals have dignity and their dignity should not be put between ESCR and CPR. All 
humans should be able to have access to drinking water, food, primary education, health and 
jobs as they are also necessary for enabling individuals to exercise their freedoms. If human 
beings are given access to one and not the other, it is difficult to assume one has had a 
dignified life. After all, this is not a life of luxury but basic rights, meeting basic needs which 
have historically been ignored.  
Inequitable development is likely to be already contributing to the deteriorating security in 
numerous parts of the world, including Afghanistan. Security is a key condition for 
development but a lack of equitable development heavily contributes to insecurity and other 
grievances. Development initiatives have to be framed from a human-rights language as 
there will be no development without access to basic human rights. Where communities are 
not provided with human rights and the right to development, insecurity persists – a point 
that will be studied in more detail in Chapters Two and Three. 
It is high time not to overlook anymore the effect deprivation of ESCR has on the dignity of 
human beings. In the absence of such basic rights and inequitable development, poverty and 
exclusion will continue to contribute to the security threats we face today. In order to avoid 
further erosion into such a situation, international collaboration is required to provide the 
necessary political goodwill and financial resources towards a fairer world, where people 
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have access to the most basic rights, and hope for a dignified life. The MDGs, the 
Afghanistan National Development Strategy and, by extension, the National Solidarity 
Programme in Afghanistan, intended to precisely do the same, which will be the subject of 





Introducing Development in Afghanistan 
In this chapter, I present the current development context in Afghanistan, including the 
country’s human rights framework. I attempt to set out the programmatic and operational 
requirements of the National Solidarity Programme, setting the scene for Chapters Three and 
Four. In addition, I also briefly set out the Citizens’ Charter which is expected to build on 
the work of the National Solidarity Programme and continue to embrace a more consistent 
human rights-based approach.  
2.1.  The magnitude of deprivation in Afghanistan after 9/11 
In 2001, the magnitude of deprivation in Afghanistan was beyond imagination. The country 
had suffered from many years of civil strife and the aftermath of Soviet invasion. Beyond 
the main cities, very few had access to basic rights such as health, education, clean drinking 
water, and food. Jobs were in short supply. At the time of the Millennium Declaration, 
Afghanistan was in total isolation with the hard-line Taliban in power. The country was 
effectively under international sanctions due to the Taliban leadership hosting Osama Bin 
Laden after the attacks of 9/11 in 2001. These tragic events brought pain and suffering not 
only to victims in the US but also to ordinary Afghans who became victims of numerous 
bombings and night raids by the US forces. The 9/11 tragedies turned the international 
community’s attention to the widespread problems in Afghanistan. 
In 2004, a couple of years after the fall of the Taliban, the UN termed the statistics on poverty 
“overwhelmingly depressing”.1 Nonetheless, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
provided the country, which had no infrastructure and hardly any functioning schools or 
clinics in the rural communities, with an opportunity to “transform the blighted lives of 
Afghan children, women and men”.2 Thus, the MDGs are seen as a firm commitment of the 
international community to Afghanistan and its people to improve the depressing statistics.  
The National Solidarity Programme (NSP), discussed in greater detail below, was one of 22 
National Priority Programmes to encourage development by improving social and economic 
conditions in the country as part of Afghanistan’s National Development Strategy (ANDS). 
The ANDS serves as Afghanistan’s poverty reduction strategy which uses pillars and 
benchmarks such as “security, rule of law, human rights and economic and social 
development”.3 The ANDS is specifically intended to help Afghanistan achieve its 
benchmarks towards the MDGs.4 
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Globally, there were eight MDGs, which included: reduction of poverty and hunger; 
achieving universal education; promotion of gender equality; reduction of child mortality; 
maternal deaths; combating HIV, malaria and other diseases; ensuring environmental 
sustainability and developing global partnerships.5 Due to the worsening security situation, 
a 9th goal by way of security was also added in 2004 to address the security issues in 
Afghanistan.6 
Since Afghanistan was still suffering from internal strife and Taliban rule in 2000, the 
Government was only able to endorse the MDGs in 2004 and certain targets had to be 
modified to reflect on the ground realities.7 Therefore, Afghanistan received an “extension 
to achieve the MDGs by 2020”.8 Despite all the odds, Afghanistan has been making 
“tremendous progress and is transitioning socio-economically and politically” to build 
institutions and reform governance.9 
Under the different National Priority Programmes (NPPs), for instance, Afghanistan has 
been keeping pace in key areas and has made considerable and steady progress, particularly 
in making sure over 7 million children attend primary school. Out of these, 4.6 million have 
been boys while 2.4 million have been girls.10 Afghanistan has made substantial gains in 
relation to female representation in the legislature. Female Members of Parliament now 
make up just over 27 percent of the whole membership for the House of Representatives and 
women have 10 percent of political seats in Cabinet.11 These are significant developments 
since 2002. 
 
Different NPPs contribute towards the MDGs in Afghanistan. Some have national coverage 
and others do not. While the NPPs for the health and education sectors have extensive 
coverage, the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) has almost countrywide coverage – with 
an initial objective to have national rollout. The NSP has provided nearly all communities 
across the country with a financial entitlement. This has rendered the NSP to be at the 
forefront of development initiatives to provide rights, as part of entitlement to the rural 
communities in Afghanistan. The NSP covers all provinces, including marginalised 
communities and geographically challenging areas, except those that have been extremely 
insecure. Also, the NSP requires extensive and inclusive participation so that communities 
are empowered and sustainable solutions are found. Before discussing the NSP in more 
detail, the following paragraphs briefly introduce Afghanistan and its development context.   
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2.2.  Brief introduction to Afghanistan and its development context 
Afghanistan has an estimated population of at least 25 million, is landlocked and is situated 
at the crossroads of Central Asia.12 Its history is replete with violent conflicts, civil strife and 
wars, including the Soviet occupation, the subsequent civil war, the coming to power of the 
Taliban, the American intervention and the ongoing insurgency.13   
Although Afghanistan has immense natural resources,14 the country entirely relies on 
international aid for all its development needs as it strives to rebuild itself. This has mainly 
been done through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) which was 
established in 2002 to provide a coordinated financing mechanism for Afghanistan’s budget 
and priority national development programmes.15 The ARTF delivers important results 
within key Millennium Development Goals, including education, agriculture, rural 
development and governance and is supported by 33 donors and administered by the World 
Bank.16 
The current humanitarian situation in Afghanistan remains very fragile. For example, the 
chronic insurgency and on-going conflict have affected over 6 million Afghans where almost 
200,000 persons have been displaced.17 This represents a 64 percent increase from 2014.18  
Similarly, around 70 percent of the population lives on less than two dollars per day and 
hardly meet their basic requirements.19 Given the widespread insecurity, the government 
priortises its security needs over basic needs of its population by allocating half of its $1.8 
billion revenue to national security, leaving less funding for development projects.20 
Despite the above, Afghanistan has also made encouraging strides since the adoption of the 
MDGs. Afghanistan’s average annual Human Development Index (HDI) growth rate has 
increased to 2.46 per cent in 2000-2013 from 1.42 in 1990-2000.21 Since the implementation 
of the MDG in Afghanistan, and given the increased international attention between 2002 
and 2012, Afghanistan’s economy has also made some gains, with annual growth rates rising 
above 9 percent GDP and peaking at just over 11 percent during 2012 and 2013.22  Some of 
                                                          
12 Save the Children in Afghanistan, Fact Sheet on Afghanistan (2009) < http://www.savethechildren.org/>.  
13 United States Institute of Peace, Lessons from Afghanistan’s History for the Current Transition and Beyond (2012) 
<www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR314.pdf, accessed on 10 October 2014> at 2. 
14 The New York Times quoted senior American officials that the United States has discovered nearly $1 trillion in untapped mineral deposits 
in Afghanistan, far beyond any previously known reserves and enough to fundamentally alter the Afghan economy and perhaps the Afghan war 
itself. For more details, please see The New York Times U.S. Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan (June 2010) 
<www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14minerals.html?_r=0>. 
15 The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund; for more details, please visit <http://www.artf.af/>. 
16 The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund; for more details, please visit <http://www.artf.af/>. 
17 United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA) Humanitarian Needs Overview Humanitarian Response 
(2016) < www.humanitarianresponse.info > at 5. 
18 At 5.  
19 At 7.  
20 At 13. 
21 UNOCHA, above n 17, at 3. 
22 The World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Update April 2013, as cited by UNOCHA above n 17, at 5.  
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the growth might have been artificial, however, as the US spent billions in Afghanistan as 
part of its military spending. It has been reported, for example, around $641 billion had been 
spent between 2002 and 2013 by the US government in Afghanistan in direct military 
spending.23 Very little of this has been spent in the development sector though and “most of 
it went to erratic targets”.24 The country remains fragile due to the increasing insecurity, the 
rising insurgency and dwindling international assistance. Despite such risks and challenges, 
the National Solidarity Proramme (NSP) has been the only Programme that has realised basic 
rights to the majority of rural communities.  
2.3.  The human rights framework in Afghanistan 
The 2004 Afghan Constitution mandates the government to “observe the United Nations 
Charter, inter-state agreements, as well as international treaties that Afghanistan has joined, 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”25 Afghanistan has ratified the ICCPR, 
ICESCR, the Convention of the rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with disabilities (CRPD).26 The Afghan Constitution guarantees individual rights 
and mentions the “importance of individual rights” by noting Afghanistan’s respect for the 
UDHR and emphasising the importance of “protecting . . . human rights, and attaining 
peoples’ freedoms and fundamental rights”.27 The Afghan Constitution also allow citizens 
to exercise freedom of expression and assembly.28 Elsewhere, Chapter 3 of the Afghan 
Constitution covers most CPR as covered by ICCPR, such as liberty and human dignity (art 
24), life (art 23), freedom of religion (art 2) and equality and non-discrimination (art 22), 
among others.29  
Since Afghanistan has ratified the ICESCR, ESCR have been incorporated in the Afghan 
Constitution. For example, article 52 of the Constitution obliges the government “to provide 
free means of preventive health care and medical treatment, and proper health facilities to 
all citizens of Afghanistan in accordance with the law”.30 Elsewhere, the Afghan 
Constitution has enshrined properly land ownership rights (art 40), right to education (art 
43), and right to employment (art 48). The inclusion of these rights in the Constitution is a 
strong indication that the Afghan Government sees itself responsible for the wellbeing of 
Afghan citizens. Nonetheless, where resources are scarce, such an undertaking places an 
                                                          
23 Anthony H Cordesman and Arleigh A Burke The U.S Cost Of The Afghan War: FY2002-FY2013 (Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies, 2012) <http://csis.org/files/publication/120515_US_Spending_Afghan_War_SIGAR.pdf> at 3.  
24 At 2. 
25 The Constitution of Afghanistan, article 7. 
26 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Ratification Status by Country/Afghanistan 
˂http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=1&Lang=en˃; Stephanie Ahmad, Alexander Benard, Jason 
Berg, Ben Joseloff, Max Rettig, Anne Stephens Lloyd and Eli Sugarman ‘An Introduction to the  Law of Afghanistan’ (Third edition, Palo Alto, 
California,  2011) at 227. 
27 The Constitution of Afghanistan, The Preamble. 
28 The Constitution of Afghanistan, articles 34 and 35. 
29 Ahmad and others, above n 26, at 229. 
30 The Constitution of Afghanistan, art 52. 
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enormous financial liability on the state.31 As such, realisation of the rights of each and every 
Afghan citizen remains an aspiration.32 
2.4. Afghanistan’s reporting to Economic, Social and Cultural and Human 
Rights Committees 
The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the national legal frameworks 
have contributed to the implementation of the ICESCR.33 The ANDS requires the 
Government of Afghanistan to strengthen its capacity to comply with and report on its human 
rights treaty obligations.34  However, Afghanistan’s track record in reporting to the ESCR 
and Human Rights Committees has not been very consistent. Although Afghanistan did 
submit its report to the ESCR Committee in 2001, the UN records show earlier reports have 
not been submitted.35 In its 2001 report, the Afghan delegation also cited “turmoil, political 
struggle, security instability, lack of data and statistics.”36 In 2001, the Afghan Ministry of 
Justice, in its report to the ESCR Committee did claim that “major gains had been made in 
adopting laws to strengthen the framework for human rights in Afghanistan”. The 
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), for example, was 
established and the Law on the Elimination of Violence against Women was adopted.37 In 
its report to the ESCR Committee, the Ministry of Justice makes reference to article 75 of 
the Afghan Constitution which mandates the Government to devise and implement social, 
cultural, economic and technological development.38 It also makes reference to the ANDS, 
and the six sectors under the Strategy which are relevant to the ICESCR, namely 
infrastructure and natural resource, education, health, agriculture and rural development and 
social protection.39  
Despite progress at the policy, institutional and legislative levels, the human rights agenda 
in Afghanistan is at a “critical crossroads”40 and Afghanistan still faces challenges to fulfil 
ESCR.41 There are signs that the overall situation of human rights is worsening. This includes 
flawed appointment process to the AIHRC, rising civilian casualties in the armed conflict 
and weakening women’s rights.42 In addition, the Government and the international 
community’s commitment and attention to the human rights agenda are weakening and that 
                                                          
31 Ahmad and others, above n 26, at 242. 
32 At 242. 
33 United Nations Second to fourth periodic reports submitted by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant (Afghanistan 
E/C12/AFG/2-4, 2007) E/C12/AFG/2-4 at 8. 
34 At 8. 
35 United Nations, Committee On Economic, Social And Cultural Rights Report On The Twenty-Second, Twenty-Third And Twenty-Fourth 
Sessions (Economic and Social Council, Annex 1, 2001) E/C12/2000/21 at 110. 
36 United Nations, above n 33, at 8.  
37 At 13.  
38 At 8. 
39 At 8. 
40 Office of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR) Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan and on the achievements of technical assistance in the field of human rights (2013) at 15.   
41 At 9.  
42 At 15.  
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the overall situation of human rights is deteriorating. Appropriately, the ESCR Committee 
has been understanding of the challenges given the fact the country has been ravaged by 
decades of war and, therefore, has “felt a bit awkward holding Afghanistan accountable 
under the ICESCR”43. However, the Committee has stated Afghanistan did not reflect 
accurately the status of persons with disability because Afghanistan characterised disabled 
people as “needing charity rather than people who have rights to opportunities to lead full 
lives”. 44 The Committee on ESCR has also blamed Afghanistan “for not being able to 
integrate such groups into mainstream society”.45  
2.5.  National Solidarity Programme 
The NSP has almost national coverage and is facilitated by 34 national and international 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) under the leadership of the Ministry of Rural 
Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD). The NSP is an integral part of the plan to realise 
the overall Afghanistan National Development Strategy, which helps realise Afghanistan’s 
commitment towards its Millennium Development Goals. 
The NSP was established by the MRRD in 2003 to “develop the ability of Afghan 
communities to identify, plan, manage, implement and monitor” their own development 
projects.46 The NSP has a total budget of under three billion USD until September 2016.47 
The NSP works in all of the 34 provinces of Afghanistan, has projects in 361 districts and 
has financed more than 80,000 development projects.48  However, extreme insecurity has 
not allowed the programme to cover 15 percent of the country.49 Since the NSP is a 
community driven development programme, it prides itself in having communities as right 
holders rather than beneficiaries in its implementation.50 
The programme is centred around two interventions at the village level. First, the NSP has 
created a gender-balanced and inclusive Community Development Councils (CDCs) through 
a secret ballot. Secondly, the NSP disburses block grants, valued at $200 per household, to 
help fund projects at the village level, which are selected, designed, implemented and 
                                                          
43 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights considers Report of Afghanistan (2010) Relief Web Net E/C12/AFG/2-4 
˂reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/committee-economic-social-and-cultural-rights-considers-report-afghanistan˃. 
44 Relief Web, above n 43. 
45 Relief Web, above n 43. 
46 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Rural Development (MRRD), The National Solidarity Programme 
(NSP) <http://www.nspafghanistan.org/default.aspx?sel=109>. 
47 Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, Ruben Enikolopov Randomized impact evaluation of Afghanistan's national solidarity programme (Washington 
DC, World Bank, July 2013) <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/07/18273450/randomized-impact-evaluation-afghanistans-
national-solidarity-programme> at 2. 
48 At 2. 
49 As per interviews with senior officials with the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) Interview with Abdul Rahman 
Ayubi, former Executive Director of the NSP (the Author, Kabul, 22 August 2015). 
50 Yemak Reza, Yemak, Gan Fun Chen Delice Celebrating ten years of the National Solidarity Program (NSP): a glimpse of the rural 
development story in Afghanistan (Washington DC, World Bank 2013) <documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/01/18427935/celebrating-
ten-years-national-solidarity-program-nsp-glimpse-rural-development-story-afghanistan> at 8. 
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monitored by the communities.51 Since the establishment of the programme, the NSP has 
established around 37,000 democratically elected CDCs across the country.52 
The CDCs have become key development actors themselves as the government’s outreach 
does not go beyond the main cities and towns due to the prevailing insecurity. The CDCs 
and the Facilitating Partners (FPs) have helped the NSP to serve as the face of the 
government to the rural people. This is a significant change from the past as previously rural 
communities, in particular women, never benefited from government-provided services.53 
The NSP also promotes good governance at the local level to help empower rural 
communities to make decisions to improve their living standards.54 The NSP has provided 
rural communities with an historic opportunity where men, women and people from different 
communities, including the most marginalised and vulnerable, participate in elections for 
CDCs. In order to ensure widespread and grassroots participation, the NSP requires at least 
65 percent of community members’ participation in pre-CDC election mobilisation 
processes and at least 80 percent of mobilised communities should take part in elections.55 
One of the most unique and democratic aspects of the NSP is its emphasis on meaningful 
and inclusive participation of communities in development process. As per the Operational 
Manual of the NSP, there should be three community wide meetings to ensure there is equal 
participation from community members, which is also representative of the community 
makeup.56   These community wide meetings are designed to ensure sufficient awareness 
about the objectives of the NSP and its block grant.57 The block grant is an entitlement of a 
CDC where each CDC can receive up to a maximum of USD 60,000, depending on the 
number of families in a CDC. 58  
The Programme has theoretically given women a voice in local governance,59 particularly in 
the executive positions of CDCs where it is mandatory to have two male and two female 
executive members.60 These executive positions are designed to enable women to more 
effectively represent other women not only at the project consultation level but also at the 
executive decision making level. The Operational Manual of the NSP requires meaningful 
female representation. For example, it requires at least 35 percent of CDC members 
                                                          
51 Beath, Christia, Enikolopov, above n 47, at 2.   
52 At 2. 
53 Yemak, Fun and Delice, above n 50, at 8. 
54 The NSP, above n 46.  
55 The NSP, above n 46. 
56 The NSP, above n 46. 
57 The NSP, above n 46. 
58 The NSP, above n 46. 
59 Yemak, Fun and Delice, above n 50, at 8. 
60 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Rural Development (MRRD), The Operational Manual VII, The 
National Solidarity Programme (2012) <http://www.nspafghanistan.org/default.aspx?sel=16>at 12. 
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nationally to be women while also making women’s participation mandatory throughout the 
project cycle.61  
Once elections are conducted, communities prepare, and then finalise, their Community 
Development Plans (CDPs) which prirotise their development needs. The NSP Logical 
Framework requires a minimum of 70 percent women, of the total number of female 
members, to participate in the CDP.62 There is a vote on setting priorities because at times 
priorities set by men may differ from those of women. If priorities set by women are different 
than those set by men, the Operational Manual requires special care to be exercised to ensure 
the priorities set by women are included in the final CDP.63  
Another unique aspect of the NSP is that the design of the Programme promotes communities 
contributing their own resources to their development projects64 which in turn gives a 
stronger sense of ownership to the communities and ultimately contributes to the 
sustainability of their project. Over 53,000 of these sub-projects, to the tune of $809 million, 
have already been completed. Communities have contributed over $160 million, i.e. over 13 
percent, towards the project costs, in cash, kind and/or labor.65  
In order to empower communities, the NSP has had a special focus on building capacities to 
enable members to conduct social audit and also hold elected members of the CDCs 
accountable. While providing the different training under its community empowerment 
package, the NSP also mandates that a minimum of 50 percent of the trainees should be 
women.66 The training is diverse and includes subjects such as community participatory 
monitoring, procurement and accounting, conflict resolution, project cycle management and 
financial management.   
As a whole, the NSP plays a key role in enabling communities to know more about their 
rights and raise awareness by having regular discussions with duty bearers on how they can 
address their basic needs. A team of four non-CDC community members are elected to form 
the community participatory monitoring team. The team is responsible to monitor the 
activities of CDC with regard to NSP implementation especially related to the use of the 
block grant and the subproject implementation. 
Extensive consultation, inclusive participation, elections and capacity building to empower 
communities are not the only features of the NSP design. The NSP has considerable focus 
on transparency and accountability. The NSP promotes transparency and accountability in 
its whole project design and implementation.67 In order to ensure funds have been spent in a 
                                                          
61 At 13. 
62 At 12. 
63 At 20. 
64 The NSP, above n 46. 
65 Yemak, Fun and Delice, above n 50, at 8. 
66 The Operational Manual VII, above n 60, at 32.  
67 At 5. 
56 
 
transparent and accountable way, the NSP has a strong social audit whereby a meeting of 
the community discusses the use of NSP funds against approved projects and against actual 
expenditure,68 which is all in line with the NSP’s procurement and accounting regulations. 
The community participatory monitoring functions as an additional layer “to monitor the 
activities of CDCs, particularly in relation to budget and project implementation”.69 Also, 
the CPM is an effective way to enable communities to ask questions from the elected 
members of CDCs and seek answers about quality of the projects and expenses incurred. 
2.6.  Projects under the NSP 
Given the protracted war and civil strife in Afghanistan since the 1980s, when the NSP 
commenced in 2003, there was virtually no necessary infrastructure or basic rights in rural 
areas, where 75 percent of the Afghan population live.70 The NSP has provided extensive 
infrastructure and basic rights to the majority of the communities across the country to ensure 
these communities have access to their basic rights. For instance, so far, the NSP has 
financed 86,022sub-projects.71 These projects include roads (23,259), water supply and 
sanitation (20,825), irrigation projects (18,611), supply of power (8,174), creating livelihood 
opportunities (2,559), constructing schools (6,711) and other miscellaneous projects 
(5,883).72 These projects have had a tremendously positive impact in the lives of the 
communities that make up the 49,075 CDCs.73 
2.7.  Jobs created under the NSP 
The NSP has had a tangible economic impact on the broader economic outcomes in short-
term due to its ‘stimulus effect’ and by injecting block grants.74 In the mid-term, the NSP 
has also created thousands of jobs in village infrastructure projects.75 The NSP projects have 
been very labour intensive and, therefore, communities have financially benefited. For 
example, the projects require preparation and transportation of stone, gravel, sand and soil. 
These are carried out by labour force. While the NSP does not create permanent and full 
time jobs, since its inception, it has created more than 49 million labour days through these 
infrastructure projects.76 
                                                          
68 At 40. 
69 At 40. 
70 Report No: 80177-AF The World Bank, Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund Project Appraisal Document (March 25, 2014) Afghanistan 
Reconstruction Trust Fund <http://www.artf.af/images/uploads/PAD_for_KMDP.pdf> at 19.   
71 The National Solidarity Program Monthly Program Report (21 April to 21 May 2015). <http://www.nspafghanistan.org/default.aspx?sel=30> 
at 4.  
72 At 4.  
73 At 4. 
74 Beath, Christia, Enikolopov, above n 47, at 21. 
75 At 21. 
76 The World Bank Assessment of Strategic Issues and Recommendations for Future Directions Technical Assistance Paper National Solidarity 
Program (2015 < http://www-
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Evaluation of the NSP has documented the wider socio-economic impact of, the Programme, 
illustrating measurable progress since its inception in 2003. For example, the NSP has 
improved access to clean drinking water, energy, education and health care.77 The impact 
evaluation has also reported some positive impact of the NSP on the economic welfare of 
rural villages, notably the creation of 49 million days.78 Although the impact evaluation has 
concluded that the NSP has had a significant impact on Afghanistan’s rural economy,79 given 
the extensive needs on the ground, a more lasting intervention is required to ensure the 
realisation of basic rights for the long- term across the country.  
2.8.  The Citizens’ Charter – a continuation of the National Solidarity 
Programme and other National Priority Programmes? 
The NSP, undoubtedly, has laid the foundation for any development work across virtually 
the whole of Afghanistan. The sector Ministries are required to use CDCs as the gateway for 
both development and governance activities.80  Since early 2015, the Government has been 
working on what is known as the ‘Citizens’ Charter’ “an initiative that would guarantee a 
minimum of core services [which can be regarded as rights] to all Afghans, using CDCs as 
the primary vehicle for service delivery”.81  The Charter is a package of basic rights to ensure 
citizens’ development rights, representing the resolve of the Afghan government to “provide 
universal access to a core set of basic services” and is expected to replace the rights provided 
under the National Solidarity Programme and other National Priority Programmes.82 The 
Charter will serve as a “compact between the government and the citizens, intended to raise 
their living standards and productivity”.83 However, the government has also admitted by 
now that it will incrementally provide these so called basic services [which can be regarded 
as rights] to its population from early 2017, initially covering 30 percent while the other 70 
percent will be covered in the next 7 years.84 
2.9.  Conclusion 
The NSP is the first national programme that also represents ‘firsts’ for so many things. The 
fact it covers 85 percent of the country is a first. The fact elections were introduced to the 
country at the village level is a first. The fact women were given equal roles at the executive 
level is a first. The fact NSP allowed millions of ordinary citizens to prioritise their 
development needs in a participatory manner is a first. The fact the programme gives control 
                                                          
77 The World Bank Report No: 84660-AF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund Project Appraisal Document Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust 
Fund (2014) < http://www.artf.af/images/uploads/PAD_for_CASA_CSP.pdf> at 37. 
78 At 38. 
79 At 38. 
80 At 4. 
81 The World Bank, Technical Assistance Paper National Solidarity Program, above n 56, at 7. 
82 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Afghanistan National Development Strategy < http://mfa.gov.af/>; Islamic 
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to communities over their resources is a first. It is also the first time the majority of people 
in rural areas have received their basic rights, courtesy of the international community.  
 
After the events of 9/11 in the US, the international community has shown commitment to 
the so-called new-born Afghanistan. The NSP is a manifestation of this commitment from 
the international community to help Afghan government realise its MDGs. The Citizens’ 
Charter will, it seems, be another firm step in that direction. Despite all these significant 
firsts, this research will explore the question whether the implementation of the NSP meets 
the core elements of the human rights-based approach to development. In order to answer 
this question, I conducted interviews with different individuals who have been involved with 









Development on the ground in Afghanistan 
This Chapter explores perspectives of participants on the design and implementation of the 
National Solidarity Programme (NSP) in Afghanistan. The Chapter attempts to find views 
of the participants whether the NSP as the flagship development programme of the 
government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan meets the principles of a human rights-
based approach to development (HRBA).  
It is pertinent to note, at the outset, that I was able to interview staff from both the 
government and Facilitating Partners. However, as an international staff based in Kabul, I 
had certain security limitations to visit communities and villages. As a result, limitations on 
my movement has impacted the possibility of access to a wider range of community views. 
Insecurity will be discussed in more detail as part of challenges under Chapter Four. 
3.1Application of the human rights-based approach under the National Solidarity 
Programme in Afghanistan  
As mentioned earlier, this thesis uses a combination of sources including desk research, 15 
interviews and five Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with individuals working and 
benefiting from the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) in 15 provinces to ascertain the 
situation on the ground. The focus of the fieldwork was on three different groups: 
government staff and advisors of the NSP; staff working with the Facilitating Partners (FPs) 
of the NSP; and elected and ordinary members of the Community Development Councils 
(CDCs). While the NSP staff gave consent to mention their names, the details for FPs’ staff 
and community members remain confidential. Instead, pseudonyms are used for FPs’ staff 
and community members.  
The fieldwork resulted in almost 400 minutes of recorded interviews which I have also 
transcribed. Informed consent was received prior to conducting each interview.  
As mentioned in the Introduction to the thesis, in order to examine the application of the 
human rights-based approach to development in the NSP, I have used a qualitative method, 
namely purposive sampling which groups participants according to their knowledge and role 
to a particular research question. 
The interviews were structured around the five elements of the HRBA discussed in Chapter 
One. These are the NSP realising rights, participation, empowerment, non-discrimination 





3.1.1 Communities see the National Solidarity Programme as realising rights 
 
Realisation of rights as per the human rights framework is the first of five elements under 
the HRBA. Given its theoretical nature, the question whether the NSP is seen as delivering 
aid or realising basic rights produced interesting perspectives and responses. Although views 
differed on whether the government can in reality provide such rights, there was relative 
consensus that the government has an obligation to provide basic rights to its people. The 
NSP, therefore, provides the platform for realising such rights.  
 
The design of the NSP has an inherently equitable nature, “qualifying each rural family” for 
an amount of US $200, per phase, known as the block grant. 1  Communities see the block 
grant as their entitlement to fund their basic rights as per their development priorities, in a 
participatory manner.2  While the design of the NSP illustrates how it aspires to realise every 
household’s basic rights to water, education, health or jobs, albeit short term, many of the 
answers indicated communities’ understanding of the NSP realising rights depended on a 
number of variables. These included awareness, quality of mobilisation, top down approach, 
and maturity of CDCs.3 
 
Raising awareness about the objectives of the NSP is a contractual responsibility of the 
Facilitating Partners (FPs) whereby FPs are required to ensure communities understand the 
Programme’s objectives, under which all households within a community receive block 
grants.4  FPs are required to ensure communities fully understand their entitlements and that 
communities are fully aware of their rights and responsibilities as outlined in the Operational 
Manual of the NSP.5 While FPs agree it is their contractual responsibility, Interviewee 4, 
who has more than 10 years of direct work experience with the NSP, agreed that the 
understanding of the NSP realising rights depended on how the FPs mobilised communities 
and how FPs delivered this message to the communities.6 Also, finding competent staff is a 
challenge which affects the quality of mobilisation. Therefore, appropriate awareness cannot 
be raised in the absence of qualified staff.7  
 
                                                          
1 Interview with Abdul Rahman Ayubi, former Executive Director of the NSP (the Author, Kabul, 22 August 2015); Interview with Rasoul 
Rasouli, Acting Executive Director of the NSP (the Author, Kabul, 7 July 2015). 
2 Interview with Jovitta Thomas, Senior Operations Advisor to the NSP (the Author, Kabul, 15 November 2015); Interviewee 8 (the Author, 
Kabul , 3 September 2015); Interviewee 3 (the Author, Faizabad district, Badakhshan Province, 15 September 2015); Interviewee 7 (the Author, 
Badakhshan Province, 10 August 2015); Interviewee 10 (the Author, Ghor Province, 15 July 2015). 
3 Interview with Abdul Rahman Ayubi, above n 1; Interviewee 10, above n 2; Interviewee 8, above n 2; Interviewee 4 (the Author, Kabul, 2 July 
2015); Interviewee 3, above n 2. 
4 Interview with Rasoul Rasouli, above n 1; Interview with Brigitta Bode, Planning and Policy Advisor of the NSP (the Author, Kabul, 16 August 
2015). 
5 Interview with Rasoul Rasouli, above n 1.  
6 Interviewee 4, above n 3.  
7 Interviewee 4, above n 3. 
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Jovitta Thomas, who has been with the Programme since 2003 in different capacities, opined 
that understanding of the NSP may “vary widely from community to community”.8 There 
could be various contributing factors, such as government representation, proximity of the 
community to the district centres, the phase of the NSP and whether the FP has a needs-
based or rights-based approach.9 In principle, the NSP arguably realises rights as 
communities receive a fixed amount under each phase.10 However, the problem has partly 
been a top down approach in designing the NSP, and without adequate involvement of the 
communities in the design phase, some communities may not necessarily see the NSP 
realising rights.11 
While the majority of the interviewees were of the view that NSP delivered on its 
commitments to realise rights,12 everyone has not necessarily been familiarised to the 
concepts of project participants, right holders and duty bearers.  For instance, in some CDCs, 
staff of the Facilitating Partners were not even using the word right holder or project 
participant.13 Instead, they were using “the concept of beneficiaries although they are now 
gradually shifting to project participants and rights’ holders”.14 According to one FP staff, 
efforts were being made with the team and community members to shift to the rights 
terminology and work with communities in a way that CDCs see the delivery under the 
project as their rights and not just aid.15  
Awareness about recognition of rights under the NSP was not accurate among some of the 
community members interviewed as part of the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs).16 For 
instance, female project participants in Badakhshan province said that the NSP projects “first 
came from the God and then they came from the [Facilitating Partner] that has been helping 
us”.17 Almost all of the women sitting in the room repeated in one voice that they do not 
think the NSP [realises] their rights. The female Social Organiser18 who has worked under 
the NSP cited “awareness as a key factor for more women knowing that the NSP realised 
rights for both men and women”.19  
                                                          
8 Interview with Jovitta Thomas, above n 2.  
9 Interview with Jovitta Thomas, above n 2. 
10 Interview with Jovitta Thomas, above n 2. 
11 Interview with Jovitta Thomas, above n 2. 
12 Interviewee 4, above n 3; Interview with Brigitta Bode, above n 4; Interviewee 12 (the Author, Kabul Afghanistan, 2 January 2016); Interview 
with Abdul Rahman Ayubi, above n 1; Interview with Rasoul Rasouli, above n 1; Interviewee 1 (the Author, Kabul, 9 June 2015); Interviewee 7, 
above n 2.  
13 Interviewee 5 (the Author, Faizabad, Badakhshan Province, 13 July 2015). 
14 Interviewee 5, above n 13. 
15 Interviewee 5, above n 13. 
16 It is pertinent to note that there are around 37,000 CDCs. While the number of interviewees are fairly representative in terms of FPs and 
government officials, the number of CDCs interviewed are no way near to a representative view given a number of facts, including conservative 
nature of communities, security, levels of education and socio-economic situation.  
17 Focus Group Discussion 1/female (the Author, Kishim District Badakhshan Province, 10 August 2015). 
18 Given strict local traditions for women not to interact with male staff, the NSP incentivises female employment as having female staff would 
create an environment for women to come out and participate in development activities. Where FPs recruit Female Social Organisers, each FP 
gets an additional bonus payment too.  
19 Interviewee 3, above n 2.   
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In contrast, awareness about the NSP among male CDC members in a more secure 
environment was different. For example, the Head of one of the CDCs in Argo district of 
Badakhshan said that the NSP realises the rights of the communities because it has national 
coverage and not only the NSP realises rights to members of his CDC but to all communities 
across Afghanistan.20 The Deputy Head of the CDC was equally clear, stating that “this has 
happened to the whole of the country so it must be our right”.21 Moreover, the Treasurer of 
the CDC claimed that “although the money comes from the international community, for 
which they are thankful, it is their right to have access to basic services”.22 The other 
members of the community who were accompanying the Treasurer unanimously confirmed, 
saying “the NSP realises their rights”.23 A similar position was expressed by CDCs from two 
districts in Ghor province, who were on a visit to the provincial capital, that the provision of 
projects under the NSP is the government’s responsibility to ensure basic rights to the 
nation.24  
Although the sampling with communities was small, the community members who were 
interviewed do see the NSP realising rights because “the programme gives control over 
resources to the communities".25  Communities also see the NSP realising rights because 
they provide community in kind and cash contributions and subsequently take care of 
Operations and Maintenance of NSP projects.26  
This can be seen on the ground too. There are 87,000 projects across Afghanistan and some 
of these projects are in very insecure areas. Yet, these projects are still functioning because 
communities have a strong ownership in the projects, consider them as community assets 
and everyone is benefiting from them.27 Similarly, four interviewees, who have more than 
30 years of combined work experience with the NSP in one capacity or another, argued that 
communities’ in kind contributions, role in project implementation, oversight and 
Operations and Maintenance of their projects strongly indicated the NSP realises their 
rights.28  Transfer of funds to the CDCs’ bank accounts and the CDCs’ elected members 
being the signatories with the bank and the provincial authorities further contribute to the 
understanding that the NSP realises rights.29  
According to Interviewee 12, who has worked on the design of the NSP and facilitates the 
NSP in 10 provinces, a large number of CDCs think the NSP realises their rights for two 
                                                          
20 Focus Group Discussion 2 (the Author, Argo District, Badakhshan Province, 10 August 2015). 
21 Focus Group Discussion 2, above n 20. 
22 Focus Group Discussion 3 (the Author, Argo District, Badakhshan Province, 15 September 2015). 
23 Focus Group Discussion 3, above n 22.  
24 Focus Group Discussion 4 (the Author, Shahrak District, Ghor Province, 13 October 2015); Focus Group Discussion 5 (the Author, Dolaina 
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25 Interview with Abdul Rahman Ayubi, above n 1. 
26 Interview with Abdul Rahman Ayubi, above n 1; Interviewee 3, above n 2.   
27 Interview with Abdul Rahman Ayubi, above n 1. 
28 Interview with Abdul Rahman Ayubi, above n 1; Interviewee 6 (the Author, Kabul, 11 August 2015); Interviewee 7, above n 2; Interviewee 10, 
above n 2. 
29 Interview with Abdul Rahman Ayubi, above n 1; Interviewee 6, above n 28; Interviewee 7, above n 2; Interviewee 10, above n 2. 
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reasons.30 First, they think the government has a responsibility to realise their basic rights 
and secondly, the CDCs have ownership of the process.31 The ownership of communities 
can be seen in the process while deciding on their priorities as well as the communities’ role 
in design and implementing their projects.32  
Realistically speaking, argued Ayubi – the former Executive Director of the NSP, “the 
minimum what a post-conflict country like Afghanistan should provide to its citizens is basic 
services”.33  The government intends to build on the NSP and enact the Citizens’ Charter, 
which is a guarantee of basic rights.34 While the NSP leadership claimed the NSP has 
provided the basis for the Citizens’ Charter to provide access to education, health, irrigation, 
water management, including drinking water, improved farming technology and job 
opportunities,35 there was also a word of caution about availability of resources.  The 
Citizens’ Charter is “a big promise which would require proper strategy and money”.36 At 
the time of writing this thesis, the government is finalising the Citizens’ Charter, in close 
consultation with its international partners and may start implementation towards November 
2016. 
3.1.2 Participation  
 
Participation is the second key element of a human rights-based approach. Participation is 
also a key element of NSP and appears to be widely exercised in practice. Given the 
significance of participation at the grassroots level, the NSP processes heavily focus on 
participation. Yet, arguably, the Afghan context poses serious challenges for meaningful and 
inclusive participation where communities from all walks of life have a voice in the decision 
making process to shape their development priorities. 
 
Views from the Facilitating Partners (FPs) indicated that both context and awareness are key 
to meaningful and inclusive participation. For instance, in some districts where tribal 
structures are dominant, tribal elders did not initially allow women to take part in the 
development and decision making process.37  After the introduction of the NSP to their 
communities and establishment of CDCs on the ground, the Social Organisers contacted 
influential people and members of CDCs, who were against this process. According to these 
interviewees, once the objectives of the NSP were explained to them, the leaders gradually 
                                                          
30 Interviewee 12, above n 12.  
31 Interviewee 12, above n 12. 
32 Interviewee 6, above n 28; Interviewee 7, above n 2; Interviewee 10, above n 2. 
33 Interview with Abdul Rahman Ayubi, above n 1. 
34 Interview with Abdul Rahman Ayubi, above n 1. 
35 Interview with Abdul Rahman Ayubi, above n 1. 
36 Interview with Abdul Rahman Ayubi, above n 1. 
37 Interviewee 3, above n 2; Interviewee 8, above n 2. 
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understood the NSP. According to Bode, once the NSP was understood as a community 
driven development programme, it also helped with increased participation.38  
The quality of facilitation and participatory empowerment approaches by FPs contribute to 
communities’ participation in different stages including decision-making processes.39 To 
this effect, the NSP requires genuine participation on the ground which starts with 
community mobilisation, where communities are given information about the different 
aspects of the NSP affecting their lives.40 Communities are involved in elections and 
subsequent preparation of Community Development Plans (CDPs).41 However, before the 
CDPs are finalised, a series of community wide consultations take place to list all the issues 
in their surrounding areas and villages.42 Thus, communities are involved right from the start 
to identify their collective needs, suitable projects, and locations.43 Once CDPs are in place 
and communities have listed their development priorities, CDCs’ attention turns to 
implementation44 during which CDCs have full and actual participation in the design, 
implementation and monitoring of their sub-projects.45 In this process, FPs only play a 
“catalyst role” to ensure communities are going in the right direction and are actively 
participating.46  
The platform for participation is not only at the community level, however. The elected 
members take part in district and provincial level meetings to discuss issues surrounding 
their CDCs.47 The elected members of  CDCs come to Kabul to take part in the national 
conferences involving all the CDCs from across the country and taking place once every 
three years.48 The attendance of the elected CDC members from across the country is seen 
as a “good indication of their active participation to advocate for their issues at the national 
level” in an effort to influence policies and laws.49 Exposure visits to district and provincial 
centres and Kabul appear to have allowed women to participate in a bigger forum, which has 
positively contributed towards their confidence and gradual empowerment.50 For example, 
“women are able to meet and exchange their views in meetings with other women” and this 
is seen as an area where an increasing number of women are being empowered.51 
Nonetheless, such trips and exposure visits are rare and infrequent.  
                                                          
38 Interview with Brigitta Bode, above n 4; Interview with Abdul Rahman Ayubi, above n 1. 
39 Interview with Abdul Rahman Ayubi, above n 1. 
40 Interviewee 6, above n 28; Interviewee 7, above n 2; Interviewee 4, above n 3. 
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While participation of both community members and, more so, elected members is strongly 
mandated by the Operational Manual, there are very real challenges on the ground.  Low 
literacy rates is one big issue and, therefore, it was not surprising when Thomas cited “text 
heavy guidelines as a barrier to participation”.52 Also, ordinary members of CDCs lack 
influence in the decision making process.53 For instance, there are CDCs where “the elected 
members are directly involved in taking decisions” without much consultation with ordinary 
members.54  However, this was only attributed to the Arbabs55 (the power brokers) who often 
do not want to allow ordinary members to be involved in decision making process.56 
Nonetheless, the elected members of CDC had a different take in Ghor, arguing that while 
they are “informing other community members” about the projects, they also “discuss with 
them their needs and how to prioritise those needs”57. 
Cultural tradition was cited as an obstacle to female participation.58 Often, participation is 
dominated by men and rarely involves meaningful participation from women. One such 
tradition is men’s reluctance and at times resistance to allow women to come out and interact 
with other men or even women.59 Also, women have severe mobility restrictions imposed 
by local traditions. They cannot travel far from their houses and are unable to participate in 
any other activity which is planned beyond their villages. Elected CDC members rarely seek 
inputs from these women in decision-making.60 For example, if a project is proposed by men, 
both men and women would benefit but only men make the decisions and women become 
the incidental beneficiaries.61 At the village level, CDCs confirmed that women are 
“consulted through men” and projects are “selected through the direct or indirect 
involvement of women”.62 Male members of two CDCs also proudly admitted that the 
“projects selected by men are highly appreciated by women”.63 
In order to enable female community members, and even at times elected female CDC 
members, the NSP has incentivised recruitment of female Social Organisers, paving the way 
for separate meetings for male and female community members. This practice is common in 
almost all provinces. For instance, CDCs in Badakhshan, Ghor, Samangan, Faryab, 
Kandahar and Panjshir provinces talk to women through other women, tribal elders or there 
                                                          
52 Interview with Jovitta Thomas, above n 2. 
53 Interviewee 10, above n 2. 
54 Interviewee 10, above n 2. 
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can be meetings in separate rooms where women can hear what men talk about.64 The result 
of these separate meetings is then communicated to the male executive members of CDCs 
through the female social organizer, the female elected member or a male family member of 
the female elected member, who is known as Mahram.65 
In contrast, joint meetings are possible in a limited number of districts with less conservative 
traditions.66 For example, female participation in the two districts of Wardak province was 
around 95 percent of the total participants.67 Similarly, female participation in the more 
secure and less conservative province of Bamyan is equally high.68 In contrast, female 
participation in another district of Wardak province was around 20 percent of all of 
participants in a more conservative CDC.69 Such varying levels of female participation 
provide important perspective on the relevance of participation and good security, flexibility 
and attitudes of the communities with regard to women.70 While joint meetings are important 
for free and active participation for women so that they can influence their development 
priorities, joint meetings are rare simply because they do not fit with the rural Afghan 
traditions. Hence, separate meetings become the most effective platform for female 
participation.  
Separate meetings, which are culturally valid but not necessarily consistent with the 
principles of the human rights-based approach, allow for some kind of decision to be arrived 
at because it is more effective than bringing both men and women together in one room 
where “many things would not surface in the final decision making process”.71 This is 
because local conservative traditions do not allow women to express their views in the 
presence of men who are not their family members. Therefore, joint meetings can be 
counterproductive. For example, when there has been an attempt to have joint meetings, 
women hardly speak and fail to propose what they need. Instead they remain silent whereas 
men speak up and their preferred projects are selected.72 
Taking conservative local traditions into account, both interviewees 4 and 12 argued that 
separate meetings are a good idea because women can, at least indirectly, participate.73 
However, women’s role in the decision making is weak and whatever men say, “women 
would simply accept and could not act independently”.74 Also, there is hardly any direct 
interaction between men and women. The role of women in project selection, therefore, 
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becomes very weak and where “women want to have a carpet weaving or maternity clinic, 
men would go for projects such as roads and schools”.75 This illustrates the very nature of 
the problem as largely men make decisions affecting women and other marginalised groups. 
Where women have a different preference, men may disagree or ignore their choices.76  
Bode, on the other hand, cautioned that it is necessary to be realistic in a male dominated 
society where influential men make decisions.77 Bode was skeptical about active female 
participation in the Afghan context, arguing the main focus of the NSP had been “to get the 
infrastructure to the village in a transparent manner and that the infrastructure was solid and 
lasted for a long time”.78 Bode also admitted to not being concerned about “leaving some 
people out” and that ensuring participation of women was a responsibility of the Facilitating 
Partners (FPs).79 Bode, in fact, presents a realistic view of participation for women in 
Afghanistan because if progress of infrastructure work was conditional upon female 
participation, not much progress would happen on the ground. This exposes the weaknesses 
of the human rights-based approach in a conservative and post conflict state.  
While the former Executive Director of the NSP confirmed there is “no denying the rural 
population is very conservative” about female participation, tangible progress has happened 
for the first time in the history of Afghanistan despite all the odds.80 Now, women have an 
opportunity they did not have ten years ago. They can benefit from development initiatives 
and in many cases they can take part in the discussions although the extent of their 
involvement, discussed in more detail in the next chapter, is highly debatable. For example, 
two seats are now reserved for women as part of the executive body of each CDC. Some 
NSP senior staff took the reserved seats for women in the executive body as a positive 
development, arguing this has increased female participation from “less than 20 percent to 
43 percent” based on the data from internal reports which have been confirmed by external 
evaluators and reports.81 However, the Senior Operations Advisor to the NSP contrasted 
membership and participation, adding the increase to 43 percent needs to be contextualised 
as Afghanistan is a traditional and conservative country where participation, as understood 
in the West, may not work.82  
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3.1.2.1.Participation of persons with disability 
In addition to the generally reported good levels of participation by men and some, albeit 
more limited, participation by women, there were some examples of the inclusion of persons 
with disabilities too. For example, in Faryab, a province in the north of the country, the most 
marginalised not only participated in the decision making process but they were also 
represented in the executive body.83 In one community, a disabled person was an elected 
member of one of the CDCs and in addition to representing the whole of the community, he 
also represented persons with disabilities and is their voice.84  
However, such examples were rare and persons with disabilities often appear to be ignored 
and excluded when it comes to the decision-making process or how they benefit from the 
NSP. In other words, they do not have the same level of opportunities to lead full lives. 
Despite Afghanistan ratifying the UN Convention on the rights of persons with disability, 
disability friendly programming is not common within the NSP. In practice, disability 
considerations are missing from the design of infrastructure projects which do not take into 
account the needs of persons with disability. Although an elected member of one of the CDC 
stated that their CDC does make sure to include other family members of the disabled with 
their CDC so the family of the disabled person can benefit financially from the wages given 
against labour,85 a lot of disabled people do not directly benefit financially from the NSP 
projects who should be entitled to the same benefits as other community members.86 In 
addition, NSP projects generally lack disability ramps and facilities. That is why there is 
“little inclusion of persons with disabilities in the NSP in practice”.87  
3.1.3 Empowerment 
Empowerment is the third element under the human rights-based approach. It is also at the 
heart of the NSP’s Operational Manual and implementation. Once rights are recognised and 
communities have meaningful and inclusive participation in deciding their development 
priorities, their capabilities are built and gradually communities know more about their basic 
rights. While empowerment is critical for the NSP, empowering communities in a war 
ravaged country, hit by ongoing insurgency, is a slow process. This process, nonetheless, 
begins with communities knowing about their rights and corresponding obligations of duty- 
bearers to improve their living standards and positively influence their future. In order to 
empower CDCs, the NSP delivers 12 training modules as part of its empowerment package 
to build communities’ capacity in a number of areas, including procurement, 
implementation, social audit, linkages with markets, donors and knowing the objectives of 
the NSP, among others.  
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The NSP’s training package is important as it is used as a tool to train other community 
members in wider meetings, and during prayer times where “key messages are shared so 
communities are aware of the objectives and expected results of the programme”.88  These 
training sessions have been successful as they have started to build capacity of 
communities.89 For instance, when one interacts with them in their villages, “it appears as if 
these people have gone to university and have studied development” while the reality is 
“everything they have learnt is by doing” under the NSP.90  
While empowerment is a key intended impact of the NSP, empowerment also meant 
involving communities in the processes and “giving communities control over their 
resources”.91 Such an approach empowers communities to “make their own decisions about 
their own development issues”, which also can help that “there is no elite capture”.92 As well 
as giving communities control over their resources, the social audit gives communities 
another opportunity to ask questions about where and how the funds have been spent during 
implementation.93 A number of interviewees, including staff of the NSP and FPs, were of 
the view that this empowers communities.94  
However, Bode also defined empowerment in the sense that communities “stand up for their 
rights” and tell their leaders that they are “tired of them having all the development projects 
to “their side of the village”.95 According to Bode, where communities stand up for their 
rights and “refuse such things to happen again”,96 communities are able to not only 
participate in the decision making process but also shape decisions. If such empowerment 
did not take place, Bode feared the development infrastructure projects would go to the parts 
of the village that belonged to the powerful traditional leaders.97 When this is the case, 
communities are not empowered.98   
Realistically speaking, it is impossible to expect communities to stand up to warlords and 
strongmen in an insecure environment, with very weak rule of law. Such a level of 
empowerment is too ambitious in a country like Afghanistan which has been plagued by 
decades of civil strife and absence of rule of law. Interviewees were of the view that the NSP 
has empowered CDCs when there is a comparison between the current phase and the 
previous phases because one can see a lot of positive changes. For instance, CDCs are able 
to manage their own procurement, locally implement their own micro hydro power projects, 
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produce locally available power and manage their own finances.99 CDCs’ capacity has been 
enhanced in writing proposals to approach local donors, get funding for their emerging or 
existing unfunded development priorities and mobilise communities for development work 
in their communities.100 CDCs also engage in re-elections every three years, a process which 
was unheard of at the beginning of the NSP, and which is crucial for the sustainability of 
CDCs so they are not entirely donor driven.  
CDCs shared the sentiments about their increasing confidence and capacity to handle the 
affairs of the CDCs as they have gained more skills and knowledge. For instance, the Chair 
of one CDC said they are able to manage construction work for a range of projects by 
themselves and are able to attract increased funding for their water and other basic needs.101 
As a result of the increased capacity, knowledge and awareness, CDC members know “how 
to go about their rights”102 unlike the time when the NSP started. CDC members in Ghor 
said they now “have an opportunity to meet and discuss development issues and jointly find 
solutions for their problems”.103 Also, CDCs from Badakhshan indicated they have learnt 
more and now they are able to help in the design and costing of their development projects 
and know how to operate their micro-hydro power projects to produce power supply.104  
More importantly, the NSP has created “democratic and localised leadership”, gradually 
replacing the traditional and unelected leadership at the village level.105  
However, the majority of the training has been directed solely at the elected members of the 
CDC and not the rest of the community members, something confirmed by the elected 
members during interviews.  Bode, from the NSP, defended this by arguing that “while 
communities design their own projects, and they are in control of development processes at 
the community level, it is not realistic and possible to empower everyone”.106 Instead, it is 
more realistic or feasible to “empower the elected persons at the community level” who can 
then take up matters on behalf of the rest of community members who have elected them.107 
While the NSP has educated, helped and empowered a large number of CDCs, women have 
not equally benefited and only the capacity of a limited number of “courageous, liberal and 
already educated women” has been built under the NSP.108  Elected women have not been 
involved in procurement, and social audit is also carried out largely by men.109 Equally, those 
who were “not literate and also had mobility restrictions have not been empowered”.110 In 
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the absence of face to face and direct interaction due to cultural restrictions, elected women 
can hardly have a constructive dialogue with the elected male members of CDCs, and 
instead, women have no choice but to endorse decisions made by men.111 For instance, 
elected men would come to the elected women and “seek their signatures” and then go about 
their business. Therefore, building women’s capacity, in an effort to empower them under 
the NSP, according to one interviewee at least, has arguably been largely cosmetic.112  
Elite capture appears to be a real obstacle to empowerment. Among the different types of 
elites, Arbabs, who are local power holders, have posed genuine challenges to 
empowerment. Arbabs have had a grip on power in their localities for a long time. In some 
provinces, such as Ghor, Arbabism113 is prevalent, resulting in elite misbehavior towards the 
ordinary members of  CDCs.114 For example, the Arbabs are not allowing poor people to 
take part in decision making and therefore, there is not “much of empowerment”.115 Often, 
some power holders control CDCs116 and do not involve community members in the decision 
making process or seek communities’ advice117 although the extent of this control may vary 
from CDC to CDC.118  
3.1.4 Non-discrimination 
Non-discrimination, the fourth element of a human-rights-based approach, is an integral part 
of HRBA, making sure development reaches all communities, including the most vulnerable, 
marginalised, minorities and people of all genders. Put otherwise, HRBA requires an 
inclusive approach. Arguably, the non-discriminatory and unbiased nature of the HRBA is 
explicit in the NSP’s design as the Programme provides all rural communities in the country, 
on a per family basis, an amount of USD 200, per phase.119  This way, the poorest of the 
poor could benefit from the NSP where CDCs consult on their collective development 
needs.120  
The staff of Facilitating Partners and community members were in agreement about the 
observance of non-discrimination in the NSP processes. For instance, the formation of CDCs 
is done “without consideration of race, gender and ethnicity”.121 The NSP’s Operational 
Manual also demands involvement of marginalised households and women during selection 
                                                          
111 Interviewee 3, above n 2.   
112 Interviewee 9, above n 64; Interviewee 3, above n 2.   
113 The practice of Arbabs making decisions and ruling villages. 
114 Interviewee 10, above n 2. 
115 Interviewee 10, above n 2. 
116 Interviewee 10, above n 2. 
117 Interviewee 7, above n 2. 
118 A similar point was also raised in the World Bank Impact Evaluation of the NSP in 2013; for more details, Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, 
Ruben Enikolopov Randomized impact evaluation of Afghanistan's national solidarity programme (Washington DC, World Bank, July 2013) 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/07/18273450/randomized-impact-evaluation-afghanistans-national-solidarity-programme> at 
at 5. 
119 Interview with Abdul Rahman Ayubi, above n 1. 
120 Interview with Abdul Rahman Ayubi, above n 1. 
121 Interviewee 1, above n 12. 
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and implementation of the Programme.122  Similarly, the very fact that the NSP was intended 
to be a national programme underlines its non-discriminatory nature, although national 
coverage was later compromised by extreme insecurity. 123  In order to reach out to the most 
vulnerable and marginalised communities, FPs also ensure they include people within 
communities who are victims of power disparities.124  
Although the NSP has reached more than 37,000 CDCs, it has failed to reach 15 percent of 
the country. This percentage makes up around 6,000 communities that were not provided 
with the first round of block grants which happened to be in “extreme insecure areas”.125 
This is attributed to the unpredictable security situation as the government was not able to 
reach areas which became extremely insecure in the two years following 2011.126 The NSP 
leadership is disappointed with not being able to reach out to every community as national 
rollout was one of the main objectives of the programme.127 Insecurity has rightly been 
termed as the biggest challenge to the programme and its mandate which has “undermined 
the equity objective and non-discriminatory nature” of the NSP to reach every community.128  
While the NSP may have reached as many communities as security permitted, it has not been 
able to adequately address needs of persons with disability. This is despite NSP’s 
Operational Manual requiring CDCs to ensure needs of persons with disabilities are reflected 
in the development of their community planning.129 Hardly any interviewees referred to such 
instances where physical, financial and social needs of persons with disabilities are reflected 
in the design of the NSP sub-projects. Efforts by some CDCs were seen to help not the person 
with a disability but their immediate family members. For example, CDCs try to include 
family members of the disabled persons so that “the family of the disabled persons can 
benefit financially from the wages given against labour”.130 Perhaps, the issue has also been 
compounded by the fact that the NSP has addressed collective community rights and not 
specifically rights of vulnerable populations such as persons with disabilities.  
3.1.5 Transparency and Accountability 
 
The fifth and last principle under the human rights-based approach is the requirement for 
transparency and accountability. The NSP has attached special importance to this principle 
and has introduced a number of checks and balances to ensure funds are spent in a transparent 
and accountable manner. These checks and balances are present at different levels of the 
                                                          
122 Interviewee 1, above n 12. 
123 Focus Group Discussion 2, above n 20. 
124 Interviewee 2 (the Author, Kabul, Afghanistan, 13 June 2015). 
125 Interview with Abdul Rahman Ayubi, above n 1. 
126 Interview with Abdul Rahman Ayubi, above n 1; Interview with Brigitta Bode, above n 4; Interview with Rasoul Rasouli, above n 1. 
127 Interview with Brigitta Bode, above n 4. 
128 Interview with Abdul Rahman Ayubi, above n 1; Interview with Brigitta Bode, above n 4. 
129 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Rural Development (MRRD), The Operational Manual VII, The 
National Solidarity Programme (2012) <http://www.nspafghanistan.org/default.aspx?sel=16>at 23. 
130 Focus Group Discussion 3, above n 22. 
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implementation of the Programme. A key issue is how these mechanisms work in the Afghan 
context.  
 
To begin with, the NSP has applied some of the standard accountability mechanisms, which 
are used in participatory development and decentralised governance around the world. For 
instance, funds are only withdrawn if all four signatories, including two women CDC 
members, complete the relevant forms. Once funds are withdrawn and implementation starts, 
there are signboards in different locations of each village which show how much has been 
received and spent and if the funds have been spent for the intended purpose.131 Such 
mechanisms enable communities to monitor financial documents, cash books and invoices 
during the project implementation, in an effort to hold at least the elected male CDC 
members accountable in a transparent manner.   
 
The above are not the only accountability mechanisms in place. The NSP also “tops up the 
accountability mechanism with Community Participatory Monitoring”132 (CPM) which is 
comprised of a team of non-elected members of a CDC to hold the elected members 
accountable.133 In addition, the NSP has grievance handling mechanisms where the 
Grievance Handling Unit (GHU) “registers any grievance from community members 
regardless of their receipt channels”.134 The NSP expects the issue to be resolved at the field 
level. However, in the event the issue could not be resolved by the NSP’s field offices, it is 
then referred to the GHU in order to analyse it further to find a possible solution, under the 
leadership of the Programme.135 Since the establishment of the GHU in 2009, it has received, 
reviewed and resolved 3,067 grievances.136 In addition to the fund flow mechanisms and the 
internal monitoring, the NSP also benefits from third party monitoring by the World Bank 
to monitor all the activities of the NSP.137 These different layers and forms are in place to 
make sure funds are not misused but rather spent in an accountable and transparent 
manner.138 These accountability measures in place have also been endorsed by the Office of 
the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), indicating that the 
“numerous oversight and internal controls by the rural communities, the government and the 
World Bank provide reasonable assurances that the NSP funds are used for the intended 
purposes”.139 
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While the majority of the interviewees suggested the different requirements for transparency 
and accountability are largely effective, the various forms can also create practical 
complications on the ground. For example, the NSP’s Operations Advisor was more critical 
of these forms which are difficult to understand and most require CDCs to “tick boxes”.140 
The Environmental Social Safeguards forms are a case in point. They are technical and 
difficult for NSP staff to understand, let alone members of CDCs.141 Since communities are 




The NSP is the development programme with the single biggest outreach across 
Afghanistan. It is a Programme that is known across the country and carries weight and 
importance among donors, government, communities and even acceptance among some of 
the Armed Opposition Groups, where security permits. According to numerous interviewees, 
the NSP has put in place CDCs which are now recognised as the gateway for development 
and governance activities. The CDCs have largely provided the platform for communities to 
be increasingly aware of their rights, have control over their own resources and enjoy basic 
rights.  
The qualitative interviews and Focus Group Discussions suggest the NSP promotes an 
inclusive approach, “emphasising” the need for empowerment with a voice for the most 
marginalised, non-discrimination and accountability.143 While the NSP is silent on whether 
the projects provided under the NSP are realised as rights, the NSP leadership believes that 
the NSP is largely consistent with the human rights based approach.144  I intend to test this 
view in Chapter Four. 
While the NSP leadership and staff argue that the NSP largely demands robust participation 
at different levels, women cannot meaningfully take part given the cultural, religious and 
social challenges. In fact, women cannot come out, in many communities, and are not 
allowed to socialise in the same way as men do. These are cultural considerations that the 
NSP does try to take into account, allowing for separate arrangements and meetings for 
women and men. While this may be appropriate for ordinary members of CDCs, according 
to a large number of interviewees, it is difficult for the elected female members to carry out 
their duties in an effective manner. Women have to be accompanied by a male family 
member, Mahram, while meeting another elected male member. Chapter Four will test if the 
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requirement for inclusive participation under the NSP is possible in the context of Afghan 
values and traditions.  
While women may take part in training and planning processes, according to the majority of 
interviewees, their role is symbolic and confined to their own meetings. Beyond those 
meetings, they cannot significantly influence the decision making process. Given their 
mobility restrictions, they cannot raise their voice and in the process, elected women lose 
effective control over resources and procurement. Some interviewees even suggested that 
the agendas are pushed and influenced by men. 
Nonetheless, the NSP has given women some recognition and a platform for some 
participation. Women are recognised in the executive body and they have been given two 
positions which can only be filled by women. This is a positive development in a country 
like Afghanistan as it has increased women’s representation, at least on paper. Such 
recognition was unimaginable in 2002, before and during the Taliban era. The NSP has, in 
some areas, allowed women to come out of their homes and take part in meetings in the 
community centres where only women meet. There, women may take part in prioritising 
their development needs. However, according to the majority of male and female 
interviewees, women are not the ones who make the final decisions. Men decide on projects 
which may be beneficial for women. 
The NSP has also allowed the capacity of both elected men and, to a lesser degree, elected 
women to be built in order to help implement their projects. According to the majority of the 
interviewees, the CDCs are versed in accounting, procurement, environmental social 
safeguard needs of the community, linkages with donors and other government stakeholders 
and community development work. While the NSP has largely empowered the elected, it has 
left behind the ordinary communities as it must have been too costly to empower everyone 
in the community. Perhaps, it would not have been realistic in any case, but building the 
capacity of the select few may also strengthen the monopoly of the existing traditional power 
brokers who had ended up in some CDCs.  
The NSP, at least on paper, has also addressed disability needs. While the design of the NSP 
does demand that disability needs be taken into account during the Community Development 
Plans (CDPs),145 according to the interviewees and my observations, the NSP projects have 
not observed disability needs on the ground. Infrastructure projects are not friendly to 
persons with disabilities and they do not have the necessary access and ramps. Equally, the 
NSP does not take into account needs of persons who have visual or hearing impairments or 
mental health issues. This, perhaps, along with female participation, is the biggest 
shortcoming of the NSP when it comes to its inclusivity. 
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The majority of interviewees said that the NSP has fared very well when it comes to 
accountability and transparency, at least in secure areas. Accountability has been factored 
into every step of the NSP’s procedures. It has been institutionalised from a grassroots level 
but also from the top down. Donors have had a heavy emphasis on aid effectiveness.  Many 
interviewees also said that the NSP has been successful in terms of introducing community 
participatory monitoring whereby community members assess the expenditure and the 
quality of the work. This has enabled community members to take stock of the work 
undertaken by the elected members. However, the heavy reliance of the NSP on form filling 
as an accountability tool in a country where 75 percent of the population may not be literate 
is somewhat problematic. In addition, holding CDCs accountable in some of the insecure 
areas has been difficult as the areas are beyond the control of the government although the 
NSP implementation continues.  
Insecurity may have obstructed the vision of the National Solidarity Programme in other 
ways too. As noted, according to the field work, insecurity has compromised the national 
coverage and the equitable objective of the programme. Insecurity has not allowed both men 
and women to come out and participate with the same degree of enthusiasm and vigour. 
Insecurity has not allowed staff to closely monitor the progress and quality of the project, 
raising concerns about transparency and accountability and the possibility of the so called 
‘ghost projects’ which only exist on paper. While the NSP has faced a number of challenges, 





The National Solidarity Programme: Is it implementing a human rights-based 
approach? 
This chapter draws on inputs from both interviewees and development literature to consider 
whether or not the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) follows a human rights-based 
approach (HRBA). In doing so, this chapter attempts to synthesise the field work with the 
literature. While the NSP has made important strides in embracing HRBA, it faces a number 
of challenges which interfere with smooth implementation. They include insecurity, elite 
capture, cultural traditions, politicisation of development aid, coordination among different 
stakeholders and financial sustainability of the NSP and the institutional sustainability of the 
Community Development Councils (CDCs). Each is studied below.  
It is pertinent to note that the literature on HRBA in post-conflict countries also mirrors the 
challenges faced in Afghanistan by confirming that “applying HRBA in a conflict 
environment brings new challenges and additional complexities”.1  
The “Citizens’ Charter” which is another step towards a fully-fledged human-rights-based 
approach is also considered. I conclude with an analysis of the compliance of the NSP with 
the five elements of HRBA.  
4.1 Challenges facing the implementation of the National Solidarity Programme 
  
4.1.1. Insecurity 
Growing insecurity challenges all aspects of the implementation of the NSP, in one way or 
another. This is true in both secure and insecure areas although working in insecure areas is 
a more significant challenge. To put things into perspective, for example, between 2003 and 
2008, security was much better and the [government] had dreams to reach and cover every 
community.2 However, with deteriorating security since 2008, it has been unpredictable and 
difficult to plan for the extension of the NSP to the remaining areas.3 The 15 percent of 
communities which have not been covered by the NSP are in “extremely insecure” areas. 
Unsurprisingly, insecurity has been termed as the single biggest challenge to the equitable 
nature of the NSP.4 
                                                          
1 United Kingdom Interagency Group on Rights Supported by ActionAid & CARE International, Rights-based approaches and  
Humanitarian Interventions in Conflict Situations: A Learning and Discussion Document (March 2009) 
<http://conflict.care2share.wikispaces.net/Rights+Based+Approach> at 14. 
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3 Interview with Abdul Rahman Ayubi, former Executive Director of the NSP (the Author, Kabul, 22 August 2015). 
4 Interview with Abdul Rahman Ayubi, above n 3; Interview with Brigitta Bode, above n 2.  
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While there are varying reports about the extent of insecurity, as much as 30 percent of 
Afghanistan is not accessible.5 As such, security remains a real barrier to effective 
implementation of development programmes across the country.6  Despite growing 
insecurity across the country and with the first quarter of 2015 being the most violent on 
record,7 the NSP has still been able to implement projects in 85 percent of the country which 
is either secure or partially secure. This is mainly due to the involvement of communities at 
the grassroots level. This, in fact, represents a major strength of the Programme as without 
communities’ support, implementation of the NSP would not have been possible in insecure 
areas. Where the government does not have access, CDCs and Arbabs frequently ensure safe 
passage to the staff of the Facilitating Partners (FPs) to continue project implementation on 
the ground.  
The fact that insecurity has not significantly affected implementation in 85 percent of the 
country is in stark contrast with other HRBA interventions in insecure environments, such 
as during the conflict with Maoists in Nepal in the 1990s where “participants were physically 
abused for acceptance of development projects or even initiating dialogue with NGOs”.8 The 
NSP has been branded as a community owned and not government owned programme. That 
is why, in Afghanistan, the Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs) have largely allowed NSP 
work to continue because of the community ownership in all the NSP projects. Insecurity 
has, however, challenged different aspects of implementation. For example, froom time to 
time, in secure areas, communities cannot come out or travel due to fighting and other 
inherent dangers. This also affects the frequency of the training. Communities may also lose 
track of the topics they were being trained on, before they are trained on the next. Insecurity, 
as a result, clearly compromises the quality of mobilisation, appropriate awareness about the 
NSP realising rights, and by extension, empowering communities who lack sufficient 
knowledge about the objectives of the NSP. 
The 85 percent coverage has been due to a change in strategy. For example, in partially 
insecure areas, the NSP can operate because of a watered down version of its Operational 
Manual, namely the High Risk Areas Strategy. According to the World Bank, when the NSP 
applies its High Risk Areas Strategy, it provides more flexibility in implementation by 
placing more reliance on community members for implementation.9 Also, the Strategy 
exercises flexibility by providing additional financial incentives known as insecurity 
                                                          
5 The World Bank Assessment of Strategic Issues and Recommendations for Future Directions Technical Assistance Paper National Solidarity 
Program (2015 <http://www-
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6 Report No: 54540-AF, The World Bank, Third Emergency National Solidarity Project (2010) The World Bank 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFGHANISTAN/Resources/Afghanistan-Reconstructional-Trust-Fund/342296-
1313436195294/P117103-National_Solidarity_III-EPP.pdf> at 2. 
7 Amnesty International, Afghanistan 2015/2016 < https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/afghanistan/report-afghanistan/>. 
8 United Kingdom Interagency Group on Rights, above n 1, at 56. 
9 The World Bank Report No: 84660-AF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund Project Appraisal Document Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust 
Fund (2014) < http://www.artf.af/images/uploads/PAD_for_CASA_CSP.pdf> at 7. 
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allowance, allowing for a lesser role for women and monitoring of the NSP projects by local 
communities.10  
Although the High Risk Areas Strategy is a good approach because it enables outreach to 
the most marginalised and insecure areas,11 it is difficult to maintain the same level of 
standards and quality as in more secure areas. For instance, it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to attract qualified staff to insecure areas, compelling the National Solidarity Programme 
and Facilitating Partners to rely on less qualified or unqualified staff to build capacity of 
communities and CDCs. Similarly, some CDCs in insecure areas, which already make up 
the 85 percent, are not able to attend training and, therefore, their understanding of the NSP 
is not accurate. As a result, in insecure areas, “communities and FPs only focus on 
infrastructure work and not capacity”.12 
While the effects of insecurity on other elements can be mitigated and at times tolerated, 
insecurity has been a big obstacle to transparency and accountability. Security remains 
volatile where the presence of Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs) can pose an immediate 
threat to communities, provincial government and staff of Facilitating Partners.13 Under such 
circumstances, access becomes a major obstacle, and Facilitating Partners then often resort 
to local recruitment. FPs have to rely on the authenticity of the project documents provided 
by local staff and CDCs. If the documents look credible, this may disguise any shortcoming 
or fraud on the ground where FPs cannot send their own staff. While local recruitment is a 
good solution to ease mobility restrictions in order to monitor the quality and progress of the 
projects, it could also lead to collusion between staff and members of CDCs over fabricating 
documents because physical verification of projects is not possible.  
Lack of physical verification in insecure areas has also fostered the development of ‘ghost 
projects’. These are projects which have existed on paper and for which disbursements have 
been made but the claimed projects do not exist on the ground. Since physical verification 
of the project is not possible, it is impossible for the NSP systems to substantiate if either the 
project or progress is fake or genuine. Although disbursements are made to these CDCs after 
submitting progress reports, these funds are in fact embezzled since there are no projects on 
the ground. Ghost projects are hardly reported on as they tend to emerge from extremely 
insecure areas although their existence is acknowledged by both donors and the Afghan 
government.14  
In insecure areas, lack of accessibility leads to fiduciary management challenges for the 
World Bank too.15 In order to address these concerns, Global Positioning System (GPS) was 
                                                          
10 At 7. 
11 At 7. 
12 Interviewee 8, above n 2. 
13 The World Bank, Report No: 54540-AF, above n 6, at 19.  
14 CNBC, Afghanistan is on the brink after the US invests $100 billion (03 February 2016) < http://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/03/afghanistan-is-on-
the-brink-after-us-invests-100-billion.html>.  
15 The World Bank, Report No: 54540-AF, above n 6, at 19. 
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introduced to provide coding and progress reports for all infrastructure projects. However, 
the carrying of such equipment is sensitive because it can also be used for intelligence 
gathering purposes. If the Taliban realise FPs’ staff carry GPS technology, they are arrested 
on the suspicion of spying and are exposed to grave risks.16  
4.1.2. Elite capture 
Some degree of elite capture is inevitable in rural community driven development projects 
as “elites embody moral, political and social authority”.17 Unsurprisingly, elite capture has 
been an obstacle towards meaningful, free and active participation in the NSP because 
powerful commanders, Arbabs and traditional power holders often make unilateral decisions 
or influence decision making processes.18 This is consistent with World Bank definitions of 
elite capture where “elites are actors who have disproportionate influence in the development 
process as a result of their superior, social, political or economic status”.19 Elite capture 
which results in inequitable distribution of resources has also been reported in literature on 
the NSP.20    
Generally speaking, Arbabs are present in large parts of Ghor province and some parts of 
the Northern provinces. Arbabs are like village chiefs. They are men. Normally, within a 
village, there is one Arbab who is the authorised person and when he makes a decision, there 
is no one to change it. Also, for some social issues, the only person who is authorised to 
make decisions is the Arbab. These powerful individuals run some CDCs and make non-
consultative and unilateral decisions on communities’ resources. For example, some elected 
CDC members, who are also Arbabs, announce their decisions to communities without 
previously engaging other CDC members.21  
These powerful individuals and Arbabs are fearful of communities’ engagement as they 
perceive community participation will counter their traditional dominance over village 
affairs. This is not unexpected in HRBA or in a patriarchal society where traditional leaders 
or strongmen are suspicious and paranoid of citizens’ engagement.22 Literature both on 
Afghanistan and other post-conflict countries suggests that elite capture undermines 
development because elite capture pushes corruption to the lower lines.23 Often these 
                                                          
16 The Asia Foundation, Insecurity, Remoteness pose steep challenges in surveying Afghanistan (November 18 2015) 
<http://asiafoundation.org/>.  
17 Ghazala Mansuri and Vijayendra Rao “Evaluating Community-Based and Community-Driven Development: A Critical Review of the 
Evidence” (September 2003) The World Bank < http://siteresources.worldbank.org/> at 31. 
18 Interviewee 10, above n 2. 
19 World Bank “CDD and Elite Capture: Reframing the Conversation” Social Development How to Series Vol 3 Washington DC (February 2008) 
The World Bank < http://www-wds.worldbank.org/> at 1.  
20 Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, A Study of Gender Equity through the National Solidarity Programme’s Community Development Councils 
(2012) <http://landwise.resourceequity.org/record/1873> at 37; The World Bank, Technical Assistance Paper National Solidarity Program, above 
n 5 at 11. 
21 Interviewee 10, above n 2. 
22 United Kingdom Interagency Group on Rights, above n 1, at 19.  
23 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) “Local Governance, peace building and state building in post-conflict settings” “(2010) The 
United Nations Capital Development Fund < http://www.uncdf.org/gfld/docs/post-conflict.pdf> at 20.   
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individuals who are in position of power also financially benefit from CDCs.24 Nonetheless, 
literature on elite capture in post conflict countries also shows that “elite capture does not 
eliminate all of benefits of community driven development”.25 Rather, elite capture does 
have the potential to greatly decrease the effectiveness of community driven development”.26 
While elite capture may not eliminate all benefits of community driven development,27  such 
treatment of communities and the marginalised segments is the complete opposite to the 
inclusive and participatory approach intended under the NSP Operational Manual and more 
broadly, under a genuine human rights-based approach to development.28 However, 
unilateral and non-consultative approaches from Arbabs and other tribal elders are not 
surprising given that the NSP has effectively challenged the old power structures which did 
not include communities in decision making. It also highlights the fact that changing the 
centuries old stranglehold of the traditional leaders will take time. It is not reasonable to 
expect a programme in its first decade to wholly transform traditional power structures into 
democratic ones.  
Arguably, the NSP has resulted in the diffusion of power and fragmentation of the elites. 
The fieldwork has shown that while cases concerning elite capture were reportedly confined 
to provinces with Arbabs, traditional leaders and warlords, the establishment of the CDCs 
has gradually reduced the power of traditional leaders in CDCs where community members 
have elected younger leaders of their choice.29 Also, field work showed that the design of 
the NSP has contributed towards mitigating elite capture by dividing power blocks at sub 
national governance with more than 37,000 CDCs that represent their respective 
communities. This is also consistent with literature on the NSP confirming that the creation 
of CDCs has resulted in diffusion of power across multiple actors.30 Although the level of 
elite capture may differ from CDC to CDC, they represent the alternative democratic power 
structure to ensure free, active and meaningful participation. This is a process which requires 
patience and time. 
 
                                                          
24 Global Centre for Public Service Excellence “Citizen Engagement in Public Service Delivery” (22 February 2016) The World Bank 
<http://blogs.worldbank.org/category/tags/elite-capture> at 13. 
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4.1.3. Cultural traditions 
Meaningful participation, as understood from the NSP and HRBA viewpoint, is also 
hindered by cultural traditions in the rural Afghan context. It is a taboo, for example, in 
majority of rural areas for women to step out from the confines of their homes and be seen 
by other men. In the vast majority of the country, it is unacceptable practice for women to 
mix with other men who are not their family members. This is even a bigger taboo.  
While this is not unusual compared to other traditional and tribal societies which are also 
characterised by tight control over women, it undermines the possibility of true 
participation.31 Such restrictions are not consistent with the principles of inclusive and 
meaningful participation as required both by the NSP and HRBA. Put more bluntly, free, 
active and meaningful participation is not congruent with Afghan values, which require 
purdah,32 or strict separation of sexes, in the rural context, at least. This is the reality in a 
conservative Afghan rural society where elected females may only talk to female members 
of CDCs. Also, in most cases, a male family member, or Mahram, of the elected female 
CDC member will relay the feedback to the male CDC members. More importantly, when 
the Community Development Plan (CDP) is prepared and when women have feedback or 
ideas, they are shared through a male family member, with no mechanism for follow up. 
Gender-segregated meetings also mean women are unlikely to directly interact with men 
about their issues or concerns and, as a result, women may not have ownership and agency 
of their development rights.  
While gender segregated meetings are not consistent with the HRBA requirements of 
inclusive participation, it is more consistent with the Afghan context which requires 
separation of the sexes. It is also noted that “gender segregation at the different stages of the 
NSP does not either lead to team building between women and men or improve gender 
relations”.33 Yet, when gender segregated participation is contextualised, it is probably a 
culturally sensitive and appropriate response to enable more women to come out and take 
some part in social life and development activities. Separate meetings do allow women to be 
part of the outcome, albeit with less chance of influencing the process. Put differently, some 
participation is arguably better than no participation.  
Often, the conservative traditions and  religious interpretation of Islamic Holy Scripture 
about women’s role in social and public life can be attributed to “a conflation of conservative 
and tribal traditions under a [cover] of Islamic argument”.34 There is a mistaken perception 
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among men that “women’s place is in homes”, according to the religion.35 However, “Islam 
does not oppose women working and studying, both of which are acceptable in Islam”.36 On 
the other hand, some conservative Afghan religious scholars had a negative view of the NSP 
although these scholars did not inquire further about their views to see if they were right or 
wrong.37 For example, some religious elements had “disparaging views about men who 
would allow their wives to leave their homes and participate in projects or pubic life”.38 
Conservative attitudes towards women in Afghan society, therefore, are based on the 
thoughts and interpretations of such individual scholars and community members.39  
Existing literature on human rights-based approach to development in a similar religious and 
cultural context suggests that one could learn from the practices in other countries where a 
more liberal and gender-based interpretation of the Quranic verses is undertaken by Muslim 
scholars, resulting in some public space for women.40 Literature on HRBA in a post conflict 
environment suggests that “Mullahs or religious scholars should be sensitised to women’s 
rights and gender issues so that they understand mentally and spiritually the rights of 
women”.41 Increased education of religious elements will also enable them to act as change 
agents where they can explain rights given to women within the Islamic Holy Scripture.42 
While literature on the NSP has indicated that the NSP has somehow improved some men’s 
openness to women’s participation in elections and local governance,43 educating the 
religious elements about the rights of women requires time and patience and should not be 
rushed. It would take at least another generation or so in a country like Afghanistan to begin 
effecting ‘attitudinal change’ towards the role and place of women in public life. Otherwise, 
it runs the risk of being counterproductive and stamped as Western. 
4.1.4. Politicisation of development funding 
A fourth key challenge is the politicisation of development funding. Whether one likes it or 
not, allocation of financial resources is inherently political and more so in a post conflict 
country with weak rule of law. It would be naïve to suggest otherwise or assume that millions 
of dollars that flow into a country are purely allocated on the basis of international goodwill. 
Funding is politicised and reflects, at least somewhat, donors’ individual and sometimes 
conflicting priorities. Afghanistan is no exception. 
While President Ghani’s government is intent on exercising control over funding allocated 
by the international community,44 international development funding has been highly 
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political in Afghanistan as different donors have had preferences for their funds. According 
to the former Executive Director of the NSP, many donor countries had their own priorities 
in Afghanistan, which were not in line with those of the NSP, creating a “big mess”.45 This 
is consistent with the literature, on the way foreign development funding has been used in 
Afghanistan, indicating that the “aid process was influenced by donors’ interests which made 
it difficult for Afghanistan to take [the] lead in pursuing its own priorities”.46 In fact, US 
government reports state that the United States always used “preference language” to 
designate specific areas they wished to support.47 Documents show the World Bank did 
“honour US preferences”.48 
Similarly, other donors had expressed preference to link their financial assistance to a 
province where they had military presence or their Provincial Reconstruction Teams were 
based.49 Such preference to link development assistance to a donor’s military presence 
continues to be the case after 13 years in the country. A recent example is the Italian 
government which has allocated € 120 million to infrastructure projects, the bulk of which 
will be used in Herat province where the Italians have stationed troops and military 
advisors.50 Similarly, the Netherlands is interested in allocating their funds to the North, 
particularly in the province of Kunduz where the Dutch had troops and now have military 
advisors.51  Thus, it is not entirely clear how the Afghan government intends to influence or 
control donors’ strategic priorities.  
Although the PRTs were abandoned in 2012, with the benefit of hindsight, it appears that it 
was not a wise way to deliver development assistance. Arguably, the PRTs were political 
and military entities which were tasked with buying quick legitimacy for the new 
government and its international partners. The PRTs blurred the line between mainstream 
development actors and military entities, putting NGO staff in great peril if they were 
perceived as PRT workers.52 Also, the PRTs did not have expertise in participatory rural 
development approaches. Often, the PRTs would provide briefcase loads of dollars to local 
NGOs that did not know much about development but were rather treating development 
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work as a business.53 The PRTs would distribute the funds among political and tribal elders 
who could buy them access and secure passage on the basis of war economy and armed 
deterrents compared to the mainstream NGOs who worked on the basis of community 
acceptance.54 Often these strong provincial actors were linked with the drug mafia, violations 
of human rights, warlords and militia commanders.55 Similarly, development work by the 
PRTs has not been cost effective. For example, a new school under the NSP cost six times 
less than the one built by USAID.56 In addition, PRTs had heavy overhead costs for military 
personnel which were added to the project costs.57 This made projects undertaken by PRTs 
significantly more expensive than those done under the auspices of the NSP.   
4.1.5. Coordination among donors and with government  
Donor coordination, or lack of it, has also been a big challenge. This has clearly been a 
frustration to the leadership of the National Solidarity Programme because of the amount 
spent by some donors in isolation of the NSP. Ayubi noted that the Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRTs) used funds in isolation from the rest of the programmes.58 A significant 
portion of the international development assistance was channelled directly through the 
PRTs, effectively bypassing the Ministry of Finance.59 The NSP has, with a budget of under 
three billion US dollars for 12 years,60 provided medium term development assistance to 85 
percent of the country while the PRTs have spent their funds in a way that may not have 
addressed basic needs of even 15 percent population.61 Literature on PRTs in Afghanistan 
also suggests that PRTs’ work was “duplicative of other projects” conducted by other 
agencies.62 Given the seriousness of the situation, President Ghani’s first task following his 
elections in 2014 was to track and coordinate international assistance.63 Even though the 
PRTs are no longer in place, donor coordination continues to be a problem. The current 
government is intent on ensuring donor funding is aligned with the deliverables under the 
National Priority Programmes, including the forthcoming Citizens’ Charter.64 
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Arguably, the PRTs and the NSP had different objectives. The PRTs often reinforced 
counterinsurgency outcomes rather than contributing to the long term development 
objectives of the country.65 According to President Karzai, the PRTs served as the “parallel 
governing structures”, undermining Afghan government and its capacity”.66 The significant 
funding that was channelled through the PRTs did not contribute to the NSP’s strategic 
objectives. For example, the PRTs did not use the CDCs but traditional leadership which had 
connections within tribal structures. Certainly, the impact of the NSP could have been bigger 
if the PRTs had contributed more to the development objectives of the government.67 
Despite President Ghani’s good intentions, there remains deep frustration on the ground, 
resulting from lack of donor coordination. The leadership of the NSP has been very critical 
of the fact that donors would claim in every conference that they would do more work in a 
more coordinated manner but failed to do so in practice.68 One principal explanation could 
be that the PRTs preferred to link development assistance to secure passage or communities 
rising against the Taliban. This is also consistent with literature on politicisation of 
development assistance which admits that “development aid may essentially have political 
goals”.69 Such literature also suggests that “aid policies have integrated national security and 
broader foreign policy priorities”.70  
4.1.6. Financial sustainability of the National Solidarity Programme  
From 2003 to 2007, over 17,000 CDCs received funding under the First Phase of the NSP 
whereas around 6,000 new CDCs received additional funding from 2007 to 2011 during the 
second phase.71 Between 2011 and 2013, 13,500 new CDCs were funded to complete the 85 
percent rollout. Also, during Phase Three, around 11,500 CDC received a second round of 
block grant.72 In other words, out of the 36,500 CDCs that have been funded in the Third 
Phase under the NSP, only 11,500 CDCs have received a second round of funding.  
Since the Afghan government is primarily relying on international donors, the long-term 
financial sustainability of the NSP is a very real concern. Currently, the NSP stands as the 
second largest development programme in the world, with external financing of around $ 
2.5 billion over 12 years.73 As discussed in Chapter Two, since 2003, all of Afghanistan’s 
development financing comes from the international community. This total reliance on 
external funding poses significant questions as to the financial sustainability of the NSP. 
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Despite its natural resources, Afghanistan remains a poor state and cannot afford the costs 
of the NSP. Realisation of rights not only takes long time but also requires committed and 
long term funding, which the government simply does not have. Therefore, it was 
unsurprising when Ayubi stated “Afghanistan is not ready to promise all human rights to its 
citizens”.74  
Already, there have been concerns about the cost effectiveness of the NSP.75 One third of 
the funds for the NSP have come from the United States.76  While the US government has 
suggested it will ask Congress to keep financial assistance to Afghanistan in 2017 “at or 
near” what it has provided in the last decade,77 a change in administration after the 2016 US 
elections may also mean a change in priorities. Also, the current levels of funding for service 
delivery under the NSP are not affordable.78 Similarly, NSP’s reliance on the Facilitating 
Partners and its use of management structure which is made up of contracted staff, who are 
not absorbed into the government systems, are also seen as costly.79 In the last four years, 
NSP’s average budget has been around $300 million per annum.80 Of the total costs, 73 
percent goes to communities, 21 percent goes to the Facilitating Partners for facilitation, 
access and capacity building while 6 percent of the total goes to NSP management costs.81 
These represent substantial figures. Lack of availability of funds, therefore, raises serious 
questions about the long-term affordability and continuity of the Programme in its current 
shape and form. As such, sustainability entails maintaining financial support by continuing 
to invest in the CDCs as a platform for delivery of basic rights.82 The Citizens’ Charter is 
already proposing to change this.  
4.1.7. Sustainability of Community Development Councils 
In the context of the NSP, sustainability is defined as the ability of CDCs to continue their 
activities once the Facilitating Partners withdraw.83 While the NSP has largely achieved 
having functional CDCs, literature shows that CDCs have become donor driven and “the 
institutional relevance of CDCs fades substantially following project completion”.84 A 
similar concern had been raised before the start of the Third Phase. For example, external 
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evaluations showed that “CDCs wither away due to [lack of] project funding”.85 Where 
CDCs do not get additional financial assistance, they will not be interested in having re-
elections in the absence of future funding. When re-elections do not take place at the end of 
each CDC’s tenure, CDCs lose their democratic mandate and may only remain on paper. 
Unsurprisingly, sustainability of CDCs had been identified as a main challenge and is not 
unlike other community driven development programmes.86  
Sustainability of CDCs also depends on the legal status of the CDCs. Once CDCs are 
recognised as legal entities at the village level, they can attract funding from other sector 
Ministries.87 This seemed not to be initially working as “inter-ministerial rivalry did not 
allow all Ministries to embrace CDCs as the gateway for development and governance 
activities”.88 Although it took until 2013, the government finally approved a regulation 
making it binding on all sector Ministries to use the CDCs as the only gateway for 
development and governance activities.89 This regulation enlarges CDCs’ mandate “to 
encompass broader socio-economic development” at the community level.90 Despite this, 
key sector Ministries are unaware of or reluctant to abide by the regulation due to lack of 
political will or insufficient awareness about the role of CDCs.91 If the government’s 
intention is to channel all development and governance related activities at the village level 
through CDCs, it will need to clearly legislate the role of CDCs. In fact, the government 
intends to change the CDCs into Village Councils that will be used as a mechanism for sector 
Ministries to plan and manage service delivery at the village level.92 Village Councils are 
proposed to be recognised as “the whole of the government institutions” with strong linkages 
between Village Councils and sector Ministries.93 The Citizens’ Charter, which is discussed 
separately below, seems to embark on this route so that the legal sustainability of the CDCs 
will be safeguarded, making it compulsory for all sector Ministries to channel their projects 
through the CDCs in a coherent manner.   
 
The above discussed challenges pose formidable barriers to the implementation of a fully-
fledged human rights-based approach (HRBA) in a post conflict country. In particular, it 
must be considered whether these challenges fundamentally undermine the human rights 
based approach to development. While it is clear from the earlier discussion that the NSP 
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has had the hallmarks of the human rights-based approach, the following pages study the 
extent of application of each principle of the HRBA in the NSP.  
 
4.2 Application of the human rights-based approach in the National Solidarity 
Programme 
As established in Chapter One, a human rights-based approach to development comprises 
five key elements. These are: recognition of rights, meaningful participation, empowerment, 
non-discrimination, and transparency and accountability of both the processes and of duty 
bearers. Particular attention, under the HRBA, is given to the principles both equity, equality 
with marginalised population, including women, minorities and persons with disability 
receiving particular attention.94 This section reviews compliance of the NSP with the five 
key elements of the HRBA in light of the field work, the literature and the challenges just 
discussed.  
4.2.1. Does the NSP realise rights? 
The NSP provides a financial entitlement to each household under the Programme. With the 
funds, collectively, the communities can access water, education, health facilities and 
temporary employment. While the government does not recognise delivery of these rights as 
its legal obligation, the NSP does improve practical access of villagers to these basic rights.95 
NSP’s Impact Evaluation has confirmed that the Programme has improved access to clean 
drinking water, electricity, education, and health care.96 Similarly, the NSP has created 49 
million labour days through implementation of sub projects between 2003 and 2013.97  
While it is true to state that the NSP has realised rights on the ground, the Programme does 
not mention realising rights under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). It is also important to note that the NSP has not been able to 
provide regular financial assistance to the majority of the CDCs. In most cases, the NSP has 
only provided a one-off amount of $33,000 over the course of 10 years to each CDC.98 In 
other words, the government did not plan for the majority of the communities to receive a 
second round of financial assistance. Although the irregular and one-off financial assistance 
has represented a missed opportunity to reinforce and consolidate NSP’s work,99 it is 
consistent with the concept of progressive realisation as explained under Chapter One. In 
any case, the current level of funding to CDCs, which comes from the international 
community, is not financially sustainable.100 While it is understandable that the government 
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cannot afford the current level of funding to CDCs, a reduced amount of more frequent 
financial assistance to households at the CDC level will maintain realisation of rights.101  
The NSP has realised collective rights and has failed to address individual rights which is 
the basis of the HRBA. Given the design of the NSP, it is also difficult to justify that the 
NSP has realised rights for everyone because the fixed amount of $200 per household is 
provided regardless of poverty levels or the composition of a household, e.g. if there are 
persons with disability or the number of children in a given household.102 As such, the basis 
for the calculation for the financial assistance needs to be revised to make it more equitable 
and inclusive. Similarly, while the financial entitlement realises community rights, women’s 
preferences are normally not observed. Literature on the NSP also indicates that women are 
accorded “low status compared to men”,103  and that there is low awareness that the NSP 
also “provides a legally sanctioned platform from which women can become involved and 
benefit from the development process”.104  
4.2.2. Do participation levels meet HRBA standards?  
Before assessing whether the level of participation is consistent with HRBA, it is important 
to note that the idea of participation is very new in Afghanistan. Rural Afghans never had 
the opportunity to participate in elections at the village level before the introduction of the 
National Solidarity Programme (NSP) in 2003. It was only in 2004 that communities were 
gradually introduced to the idea of participating in elections at the village level to elect male 
and female representatives. Rural Afghans, who make up around 70 percent of the 
population,105 had never before been a part of the decision making process to influence their 
own development priorities. The NSP has revolutionised the idea of participation by 
allowing both men and women not only to elect their representatives but also to participate 
in planning, implementing, monitoring and holding the elected accountable. These are 
important developments towards participation, and by any standard, the NSP has taken major 
strides in creating space and resources for communities in a post conflict country that 
continues to be plagued by insurgency and fighting. NSP’s Impact Evaluation also confirms 
that the Programme has increased participation106 while also improving female participation 
in local governance where more women take part in the decision making process.107  
While acknowledging all the positive work done so far, participation within the NSP is not 
without challenges. Meaningful participation also means inclusive participation where both 
men and women can participate in setting their development priorities. However, despite the 
                                                          
101 At 22. 
102 At 12. 
103 Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, above n 20, at 61. 
104 At 45 and 61.  
105 Report No: 80177-AF The World Bank, Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund Project Appraisal Document (March 25, 2014) Afghanistan 
Reconstruction Trust Fund <http://www.artf.af/images/uploads/PAD_for_KMDP.pdf> at 19.   
106 Beath, Christia, Enikolopov, above n 30, at 57 and 63. 
107 Beath, Christia, Enikolopov, above n 30, at xi. 
91 
 
best intentions of the NSP, the fieldwork showed that men usually choose the projects while 
women are secondary and incidental beneficiaries of the projects. Where women are 
“passive recipients, this does not lead to improved gender equity” because women are not 
included in the development and decision making processes.108 While men are free to attend 
most trainings and make implementation-related visits, women have extensive mobility 
restrictions due to culture and security reasons to travel outside their homes and villages. As 
such, challenges relating to mobility and security do not allow women to meaningfully 
participate,109 and as a result, women’s voices are largely not heard in the process.110 
The involvement of elected women sometimes appears to be mostly symbolic. In insecure 
areas, this is even worse. There, men push more for their agendas and the elected female 
CDC members have either little voice or no voice as male family members may express their 
views on behalf of the elected female CDC members. Literature on women’s involvement 
in the NSP, even in secure areas, indicates that “there are no mechanisms to ensure women’s 
voices are heard by the elected male members of CDCs”.111 While the two allocated seats 
for women may have good effects despite cultural constraints,112 meaningful engagement 
and voice for women in the decision making process, in the rural context, is still a distant 
reality and is likely to take some time. 
During the field work, I also came across different perceptions of meaningful participation. 
As discussed in Chapter One, development literature requires inclusive participation113 
which is active, free and meaningful.114 Participation within the NSP is comprehensive in 
the sense that CDC members talk about their rights, take part in discussions where decisions 
are made about projects, and are continuously involved in the process by ensuring 
development projects are implemented for the intended purpose. This is consistent with 
HRBA’s notion that people need to critically engage on issues affecting them and have a say 
in the decision making process.115 However, as noted in Chapter Three and despite progress 
made, there remains some real challenges around the ongoing influence of the elite and 
traditional leadership.116  
Inclusive participation also necessitates a meaningful opportunity for participation of 
marginalised and vulnerable persons, including persons with disability. Such an opportunity 
implies that persons with disability can participate in all spheres of society on an equal basis 
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with their non-disabled peers”.117 There were few examples from the field where persons 
with disability could be said were meaningfully participating in their CDCs. There was one 
person who with disability finding his way to the elected body of the CDC. By and large, the 
field work indicated that, in general, there is no significant participation of persons with 
disabilities in the work of CDCs. Their needs are not reflected in the planning stage either.  
Unsurprisingly, a vast majority of the NSP infrastructure work is not disability friendly and 
schools, clinics and roads do not have facilities for disabled persons. This is contrary to the 
NSP’s Operational Manual which does require disability needs to be taken into account and 
Afghanistan’s commitments under the Convention on the rights of persons with disability.118 
Literature on the HRBA shows that not incorporating disability needs can be problematic 
because often persons with disabilities face discrimination and their needs are rarely taken 
into account.119 As a result, persons with disability face economic, social and even political 
exclusion.120 Literature from elsewhere also shows that mainstreaming disability into 
development is a complex process both in the North but more so in the South because of the 
multiplicity of actors on the ground where practical decisions have to be made.121 One major 
challenge with disability needs in HRBA is that it “effectively draws all human beings into 
mainstream discourse, including the most vulnerable groups such as persons with 
disabilities”.122 This appears to be the case with the NSP which has embraced the concept of 
formal equality – as discussed below. 
4.2.3. Does the National Solidarity Programme empower the Community 
Development Councils? 
The NSP delivers 12 training programmes to CDCs as part of its empowerment package to 
build communities’ capacity in a number of areas, including procurement, implementation, 
social audit, linkages with markets, donors and knowing the NSP, among others. These 
programmes have helped communities to know their rights and are used to build capacity of 
other community members on procurement, implementation, planning and social audit. 
Arguably, without communities knowing their basic rights, the process of empowerment 
cannot start.  
Yet, the government has an understandable limitation, in that it cannot build the capacity of 
each and every community member. Instead, it has opted to build the capacity of the elected 
CDC members along with other sub-committee members under the CDCs. This will remain 
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the case under the proposed Citizens’ Charter where “capacity building of members of the 
Village Councils and select few community members” will take place.123 While this is not 
consistent with HRBA, this seems to be a fair outcome as long as the wider community is 
aware of the programme, its objectives and their roles in different stages of its 
implementation and monitoring. This way, the knowledge and experience will not stay 
confined to a select few, as CDC members who receive training can pass it on to others.  
It is pertinent to mention that the vast majority of community members have either low or 
no literacy. Elected CDC members continue to fill out NSP forms incorrectly, resulting in 
delays and frustration. Yet, largely speaking, communities have tried to adapt. The NSP has 
also simplified its forms over the years. Younger CDC members have better literacy levels, 
meaning that capacity has not only been created but improved.  CDCs are, therefore, better 
able to plan and implement their projects and carry out community participatory monitoring. 
As such, the NSP has empowered communities to select and manage their own projects 
through a bottom up approach.124 More importantly, there have been encouraging signs 
where CDCs have demonstrated their ability to attract and absorb additional funding outside 
the auspices of the NSP.125 The drive behind identifying additional funding has largely 
emanated from a sense of improved awareness about their rights which needs funding. In 
this sense, CDCs have been empowered as they can act without waiting for the government 
or other development actors. 
The communities’ ability to exercise control over the financial resources has also contributed 
towards their empowerment. Except instances involving Arbabs and challenges facing 
meaningful inclusion of women, the NSP has largely given communities the power to spend 
their block grants to fund their selected development priorities, as agreed by the 
communities.126 This is another unique aspect of the NSP because never before in the history 
of Afghanistan, have communities had direct control over resources allocated to their 
development priorities. This control is not symbolic but real and transformative. This control 
has given immense confidence to communities that “they have been trusted to do this”.127 In 
no other projects currently implemented in Afghanistan, do communities have a bank 
account where funds are disbursed to their accounts and they have their own signatories. 
These are all tangible and potent signs of empowering communities and CDCs by giving 
them control over financial resources.  
In secure areas, communities largely make their own decisions as intended by the NSP and 
largely in accordance with the HRBA. Communities also have both the mechanisms and 
ability to ask questions from the elected CDCs about how and where the funds have been 
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spent. However, while communities can ask questions from their elected representatives, 
they have not been able to “stand up for their rights and [tell] their leaders they are tired of 
them having all the development projects in their side of the village”.128 If we go by this 
standard, surely the NSP has not been able to empower community members, even men, to 
stand up against the traditional power holders. Yet, it is important to remember the Afghan 
context and remain patient– the country is still struggling to overcome decades of civil strife, 
ongoing insurgency, male-dominated society and little respect for the rule of law.  
Patience has worked too. The NSP has progressively empowered communities when one 
compares the earlier phases of NSP with NSP Three. Under the First Phase, communities 
hardly knew about the concept of elections and re-elections. Communities had an 
opportunity at the end of Phases One and Two to assess the performance of the elected CDCs 
and decide whether they wanted to continue with the same membership or bring change to 
the CDC leadership. The NSP can positively influence local governance by empowering a 
more responsible leadership.129 This is unprecedented as the NSP has been very 
transformative because communities know re-election can be used as an opportunity to hold 
the elected accountable. During the re-election campaigns, communities have been able to 
put difficult questions to their elected leaders, at least in secure areas. Where CDCs have 
performed well, the NSP has tremendously contributed towards a more localised, 
accountable, democratic and empowered leadership, much to the chagrin and annoyance of 
the traditional leadership.130 
4.2.3.1. The Arbabs and traditional leaders on the way of community empowerment 
As discussed above, power structures in rural Afghanistan are still very traditional and 
dominated by Arbabs, traditional power brokers and warlords. Expecting communities to 
stand up against such powerful persons would be raising the bar too much and expecting 
standards that would be normal in democracies but not in a post-conflict country with very 
weak governance structures. Similarly, expecting communities to speak against the Arbabs 
and other traditional leadership can undermine their security because often the Arbabs and 
the traditional leaders have power, armed supporters and resources.  
These traditional leadership structures continue posing very real challenges to 
empowerment. Arbabs, the powerful and warlords have a stranglehold over the affairs of 
some CDCs. This is not new as Arbabs and other undemocratic but traditional leaders have 
ruled these villages for centuries. While CDCs have taken a substantial chunk of powers and 
responsibilities away from the traditional leaders and Arbabs, these traditional power 
structures do continue making unilateral decisions because they see involvement of 
communities as undermining their power. Thus, patience and improved community 
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education will be key in gradually challenging the traditional power structures to continue 
the journey towards full community empowerment. 
4.2.3.2. Female empowerment 
Empowerment is not an easy task in a post-conflict and insecure environment not to mention 
an extraordinary conservative country such as Afghanistan. This is very true in the context 
of Afghan women who are already marginalised. Unlike men who exercise full control over 
the allocated resources, both the qualitative data and literature on women’s involvement in 
the NSP illustrate that “full autonomy is not enjoyed by female elected members of the CDCs 
because women were not in control of funds”.131 Nonetheless, allowing women to be 
represented at the highest level of CDCs is at least a symbolic empowerment, which has 
resulted in gradually changing attitudes towards women’s role in local governance.132 
Studies also suggest that the NSP has increased female intra-village mobility and has 
provided women with a forum to socialise more to discuss their health, education and family 
issues.133 As such, the NSP has set in motion an important but slow change when it comes 
to female participation in local governance and decision making processes.134 Yet, in light 
of the qualitative data and slow progress on women’s participation, it would take much more 
time for women to be meaningfully involved in decision-making processes. 
4.2.4. Does the National Solidarity Programme adhere to the principle of non-
discrimination? 
At the outset, it is pertinent to note that the NSP is the first programme in the history of the 
country that has reached almost every community. Never before in the history of 
Afghanistan, have Afghan citizens benefited from the kind of basic rights the NSP has 
provided. The NSP intended to have a national rollout and coverage. However, as noted 
above, extreme insecurity has meant 15 percent of the communities, which are the hardest 
to reach,135 have not benefited from the NSP. This has undermined the national rollout, as 
almost 6,000 communities have not received their basic rights under the NSP. Extreme 
insecurity has therefore further penalised the most vulnerable communities. Nevertheless, 
the 85 percent coverage of the CDC has helped establish government presence and deliver 
development in many remote and insecure areas.136 The NSP allows each household, 
irrespective of origin, language or belief, to be part of a CDC and benefit from the block 
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grant. Thus, the non-discriminatory and unbiased nature of the programme is a positive 
element of the design of the NSP.  
If non-discrimination is understood as making sure all households benefit, the NSP largely 
achieves this standard. For example, the Operational Manual states that the “core objectives 
necessitate complete social inclusion for the vulnerable communities”.137 On the ground, one 
of the strengths of the NSP is making sure all the households within a given community 
benefit from the NSP. The NSP not only ensures they are included but it also ensures the 
development needs of the minorities, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), returnees are also 
taken into account and that these segments are adequately represented within the CDC.138  
However, the NSP only targets communities and provides them with their rights at a 
collective level. It does not address individual rights. This represents a problem in the design 
of the NSP. Since individuals have different needs for the same rights, the NSP also does not 
take this into account. In other words, the NSP takes a formal equality approach and not a 
substantive equality approach. Under the formal equality model, both women and men are 
regarded as the same without taking into account their biological and gender differences.139 
Everyone has access to the same level of opportunities. On the other hand, under the 
substantive equality model, the focus is on equality of outcome, equal access and equal 
benefits for both men and women, including persons with disabilities.140 As discussed above, 
the NSP has produced attitudinal change towards local governance. Women and other 
marginalised groups who were not part of the decision making processes on development 
matters are actively taking part now. This is in line with the requirements of “transformative” 
equality where social norms and entrenched causes of discrimination are addressed.141 
Transformative equality is taken well beyond substantive equality as real empowerment is 
achieved through changing power relations.142 While the NSP aspires to focus on 
transformative equality by changing behaviours and perceptions about participation and 
empowerment, in practice, the NSP has only applied a formal equality model.  
While having aspirations for transformative model, there are various reasons for adopting a 
formal equality model. The country still does not have an accurate and up-to-date census 
which has not been possible because of ongoing insecurity.143 The electronic Identity Card 
Project has failed to start and continues to face delays due to political challenges.144 In 
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absence of accurate data, the government has not been able to plan and assist with the 
realisation of rights for individuals and instead has seemed content with the provision of 
rights at the collective level. While the provision of rights at the community level can be 
contextualised and understood, the community approach leaves space for individual 
discrimination because it does not take into account the unique and separate needs of 
individuals such as women and persons with disabilities. As discussed above, financial 
constraints faced by the government can be another plausible explanation.  
Lastly, if non-discrimination is seen from the point of view of persons with disability, the 
NSP also meets this test on paper. The Operation Manual is very specific about it. For 
example, it requires CDCs “to ensure needs of minorities and persons with disabilities are 
included”,145 “equity of distribution of benefits among communities ensured” and the 
proposed projects have “community wide approval”.146 However, on the ground, 
consultations with persons of disabilities is hardly happening. Almost all the NSP projects 
seen and visited are not disability friendly and none has facilities for the disabled. As a result, 
and despite the insistence of the Operational Manual, the NSP projects are designed without 
disability needs being taken into account.  
4.2.5. Does the National Solidarity Programme promote transparency and 
accountability? 
Transparency and accountability are key elements of the NSP’s design and implementation 
mechanisms. These mechanisms are not only present on paper but also in practice, helping 
to ensure CDCs’ funds are spent according to their own plans. As discussed in Chapter Three, 
CDCs are required to fill out numerous forms which facilitate and ensure transparent and 
accountable implementation. While these forms normally serve as additional layers on 
transparency and accountability, the text heavy forms are difficult for some community 
members with no or lower literacy levels. 
In secure areas, the CDCs have robust transparency and accountability mechanisms in place. 
To begin with, funds are disbursed only if all four signatories (two male and two female) 
have signed. Once funds are released and implementation begins, the Community 
Participatory Monitoring (CPM) team keeps an eye on the funds which have been withdrawn 
and checks where and how the funds have been utilised. The CPM team visits project sites 
too although such visits are normally conducted by male members given the mobility 
restrictions for women. If the CPM team raises concerns, there can be wider community 
support in making sure projects are implemented in a transparent manner and funds are used 
for the intended purpose.  
Since the NSP is a community-led development programme, community members can also 
carry out a social audit which allows them to look at the entire “block grant against approved 
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projects and against actual expenditures” and see “if the procurement has been done in 
accordance with the NSP regulations”.147 CDCs are required to install whiteboards which 
are displayed to the public in an area accessible to all.148 The community whiteboards are 
very simple, yet effective, tools for keeping track of funds and expenditure rates. 
Communities can also look at even minor details such as cashbook, invoices, dates and those 
who carried out the procurement. However, as noted in Chapter Three, this may not happen 
in CDCs which are dominated by Arbabs. The social audit, community participatory 
monitoring and community boards are effective ways to ensure communities are aware of 
the funds and how and where they have been spent. Thus, the NSP mechanisms are intended 
to ensure communities can keep the elected CDC members honest, the process transparent 
and promote accountability at the CDC level.  Such improvements are also consistent with 
reviews of the NSP indicating there is “evidence of an impact on bottom-up 
accountability”.149 
The community-led mechanisms are appealing and effective because community elders also 
try to intervene and resolve matters amicably and without resorting to other means and often 
this is effective. For example, interviewees suggested that elders can proactively help in 
retrieving lost funds by convincing CDC members to bring back embezzled funds, if needed. 
Elders also try to be the messengers by warning CDC members that if they do not return the 
funds, their projects risk suspension from the NSP. Where community-led mechanisms do 
not work, and given the weak rule of law, not much can be done about it. Therefore, it is in 
the best interest of the communities to resolve any pending issues internally so that their 
future instalments are released in a timely manner to avoid implementation or seasonal 
delays and financial resources are not wasted or misplaced.  
While CDC members do not receive any salary and work voluntarily, a degree of 
administration costs are covered under each project. These are reimbursed by the NSP. 
Nonetheless, it seems there may be cases where the CDC members tamper with the price of 
materials required for their projects and use some of the funds for their logistical and 
administrative needs as they have to travel from their villages to their districts and most often 
to the provincial centres.150 This requires lodging and transportation costs and the costs 
covered by the NSP may not be sufficient. As a result, some CDC members may charge their 
expenses,151 both legitimate and illegitimate ones, against the CDC’s project costs, without 
declaring so. This also opens up room for collusion between CDCs’ elected members and 
suppliers where the additional administrative costs are built in the project’s costs without 
being reflected in the final sum.  
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Although the level of understanding among male members of the CDCs about transparency 
and accountability was good, the level of understanding about transparency among the 
female members of CDCs was perceived as low and weak. For instance, women said “they 
are sure the money is spent in a transparent way”152 without knowing what mechanisms were 
there to support transparency. Plausible explanations can be presented. For instance, women 
have severe mobility restrictions which do not allow them to leave their homes and villages. 
Also, the Afghan culture and values in the rural context do not encourage female 
participation in public life. Moreover, gender disparity remains high in Afghanistan where 
45 percent men are literate compared to only 18 percent literate adult women.153 Improved 
literacy levels will help women respond better to accountability and transparency needs of 
the Programme.  
The NSP has made important strides to realise basic rights in line with requirements of 
HRBA. As discussed above, the NSP largely meets the requirements of a human rights-based 
approach, bar formal recognition of the rights as a legal obligation and the extent of 
participation of women and persons with disabilities.  The irony, however, is that realisation 
of rights is a process. It neither happens overnight nor as a result of a one off financial 
assistance. Rather, realisation of rights, specially economic, social and cultural rights, 
happens progressively, with individual and collective steps, with the maximum of the 
available resources and over a period of time. The NSP seems to have positively contributed 
to this process. Yet, a more sustained effort is needed to consistently provide for core set of 
basic rights which requires long term commitment. The Government has, therefore, proposed 
the Citizens’ Charter which illustrates its obligation of conduct, as discussed in Chapter One. 
It will need to be seen, nonetheless, if the Afghan government’s conduct leads it to its 
obligation of result and realises core set of rights to the population, fully in line with other 
principles of HRBA. 
4.3 Is the Citizens’ Charter embracing a fully-fledged human-rights-based 
approach? 
In September 2015, the Afghan government announced that it intends to “restore security, 
achieve fiscal sustainability, support economic growth and create jobs”.154 One major 
initiative to restore economic growth was the announcement of the Citizens’ Charter.155 
Although there is not (yet) a standard document, it is expected to “guarantee a minimum set 
of core services [rights] to all citizens, using CDCs as the vehicle for service delivery”.156 
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The Charter, which represents an ambitious plan from the government,157 proposes to cover 
30 percent of each of the 34 provinces in the country during its First Phase from 2017 to 
2020.158 Through the Citizens’ Charter, the Afghan government has promised to “ensure 
citizens’ rights to development”159 and “help poor communities get minimum services”160 
that any state should provide to its citizens to lead a dignified life.161 This is the first time the 
government invokes the “right to development” language in practice. The Charter will also 
improve the “state-citizen” relationship and build confidence in the government’s capacity 
to respond to communities’ basic rights.162 
Ayubi’s earlier prediction that the Citizens’ Charter will build on the NSP work seems to be 
accurate because the government intends the Citizens’ Charter to be “a compact between the 
government and its citizens”.163 Although the government intends to provide water, 
education, health facilities and jobs under the Citizens’ Charter, interestingly, the 
government is not using the word “right”. Instead, it has opted for “services”. Once the 
Citizens’ Charter comes into effect in 2017, these services will be provided not by one 
Ministry but through a coordinated approach among all sector Ministries.164 The 
government’s avoidance of the word “rights” is not entirely unsurprising. It is consistent 
with the Afghan government’s reporting to the United Nations on its implementation of 
human rights. There, for example, the Afghan delegation has interchangeably referred to 
ESCR in its universal periodic reporting to the United Nations as “rights” and “services”.165 
While the failure to use the language of “rights” is disappointing, the wording still represents 
a paradigm step forward from the previous administration which did not accept even the 
provision of these so called core services as the development rights of the Afghan citizens. 
Already, due to financial constraints, the government has confirmed it will only cover 30 
percent of the country under Phase One of the Citizens’ Charter.166 Although this incremental 
and only partial coverage of population under the Citizens’ Charter raises concerns in terms 
of principle of non-discrimination under the HRBA, it is arguably consistent with the concept 
of progressive realisation, as discussed in Chapter One.167 Understandably, the reference to 
resources’ availability does challenge realising everyone’s rights at once.168 If a progressive 
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approach is to be taken, the focus, therefore, should be on the most vulnerable and 
marginalised population.  
In its effort to progressively realise the rights of the population, the Citizens’ Charter should 
take a number of points into account. For instance, the Citizens’ Charter can ensure a bottom 
up approach where not only communities but district and provincial authorities have an 
opportunity to take part in consultations leading to the design of the Charter. While there is 
a degree of de-centralisation among CDCs in terms of resources, the decision on resource 
allocation is made at the national, or even at the international level. Provincial authorities 
may not have a big say in it either. District authorities have even a lesser stake while the 
communities who are the participants in the projects have no role in the resource allocations. 
These areas need to be taken into account under the design of the Citizens’ Charter. 
Otherwise, the communities, district and provincial level stakeholders will become 
disengaged participants. 
The Citizens’ Charter also provides an opportunity to solidify the role of the Community 
Development Councils as the only gateway for development and governance activities at the 
village level, further contributing to the sustainability of the CDCs. Since the Charter will 
represent a whole of the government approach, it will also ensure smoother coordination 
among other stakeholders for using the CDCs as the delivery mechanism for development 
rights. Yet, it is also important not to overburden CDCs with too many activities. Building 
CDCs’ capacity in a more coherent manner will be key to enable CDCs to take on increased 
workload. In order to take increased workload, the Citizens’ Charter will also need to draw 
more effectively on all the possible human resources within each community and allow for 
a more inclusive and meaningful role for women and other marginalised segments of the 
communities.  
Lastly, the NSP has resulted in the creation of democratic entities at the village level. While 
this is a positive development as it decentralises power and involves communities agreeing 
on their own priorities, only functional CDCs that mobilise themselves, hold elections and 
implement their projects will not be productive. It is imperative to create economic 
opportunities around CDCs. That is why the Citizens’ Charter is expected to go beyond 
functional and democratically elected CDCs and create economic opportunities at the village 
level.  
4.4 Conclusion  
The qualitative interviews and the literature on the NSP clearly indicate that the NSP has 
improved access to basic rights and also contributed positively towards awareness of people 
about their rights. It has increased participation levels (particularly for men), provided at 
least symbolic recognition of women as equal partners to their male counterparts,  and led to 
the empowerment of largely men but to a lesser degree women, as well as transparency and 
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accountability at the village level. While the NSP is consistent with the principles of HRBA, 
the extent of compliance with each element is debatable and needs contextualisation.  
Empowerment cannot take place without communities not knowing about their rights. 
Knowing about their rights depends on effective and accurate awareness about the objectives 
of the NSP. While men perceive the NSP as realising rights, women’s awareness has been 
limited by lack of mobility and inability to participate in training and capacity-building 
activities. Irrespective of communities’ understanding, on the ground, the NSP has realised 
their rights to water, education, health and short term employment. On paper, the NSP also 
recognises communities’ entitlement to financial grants with which their rights are 
subsequently realised. However, while the government accepts communities have a right to 
financial grants, the government is not willing to accept the rights realised under the NSP as 
a legal obligation. Lack of formal recognition of citizens’ rights to economic, social and 
cultural rights is also inconsistent with the Afghan government’s ratification of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
The NSP does require participation from both men and women. In most areas, men 
participate actively and freely in all stages of the NSP and are part of the decision making 
process from the beginning till the end. Aside from those CDCs dominated by Arbabs in the 
Northern provinces, male members of CDCs can lead planning sessions and take part in 
procurement. Men also play an important role in monitoring projects. As such, male 
participation is robust and largely consistent with the requirements of both the NSP and 
HRBA.  
There has been some progress with female participation in decision making process, 
although arguably this has been largely symbolic. The NSP has symbolically empowered 
women by adopting an egalitarian approach of having two male and two female elected 
persons at the helm of each CDC. This, in itself, represents an important recognition of 
women’s role in the decision making process. There are even some brighter examples where 
a few liberal and educated women, by risking their lives, have bravely represented their 
CDCs.169 In a conservative country like Afghanistan, even a symbolic role has benefits as it 
has countered the traditional dominance of male elites over local governance and this can be 
seen as a positive development. Nevertheless, the reality is that women’s participation is 
severely curtailed by local culture, tradition and taboos. Effectively, face to face interaction 
between men and women is not viable in most communities. Instead, gender segregated 
meetings becomes the routine. This creates its own set of challenges and constraints for 
women to meaningfully participate and improve their awareness and understanding about 
the Programme and, by extension, about their rights, responsibilities and expectations from 
the government.  
                                                          
169 Interviewee 3, above n 2. 
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Gender segregated meetings have ostensible limitations as it does not allow a direct and face 
to face discussion between men and women. It does not allow women to put their questions 
and queries to their male counterparts. Arguably, it disadvantages women. On the other hand, 
gender segregated meetings do at least enable female Social Organisers to provide an 
important bridge between men and women when they discuss their respective development 
priorities before, during and after implementation. Although separate meetings and 
arrangements do not meet the requirements under HRBA to allow for free, active and 
ultimately meaningful participation, separate meetings are arguably culturally acceptable. 
Separate meetings are an example of an evolving solution to include women at least in some 
way in the development process on the ground.  
While the NSP includes minorities and other marginalised groups, it does not meet 
participation levels for persons with disability. The challenge is in implementation because 
the NSP Operational Manual clearly requires inputs from persons with disability. Arguably, 
this becomes the Facilitating Partners’ responsibility to ensure such inclusion. Either because 
of time constraints or logistical challenges, inputs from persons with disability are mostly 
not included. As a result, persons with disabilities have not had their rights realised under 
the NSP. Critically speaking, the NSP focuses on rights of community as a whole. It sees the 
community as largely homogenous. This is problematic because within the community there 
are different persons with different needs.  
In secure areas, arguably, the NSP has positively contributed to the empowerment of CDCs. 
CDCs have been able to largely make their decisions in a transparent and accountable 
manner. Communities also ask the elected male members about how and where the funds 
have been used. In some secure areas, although the traditional structures have been replaced 
by democratically elected CDCs, the traditional leaders and Arbabs continue to exercise 
some control over village affairs. Arbabs and other traditional leaders typically make 
unilateral decisions as they perceive community involvement as a threat. The NSP, 
nonetheless, has incrementally challenged the traditional leadership structures in the last few 
years, thereby gradually reducing their influence and positively contributing to a localised 
and democratic leadership.170  
In some insecure areas, implementation of the NSP has been able to go ahead because 
communities have negotiated access with the Armed Opposition Groups. This is one of the 
main strengths of the NSP as without the communities’ negotiated access, it would have 
been impossible for NGOs to access the insecure areas and provide basic rights. Yet, 
realisation of basic rights in an insecure environment comes at a cost. Facilitating Partners’ 
staff and even CDCs’ elected officials have been kidnapped and killed.171 It is hard to 
imagine that empowerment can take place in an environment filled with threats to lives and 
                                                          
170 Beath, Christia, Enikolopov, above n 30, at 5 and 22. 
171 Pajhwok News Agency, 6 NSP workers killed, MRRD slams incident (August 2013) < http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2013/08/27/6-nsp-




livelihoods. Communities are also reluctant to come out for training programmes in a hostile 
and insecure environment and, therefore, much of the so called “training” is done by way of 
a false recording of attendances of the participants. Not much empowerment has taken place 
in insecure areas where the primary focus has been on delivery of infrastructure.  
The NSP covers 85 percent of the country in geographic terms and ensures inclusion of 
households of all backgrounds within each community, including minorities and Internally 
Displaced Persons. Despite the NSP’s inclusive approach, covering all members within a 
household that has different needs has proven to be challenging for women and particularly 
for persons with disabilities. This is because the NSP looks at the household as a whole and 
provides a financial grant per household irrespective of its makeup. This is problematic for 
persons with disabilities, women within a household or any unusual household who may 
have different needs. While the NSP can claim it has covered the communities in a given 
locality, the final projects are intended for the collective use of the community, and not 
strictly adhering to the needs of these marginalised groups. As such, the NSP does not 
sufficiently meet the non-discrimination criteria of the human rights-based approach, 
including specific needs of women and persons with disabilities.  
One area where the NSP has a demonstrable strength is accountability and transparency of 
both the disbursed funds to the CDCs and transparency of the processes. There is a genuine 
presence of accountability mechanisms at the community level which contribute to 
transparency of the processes. However, a distinction has to be drawn in terms of 
accountability and transparency between secure and insecure areas. In secure areas, once 
funds are disbursed, communities can keep a regular and real eye on all the steps, starting 
with planning, prioritising, procurement and implementation. Community notice boards are 
available in each CDC where each step of the project is reflected, capturing details on 
budgets and progress of work. The Community Participatory Monitoring and Social Audits 
are very effective tools to ensure the funds have been spent for the intended purpose. Where 
this is the not case, grievances can be raised and are dealt with at the appropriate levels, 
leading to the Grievance Handling Unit, sitting under the Executive Director for the NSP in 
Kabul. The NSP has introduced a culture of bottom up accountability which was unheard of 
before its inception in 2004. As such, in secure areas, the NSP largely meets the HRBA 
criteria of accountability and transparency.  
In insecure areas, accountability and transparency face grave and very real challenges. For 
instance, it is difficult or impossible to access and monitor ongoing projects in insecure areas. 
There have been reported instances of ghost projects which exist on paper but not on the 
ground. The NSP has checks and balances in place. For instance, it would not disburse the 
next instalment unless it is satisfied with the completion rate for the earlier instalment. 
However, if CDCs’ reporting from a given insecure project is credible and does not raise 
suspicion, there are no possibilities of identification and verification of ghost projects. They 
have to be identified and then investigated, something which is further complicated by lack 
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of access and ongoing security issues. In these circumstances, it is understandable why the 
NSP did not cover the remaining 15 percent of the country which had been classified as 
extremely insecure.  
In insecure areas, community members, and more so women, cannot come out due to 
fighting or threat of outbreak of fighting to take part in all steps of their NSP projects. Just 
like a secure CDC, where tribal elders or Arbabs lead CDCs, they make unilateral decisions 
without involving communities. Because of insecurity, community boards are not elected 
and, therefore, details on budget and progress of projects are not captured. All of this makes 
it very difficult for the community members to keep track of their projects, which may create 
room for abuse. While community ownership still ensures NSP projects are implemented in 
insecure areas, and funds are spent as per plans, insecurity poses grave practical challenges 
to monitor the progress and quality of work. Given the magnitude and level of increasing 
insecurity, accountability and transparency are constantly challenged. In light of the 
aforementioned reasons, the NSP does not meet accountability and transparency criteria in 
insecure areas.  
Implementation of the NSP has been tested by various challenges including insecurity, elite 
capture, traditional values and politicisation of aid. While the list of the challenges is long, 
and understandably so in a post-conflict country like Afghanistan, financial sustainability of 
the NSP and the institutional sustainability of the CDCs remain potent challenges. Both are 
inherently linked. Although the NSP has been assisting with the realisation of basic rights 
such as water, schooling, health and short term employment, there have been ongoing 
concerns about its fiscal sustainability. The Citizens’ Charter is expected to face similar 
challenges.  
For the CDCs to remain functional, in addition to having re-elections at the end of their three 
year period, it is imperative to create economic opportunities around them. This way, it is 
more likely to bring a positive change in the lives of the communities. Access to basic rights 
and creation of economic opportunities are also likely to lead towards a more dignified life 
for communities. Economic opportunities around CDCs will also make CDCs less dependent 
on international development assistance – hence contributing to the sustainability of Village 






The aim of this thesis was to consider whether the National Solidarity Programme in 
Afghanistan reflects a genuine human rights-based approach to development. The thesis set 
out the generally accepted principles of the human rights-based approach to development. 
These principles are recognition of rights, participation, empowerment, non-discrimination 
and accountability and transparency.  
I started this research by attempting to capture the human rights framework in Afghanistan. 
In doing so, I carried out field work and then assessed the application, or extent therein, of 
the principles of the human rights-based approach in the National Solidarity Programme. 
 I also undertook a literature review to capture the relationship between human rights and 
development. Although human rights include economic, social, cultural, civil and political 
rights, my focus has been on economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) as ESCR have 
provided an important foundation for the human rights-based approach to development. 
Similarly, ESCR have also brought tangible benefits to poor people and contributed to the 
realisation of human dignity. 
While noting that human rights remains a contested concept, I discovered that human rights 
are based on the notion that each human possesses rights by virtue of being a human being. 
Development is also increasingly recognised as a human right in and of itself because 
without development human beings will not be able to have a dignified life. Both concepts 
are inherently linked and interdependent as without development, there are no rights and 
without realisation of rights, development cannot take place. Yet, tensions exist between 
different thinkers. For example, opponents of ESCR term these rights as state 
interventionism and social manifesto while proponents of ESCR contend these rights are 
essential for a dignified life. These divisions reflect not only the political climate in which 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) were drafted but also ongoing 
ideological differences. Since the Vienna Conference in 1993, opponents of ESCR have 
gradually relaxed their position although there remains a divide between CPR and ESCR.  
ICESCR was adopted in 1966 and is now widely ratified at the international level, including 
by Afghanistan. In order for human beings to have a dignified life with basic rights to water, 
education, health, employment and housing, it is imperative states respect, protect and fulfil 
these rights, as enshrined in the Covenant. However, universal realisation of the ICESCR on 
the ground is far from the vision of its drafters. Lack of financial resources, inequitable 
development and conflict are key challenges. Also, progressive realisation of human rights 
is more difficult in developing countries because these countries heavily rely on international 
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development assistance. Afghanistan is one of those countries where sustainable and regular 
provision of basic rights is not possible without international financial assistance.  
While donors have been generous to Afghanistan, the funding has often come with strings 
attached. Donor funding has largely been dictated by their own strategic priorities and 
preferences have been given to the provinces where donors’ soldiers have served. Yet, some 
funding has benefited almost everyone in the country apart from extremely insecure areas. 
Given the almost countrywide coverage of the National Solidarity Programme, donors’ 
preferences have not substantially affected the NSP although improved coordination would 
have resulted in more frequent funding for all communities. Despite the NSP typically 
resulting in only one time financial assistance to the majority of the communities in a space 
of ten years, it has brought unprecedented change to Afghanistan on a scale not seen before.   
Donors expect their funding to be utilised in a way that meets inclusive participation and is 
impact driven. In response, the Government of Afghanistan ensured the design of the NSP 
incorporated key elements comprising inclusive participation, empowerment of 
communities, non-discrimination against marginalised and vulnerable communities and 
transparency and accountability. The NSP has focused on structural issues to address long 
term development needs. The establishment of the Community Development Councils 
(CDCs) at the village level is a foundation that will serve as a sustainable service delivery 
mechanism for development work.  
Since September 2014, the new Afghan government has shown stronger resolve to its 
obligations vis-à-vis the Afghan population by introducing the Citizens’ Charter, and 
thereby, recognising its responsibility to progressively provide a package of so called core 
“services”. In 2017, the Citizens’ Charter will replace the National Solidarity Programme, 
and other National Priority Programmes intended to achieve Afghanistan’s Sustainable 
Development Goals. The recognition of development rights under the Citizens’ Charter is 
unprecedented and is a very bold step. However, the Afghan government continues to be 
critically dependent on international financial assistance to realise its vision of an 
Afghanistan where each community has access to basic rights.  
Despite the financial limitations, the NSP has largely allowed communities to have access 
to basic rights, albeit with only intermittent financial assistance from the government. In 
secure areas, the NSP has largely allowed male community members to meaningfully 
participate in decision making processes, empowered them to take charge of their own 
future, decrease their reliance on development assistance and helped them to adhere to 
principles of non-discrimination to ensure all households benefit from their rights without 
any overt discrimination and bias. The NSP has also assisted with accountability, promoting 
a dialogue where community members can hold the elected accountable. The NSP is 
consistent with some principles of the HRBA in secure areas. On the other hand, there are 
some aspects that are not fully consistent with the HRBA’s principles. In this respect, some 
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of the major findings from the research are presented below in an effort to help the next 
phases of the Citizens’ Charter to adopt a fully-fledged HRBA.  
5.1. Major findings 
 
A major shortcoming of the NSP, according to the human rights-based approach, is that it 
does not recognise the human rights to water, health, education, employment and housing as 
a legal obligation. Yet, the NSP has reached communities in 85 percent of the country for 
the first time and has realised basic rights of millions.  
 
The rights provided under the NSP also come under the mandate of other Ministries which 
have their own National Priority Programmes. This creates a degree of duplication, crossover 
of mandates, rivalries and at times confusion about who is responsible for the delivery. 
Nonetheless, the National Priority Programmes under other Ministries do not have national 
coverage and therefore, the CDCs under the NSP have become the vehicle of choice for 
realisation of these rights.  
 
While the NSP realises rights of a majority of the population to water, health, education and 
employment, the NSP has only provided one round of financial assistance to Afghan 
communities. Therefore, NSP’s financial assistance has been too infrequent, unpredictable 
and the amount insufficient for the period for which the NSP has been running. Once CDCs 
exhaust their initial block grants, there is a lot of uncertainty about the next round of financial 
assistance, if any. As a result, realisation of rights is not happening progressively and 
sustainably. 
 
Additionally, neither communities nor provincial and district authorities were consulted 
during the design phase of the NSP. Rather, the NSP was designed by external community 
development experts. In other words, the design of the NSP involved a top down approach. 
If communities were to participate in the design and planning of the NSP, it would have 
resulted in improved ownership of the Programme. In the absence of involving communities 
in the design of the NSP, it seems the top down approach has also affected communities’ 
understanding of the NSP, its objectives and their rights under the Programme. 
 
Women who are elected as female representatives of the Community Development Councils 
often cannot have direct meetings with their male counterparts. Equally, these elected 
women cannot travel without a male family companion who is known as Mahram. The 
Mahram who is unelected often fully represents the elected women without having the 
democratic or electoral mandate. Mahram, therefore, undermines the representativeness and 
mandate of the elected women. The inability of women to participate fully in the work of 
CDCs is fatal in terms of assessing the NSP as reflecting a HRBA. However, when viewed 
through the lens of traditional Afghan society, although appearing as small steps to Western 
eyes, great gains have been made in involving women in development. Perhaps it is the case 
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that the inclusivity of the HRBA is overly-optimistic in traditional societies, or needs to be 
implemented in a way that is meaningful to local communities. 
 
At the community level, meaningful and inclusive participation for unelected women, as 
envisaged by the HRBA, is not feasible. In the Afghan context, it is not culturally appropriate 
to have face to face interactions between male and female community members. Women 
cannot influence their choice of projects while men act paternalistically by choosing a project 
that they see as good for everyone. NSP’s gender segregated approach is arguably an 
appropriate mechanism to have women on board at least partially instead of leaving them 
out altogether. Such an approach at least ensures some participation of women in 
development discussions than leaving them out. 
  
Although the NSP has been the second largest development programme in the world, and by 
far the largest in Afghanistan, the coverage, budget and length of the programme bring their 
own challenges. The funding for the NSP has come entirely from the international 
community, and mainly from the United States. With global financial uncertainty increasing 
and major global emergencies emerging elsewhere, the current level of funding is neither 
affordable nor sustainable. As a result, the financial sustainability of the NSP, and now the 
Citizens’ Charter, remains a very real challenge to the realisation of what the government 
refers to as core services. 
 
CDCs have become project and donor driven. This has affected the institutional 
sustainability of the CDCs. The frequency of financial assistance to the CDCs has also 
negatively contributed to the institutional sustainability of CDCs. When projects are 
finished, CDCs’ institutional sustainability tends to fade away because communities are not 
interested in having elections or re-elections without anything more substantive. As a result, 
if CDCs do not get additional funding or some basic maintenance costs, the investment of 
the last ten years may be under threat.  
 
Accountability and transparency are two of the NSP’s ostensible strengths, resulting in 
increased recognition and funding from the international community for the NSP. Rigorous 
accountability and transparency procedures have also resulted in social accountability of the 
elected members of CDCs. As a result, there is confidence among Afghan communities 
about the projects under the NSP and the value of funding under the Programme.  
 
Although implementation of the NSP has continued in insecure areas, insecurity has 
challenged each and every aspect of the NSP, in one way or another. Insecurity does not 
allow normal participation in mobilisation, elections, community development planning, 
implementation and monitoring of projects. The focus in insecure areas stays on delivery of 






5.2.  Recommendations 
 
The following recommendations are developed in view of the research and findings. These 
recommendations suggest ways to help the Afghan government and its donors embrace a 
more contextual human rights based approach under the Citizens’ Charter.  
 
5.2.1 Recommendations for the design of future phases of the Citizens’ Charter 
 
The design of the Citizens’ Charter needs a more consultative approach at the national and 
provincial levels, allowing Community Development Councils, Provincial and District 
Governors to provide their inputs. Successful implementation demands inclusive design of 
a Programme where community needs are not only assessed and understood from the 
government’s point of view but fully consulted with community members. Communities are 
not, and should not be, seen as simply recipients of development aid. Rather, they should be 
seen as active project participants. This will not only generate interest from the local 
stakeholders to participate but also promote ownership and help sustain efforts from the 
community in the subsequent implementation of the programme. 
 
While the tradition of Mahram needs to be preserved to respect the longstanding local values, 
Mahrams should only be used for traveling purposes and not undermine the mandate 
conferred on the female elected members. Mahrams should not be allowed to deliberate on 
behalf of the elected women. While Mahrams should continue accompanying elected female 
women to ease mobility restrictions, however, they should not represent them.  
 
Needs of persons with disabilities should be better integrated and practically observed. 
Approval of projects should be made conditional upon inclusion of disability needs. Also, a 
monitoring system needs to be in place to ensure that the disability needs, which have been 
incorporated as part of the community development planning, are implemented. A checklist 
along with a focal point for disability should be introduced at each CDC level.  
 
5.2.2 Recommendation on the future role of the Community Development Councils 
under the Citizens’ Charter 
 
CDCs, at least in secure areas, carry out their governance functions by mobilising 
themselves, undertaking elections, meeting to discuss their development priorities and 
responding to community concerns and queries on progress and quality of work. In other 
words, in secure areas, the NSP has contributed positively to the establishment of functional 
CDCs. Nonetheless, this is not sufficient for effecting a meaningful and sustainable change 
in the lives of community members. Instead, economic opportunities should be created 






5.2.3 Recommendation to donors 
 
Inclusive, active and free participation of women faces formidable cultural challenges in 
Afghanistan. Although female participation has improved since the beginning of the NSP, 
and recognising the fact that female participation needs to further improve, donors should 
not rush inclusive participation. Instead, donors can encourage, as part of its programming, 
a more contextual and locally sensitive approach as some requirements of the HRBA are not 
easily applicable to conservative and post conflict societies.  
 
Given the number of donors in Afghanistan, improved harmonisation among them is 
necessary to avoid duplication and wastage of resources. Donors also need to have more 
coherent country strategies for Afghanistan to ensure development assistance is consistent 
not only with each other but in line with the priorities of the Afghan government. Donor 
country strategies for Afghanistan should specifically contribute towards the Afghanistan 
National Development Strategy, and the overall development framework. This way, both the 
Afghan government and the international community can jointly work towards progressive 
realisation of rights with the available resources.  
 
Lastly, development funds should not be provided on the basis of political agendas. Rather, 
funds should be allocated to respond to the collective development needs, in an equitable 
manner. When funds are equitably allocated to all the provinces in Afghanistan, this can help 
the Citizens’ Charter become more aligned with the human rights-based approach. By the 
same token, the level of donor funding should not be influenced by the presence of their 
troops or military advisors in a given province.  
 
5.3.  Conclusion 
Over the last four decades, Afghanistan has seen persistent conflict and civil strife. In the 
process, the country has lost its ability to deliver basic rights to its population. Since 2001, 
although Afghanistan has forged partnerships with the international community to advance 
its shared vision of regional and international peace and stability, the country has shown an 
intolerable level of dependence on donor funding. Donor fatigue and dwindling international 
aid could derail the country’s vision of providing basic rights to its population, which can 
further undermine the government’s legitimacy. Therefore, it is imperative Afghanistan 
becomes fiscally more independent to gradually fund the so called core services [which can 
be regarded as rights] for its population. This will also help improve the government’s image 
among Afghans for taking responsibility for the citizens’ rights. The Citizens’ Charter, which 
will focus on new areas including improved farming technology, road to market and 
renewable rural energy, has the potential to create economic growth at the rural level, seems 
to be a first step in that direction.  
Although the communities were not involved in the design phase of the Programme, the NSP 
has embraced a bottom up approach in implementation by involving communities in making 
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their own decisions about their own resources and development priorities. In secure areas, 
communities are increasingly aware of their rights and the state’s obligations towards them. 
Elections and re-elections have empowered ordinary members to elect their representatives 
for the Community Development Councils (CDCs). The CDCs have been entrusted with 
financial and leadership responsibilities that entail transparency and accountability 
measures. As a result, CDCs’ capacity has been built and communities have been 
empowered.  
In view of the above, my research indicates that the NSP observes some of the hallmarks of 
the HRBA, except for the formal recognition of rights and participation of women and 
persons with disabilities. The extent of application of other principle such as participation, 
empowerment, non-discrimination and transparency “varies according to the level of” 
insecurity, capacity levels and conservative traditions. Also, inclusivity of the HRBA is 
rather ambitious in countries with insecurity and conservative traditions. Perhaps, in these 
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7.2. Annex Two 
 
Base questions for the field work 
 
The following presents the base questions. Presentation of the questions to each interviewee 
depended on their role, seniority and at times, capacity.  For example, while the more 
theoretical and conceptual questions were put to the Senior Government officials and staff 
of Facilitating Partners, the questions were simplified and put in more easy to understand 
language to community members and some of the junior staff in the field.  
 
a. Please briefly introduce yourself and your role with the National Solidarity 
Proramme (NSP).  
b. How do you see NSP projects? 
c. Do you see project participants as beneficiaries or rights holders? Please explain.  
d. How do communities see the projects under the NSP? As aid or as their 
entitlements? 
e. How are project participants involved in the funds and subsequent project 
implementation? 
f. Do project participants participate in the decision making process that affect their lives? 
Please give examples and explain.  
g. Do women, marginalised and vulnerable groups also take part in the decision 
making process? If yes, please state how.  
h. Where there are separate meetings, do you think these separate meetings can give 
a meaningful participation opportunity for women? 
i. Do you think the money is spent in an accountable and transparent manner? If yes, please 
explain how by giving specific examples, if possible.  
j. Do you monitor your projects to ensure they are consistent with human rights principles? 
k. Are there are any donor requirements on integrating human rights based approach 
in development work? Do you think the design of the NSP is consistent with human rights 
principles? Do you think donors have preference when it comes to allocation of funds for 
development needs? Does this represent a problem?1 
l. What are some of the practical challenges in relation to integrating human rights-based 
approach in development work? 






                                                          





7.3. Annex Three 
 
List of interviewees 
 
a. Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), The National 
Solidarity Programme (NSP) – Kabul based staff 
 
1. Former Executive Director – Mr Abdul Rahman Ayubi 
2. Acting Executive Director – Mr Rasul Rasuli 
3. NSP Programming and Policy Advisor – Brigitta Bode 
4. NSP Senior Operations’ Advisor – Jovitta Thomas 
 
b. Other Kabul based interviews 
 
5. Interviewee 1 
6. Interviewee 2 
7. Interviewee 4 
8. Interviewee 8 
9. Interviewee 12 
 
c. Badakhshan province 
 
10. Community Development Council – KISHM – Focus Group Discussion (FGD) 
11. Community Development Council – ARGO District FGD 2 
12. Community Development Council – ARGO District FGD 3 
13. Interviewee 3 
14. Interviewee 5 
15. Interviewee 7 
 
d. Samangan province 
 
16. Interviewee 9 
 
e. Ghor province 
 
17. Interviewee 8 
18. Interviewee 10 
19. Community Development Council (CDC) Shahrak District FGD 4 






















7.5. Annex Five 
   
List of Human Rights treaties Afghanistan has ratified 
Number Name of Treaty Signature Ratification 
1 
International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 1969 1983 
2 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 1976 1983 
3 
International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 1976 1983 
4 
Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women 1981 1983 
5 
Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment  1987 1987 
6 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1990 1994 
7 
Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities 2008 2012 
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